Monday, January 18, 2010

Devising a College Football Playoff System

It seems like after every college football season a number of fans lament about the fact that at least one team was not properly afforded the opportunity to participate for the National Championship. This lament frequently results in the desire for some form of playoff system bolstered by the citation that almost all other sports at both the collegiate and professional level have playoff systems, thus it is only rational that the most popular college sport have one as well. However, most individuals enjoy the comfort of their opinion to have a playoff without bothering to think about how to establish one and more importantly how to neutralize the obstacles that would prevent the adoption of a playoff system.

The first step in addressing the playoff issue is to avoid putting the cart before the horse, not designing a playoff system before understanding how that design will eliminate the problems in the transition between a single BCS Championship game to a playoff system. The largest problem in transitioning between systems is also the element that is rarely addressed in-depth, the level of money involved for the schools and the conferences due to their participation in the bowl system. Currently there are 34 bowl games (5 BCS level games and 29 non-BCS level games) with 2 games (the Yankee Bowl and the Dallas Football Classic) to be established in the next two years. The total payout distributed to college universities from these bowls games amounted to approximately 148.16 million dollars in 2008 with an additional possible 6 million from the two potential aforementioned future bowls.1 A playoff system would have to recoup some if not all of that money depending on how the future playoff system was designed with respect to the bowls.

However, the money involved in the bowl season is not as clear-cut as most people believe. Universities only receive a small fraction of the money that is awarded for a specific bowl appearance, not the millions of dollars a bowl reportedly awards a team. The reason for this is that all of the universities affiliated with a specific conference pool all of the awarded bowl money and then distribute it based on the given formula for the particular conference (revenue sharing among teams). For example most conferences take all of the money awarded to each of their affiliated teams playing a bowl game and create a single payment fund. From that fund, based on a pre-determined rules established by the conference, each team participating in a bowl game receives an expense account determined largely by which bowl the team is attending. Once all expense account money is distributed to bowl participants, the remaining money is distributed to each team affiliated with the conference as prescribed by the conference. Typically this distribution is equal between all teams regardless of whether or not they are participating in a bowl game.

Rather than use real conference information because it varies from conference to conference, the following example should suffice as a clear descriptor of the above distribution process. Suppose generic conference A has 10 teams and 5 go to bowl games. The conference champion team A goes to bowl game A which pays out 17 million dollars, but is not the National Title game; the conference runner up team B goes to bowl game B which pays out 3.5 million dollars; the next two teams, team C and team D, go to bowl games that pay out 1.5 million each and team E goes to a bowl game that pays out 750,000 dollars. All of that money is accumulated in a 24.25 million dollar pot. Then based on the bowls each team is attending money is distributed for expense accounts. Conference rules typically generate of fixed amount based on the range of bowl payout similar to the one below:

- If a team goes to a bowl with a payout/receipts of 1.4 million dollars or less the team will receive a 650,000 dollar expense allowance;

- If a team goes to a bowl with a payout/receipts between 1.4 million and 2.5 million dollars the team will receive a 1 million dollar expense allowance;

- If a team goes to a bowl with a payout/receipts between 2.5 million and 4 million dollars the team will receive a 1.5 million dollar expense allowance;

- If a team goes to a bowl with a payout/receipts greater than 4 million dollars the team will receive a 2.25 million dollar expense allowance;

- If a team goes to the National Championship Game the team will receive a 2.3 million dollar expense allowance;

Note that there are also additional funds awarded for an expense account based on a dollar per mile ratio ($250 per mile that needs to be traveled to reach the bowl location). However, in the above example these dollar per mile ratios will not be explicitly included.

Thus under such rules Team A would receive an expense account of 2.25 million dollars, Team B receives 1.5 million dollars; Teams C and D receive 1 million and Team D receives 650,000 dollars. After subtracting those amounts from the total pool of awarded money, the conference then divides the remaining money among all of the teams (note that some conferences keep a share of the money for general conference business). So assuming that Conference A does not keep a share, the money received by each institution due to the bowl payouts are:

Team A – 4.035 million dollars;
Team B – 3.285 million dollars;
Team C – 2.785 million dollars;
Team D – 2.785 million dollars;
Team E – 2.435 million dollars;
Team F – 1.785 million dollars;
Team G – 1.785 million dollars;
Team H – 1.785 million dollars;
Team I – 1.785 million dollars;
Team J – 1.785 million dollars;

The payout for Team A is a far cry from the 17 million dollars that was awarded by the bowl to the conference. Also someone might argue that most of the lower bowls only payout 1 million or less thus most of the money made from the bowl season goes to the power teams even in this distribution scheme which seeks to maintain a standing of ‘the rich get richer and poor get poorer’. However, such a mindset is not accurate. The team payouts in the above example are only the gross payouts, not the net payouts. Remember Teams A – E still have to attend their bowl and attending bowls cost money.

A large part of the money spent by universities traveling to bowl games involves transporting the team, the band (300-500 people right there), cheerleaders, important boosters and other individuals. These expenses can run high enough that some teams participating in the lower payout bowls (≤ 1,000,000 dollars) have a significant probability of actually losing money by attending a bowl because their expense accounts are low due to the caliber of bowl they qualified for. The second whammy when it comes to going ‘bowling’ is that universities have to meet certain, predetermined by the bowl, ticket requirements. Basically the university has to buy x amount of tickets and then the university turns around and sells those tickets to fans. Any tickets they do not sell they have to ‘eat’ the costs of from their own expense account. Typically tickets are sold ‘at cost’ from the university to fans, so there is no real probability for profit for the university from ticket sales. Of course there are also voluntary expenses like various forms of entertainment for players in the city hosting the bowl. Thus it is quite possible that a team can make more money not going to a bowl than going to a bowl. However, rarely will a team affiliated with a major conference turn down a bowl bid because although the particular university may incur a loss the conference as a whole nets a gain.

So what about the little guy, the non-BCS affiliated conferences, how do they fair in the current system? Non-automatic qualifying Division I conferences (WAC, Mountain West, MAC, Conference USA and Sun Belt) receive approximately 9% of the net BCS escrow revenue if no team receives a BCS bowl bid.2 If one team receives a BCS bowl bid the revenue received doubles (another 9%).2 If two teams receive BCS bowl bids the revenue received increases another 4.5%. The distribution of these funds among the five conferences typically follows which conferences receive which bowl bids. Recently the Mountain West and the WAC have taken the most money regardless of whether or not they receive a BCS bowl bid ($3.1-$3.5 million without a BCS bowl bid to $9.1-$9.8 million with a BCS bowl bid).1 Conference USA typically receives $2.5 million, the MAC receives approximately $1.6-$2 million and the Sun Belt receives $1.4-$1.8 million.1 The Football Championship Subdivision receives approximately $1.8 million which is evenly distributed among all 8 of their conferences (each conference receives $225,000).1

Then there are specific institutions that have their own rules for revenue sharing. Due to its current lack of conference affiliation, Notre Dame receives 1.33 million dollars when not participating in a BCS bowl, which is about 1/66th of the net revenue to automatic qualifiers (due to the fact that there 66 automatic qualifying schools).2 If Notre Dame participates in a BCS bowl it receives 4.5 million dollars which is equal to what is awarded to a second qualifier from a BCS affiliated conference. Until 2006 Notre Dame received a full BCS share (similar to that currently awarded to an automatic qualifier) if it was invited to a BCS bowl. [Remember if a BCS conference has two teams playing in BCS bowls only the automatic qualifier receives 17 million dollars, the ‘at large’ qualifier receives 4.5 million dollars]. Military academies, Army and Navy, receive 100,000 dollars each.1

With all of that revenue distribution it is important to identify where money is going to come from in a new playoff system. For example some have proposed that the playoff system be implemented into the bowl system in some respect. One of the more popular proposals uses 8 teams where of the 7 games that would comprise the playoff 5 of them incorporated the BCS bowls. The typical mindset under such a proposal is that the BCS bowls would payout at least the same amount of money that they do under the current system, which would significantly alleviate any financial losses involved in the transfer between systems.

A quick side note: it is highly improbable that a playoff system of 4 or fewer teams would be implemented solely because such a playoff does not offer the level of inclusion required to solve the problem of the current system, uncertainty; if the team that won the championship was really the best team in college football. A plus-one system is similar to a four team playoff in its lack of usefulness, not from an implementation standpoint, but in the solving of the original problem as previously discussed. For example suppose a plus-one system were implemented where the initial BCS bowls broke down as followed:

1 plays and defeats 6 by 3;
2 plays and defeats 9 by 6;
3 plays and defeats 5 by 7;
4 plays and defeats 11 by 17;

After these results a plus-one system would demand a new BCS ranking to determine the championship participants, but with these results how does a plus-one system resolve any conflict? What if 1 only defeated 6 by a single point? Should 2 and 3 jump 1 and play in the National Championship Game? To reiterate the fact is that in a majority of situations a plus-one system does nothing to resolve the core issue in the debate between the current system and a playoff, eliminating reasonable doubt regarding what university deserves the National Championship.

Returning to the issue of incorporating current BCS games into a playoff there are two significant problems with this base idea. The first problem is that the incorporation of the playoff system would destroy the tradition of each of the long-standing BCS bowl games. The Rose Bowl was established in 1902, the Sugar Bowl and the Orange Bowl in 1935 and each have only deviated from their traditional fixed conference match-ups a handful of times. (The Fiesta Bowl was established in 1976, thus its tradition is not nearly as important). A playoff system would make it difficult to adhere to the traditional match-up, which would leave a bad taste in the mouth of purists especially for the Rose Bowl. The one thing a playoff system cannot do is screw over the Rose Bowl as it accounts for approximately 20-25% of the total revenue taken in over the generic bowl season.1 Basically any playoff proposal that screws with the Rose Bowl is doomed to fail. Take note of how long the Tournament of Roses Association took before allowing the Big-10 or Pac-10 champion to participate in the BCS National Championship game. Most playoff advocates belittle this adherence to tradition largely because it stands in the way of what they want regardless of whatever reasons one might have for respecting the tradition and the history of a given bowl.

The second problem is fan fatigue. The rational to why this issue is a problem can be seen in the ‘at-large’ selection bowl selection process. One of the common questions uttered by pundits with regards to bowls selecting who to invite when no direct conference obligations exist is the issue of how well does a team travel. The reason such a question is important is ticket sales. This fact is stressed upon most universities as typically the universities have to guarantee a certain number of tickets. Although universities are assigned a certain minimum number of tickets, bowls do not want universities to ‘eat’ those tickets, they want universities to sell those tickets so people will come to the bowl game. One of the chief means of making money for the bowl sponsors/city hosting the bowl is to make sure that a large number of people attend the bowl spending money not only on tickets to the game, but on food, hotels, souvenirs and other tourist destinations.

Unfortunately for fans the cost of attending football games have increased over the years. With this reality it is likely that the first round of the playoffs may sell well, similar to a normal high level bowl game. However, the second round would demonstrate the first wave of fan fatigue as it would be more difficult to sell a number of tickets equal to or greater than the number sold for the first round game leading to the university ‘eating’ the remaining costs. The championship game would be an interesting question regarding fan fatigue. Once again it would be difficult to sell a number of tickets equal to or greater than the number sold for the first round game (which is the number akin to that sold for a current bowl appearance) to team partisans, but because it is a championship game there is the possibility to pick-up some non-affiliated fans. However, the total amount of this pick-up is unknown and it is unlikely that bowl sponsors would estimate this unknown quantity optimistically.

Another element to most of the proposed playoff systems is that they use a seeding system similar to the playoff system used by Division I - AA where the higher seeded team hosts the game and then later rounds are held at specific locations. This strategy may reduce some of the burden of fan fatigue, but it still does not reduce the average number of games that team x will take part in during the average playoff season, thus the total reduction of fan fatigue would be minimal especially if the opposing teams are a significant distance from one another. Interestingly fan fatigue acts as a limiting factor that almost forces any type of playoff system not to exceed 8 teams. Any argument that Division I – AA uses 16 teams, thus so should Division I – A is moot because of the sheer difference in money involved. Take a look at most of the games in a Division I – AA playoff, there are a lot of empty seats, something that would not fly for a Division I – A playoff series. Thus, with 4 teams not being enough to avoid questions of uncertainty and more than 8 teams more than likely failing due to fan fatigue, 8 teams seems to be the only workable number for a playoff system.

Another strategy that some argue would eliminate any money gap between the current system and a new playoff system is negotiations for new television contracts involving the playoff system citing the amount of money that the annual college basketball tournament garners. Unfortunately such a strategy is rather illogical because the college basketball tournament has been packaged as “March Madness” for a long period of time and was not piecemealed together from various outside sources/bowls. This piecemeal approach is exactly what would occur in the establishment of a college football playoff that includes BCS bowl games, which limits the amount of money that can be collected in its first years, the most important time frame when establishing a new system. Recall that television contracts already exist for each BCS game and depending on the anticipated match-ups for future games, contracts may actually go down. Also the first years are important generally because of the realm of uncertainty. There are no guarantees that contracts will go up in the future, thus most conferences would be wary about accepting less money in the short-term with promises of greater non-guaranteed payoffs in the future.

Some argue that it is in the best interest of the BCS to avoid starting a playoff system in order to maximize their per game profits. Basically this argument boils down to using simplistic economic theory revolving around supply and demand. The argument establishes those running the BCS as a cartel (which in large respects is true) thus it has sole control over the distribution of ‘high-quality’ bowl games. Therefore, instead of a positive slope for the supply curve, the cartel status allows for the generation of a vertical supply curve. The figure below illustrates the above situation.
* Note that the demand curve represents interest in watching or attending a BCS bowl game, which would later generate a total level of revenue from this interest;
With a vertical supply curve and a static negative slope demand curve theoretically it is risky business to increase the supply because the revenue per product ratio will decrease as shown below:
Looking at the above graph one may initially conclude that it is not in the interest of future BCS profit to increase the number of BCS Bowls or add a new playoff system. However, there are two significant problems with this theory and line of thought. The first problem relates to the percentage of decline in the revenue per product ratio. There is no debate based on the scheme of the above graph that increasing the number of bowl games will result in a decrease in revenue earned per bowl game. However, it does not distinguish by how much the ratio drops, which is a very important element in proving the main point of the theory.

For example suppose in scenario 1 an environment with 5 BCS bowl games generates 15 million dollars of profit per game. The addition of a sixth game reduces that number to 10 million dollars of profit per game. Clearly it is silly to add the sixth game as the BCS makes 75 million dollars (5 x 15) in a 5 game environment and only 60 million (6 x 10) in a 6 game environment. However, what if in scenario 2 the addition of a sixth game reduces the dollars of profit per game from 15 million to 13 million? In this scenario it makes sense to add a sixth game for in a 6 game environment the BCS makes 78 million (6 x 13) vs. 75 million in a 5 game environment. There in lies the first problem, there is almost no empirical evidence to demonstrate how the revenue per product ratio will change in response to an increase in the amount of product, thus no one can say whether or not it is in the interest, from a profit perspective, of the BCS to add additional games. With that uncertainty, one might question how the above discussion is useful. Fortunately the second problem with the above theory renders the first problem moot.

The critical problem with the above analysis is that although the supply curve was changed to accommodate the presence of cartel control, the demand curve was not changed. When supply is isolated to a single supplier, the behavior of those that want to purchase that product changes as well. In such a situation potential customers in general are more willing to accept an unchanging price despite more units of the product being available because of the price power of the cartel. Such a mentality changes the demand curve. The figure below illustrates how this change in demand curve changes the situation.

With this change in the demand curve with respect to the total supply controlled by a single supplier there is a higher probability that increasing the amount of the supply will not result in a decrease in the revenue per product ratio. Thus, it does not seem rational to presume that there is little probability that the BCS would reject a playoff season solely or even in part due to the concern that increasing the number of ‘BCS caliber’ games would reduce total revenue. In a real world example total revenue did not decrease, but actually increased when increasing the number of BCS bowl games from 4 to 5.1

Note that a proportionally linear decline in the demand curve also makes little sense in reality even if the theory were sound (which it is not). Do people really have such strict internal quotas for college football BCS bowl games? Does an individual say to him/herself, ‘Gee I am only going to watch 4 BCS bowl games this year even if there are 6 BCS bowl games played this year’? Of course not; the total number of BCS bowl games available has almost no influence on whether or not individuals watch.

The demand structure of the curve also relates back to television ratings. Some opponents of a playoff system make the claim that the public may talk a lot about wanting to see the ‘little guy’ (non-BCS affiliated teams) get his chance, but when push comes to shove they prefer watching the power conferences. Although direct analysis of the television ratings supports this conclusion there are other issues in play.

The chief issue is that most pundits continue to believe that the ‘little guy’ is inferior to the BCS conference teams regardless of what reality may indicate and continue to press that message, which has an influence on whether or not individuals select to watch games with these teams. Perhaps institutions like ESPN could try an experiment where their analysts do not automatically assume that the non-BCS team is inferior to the BCS team and will be crushed and then see if the ratings for these games change. For example the way most analysts speak of non-BCS teams it would shock them to realize that the Division I team with the best record over the last 4 years is Boise State at 49 – 4, not Florida, not Alabama, not Texas, not Ohio State, not LSU, not USC, but lowly Boise State who is also 2 – 1 against BCS teams in that span. Basically commentators generate a self-fulfilling prophecy where they imply that viewers should not watch game x because the BCS team will crush the non-BCS team, thus watching it would be a waste of time. Then they crow about low ratings justifying their position that no one watches non-BCS teams.

One final note on ratings: anyone who tracks ratings realizes that the National Championship game and games in which the Big-10 participate are the only real ratings superstars year in and year out in the bowl season. If the ‘little guy’ is actually given adequate opportunities to prove themselves over a consistent period of time rather than sporadic periods that typically only occur during the bowl season then a genuine attitude can be formed about the worthiness of these teams and whether or not their games should be watched instead of an artificial attitude pushed by individuals with bias agendas.

Another concern with most of the proposals for a playoff system is that they incorporate ‘at-large’ bids into the system. It is rather humorous to listen to individuals discuss the fairness of a playoff system over the current system, especially to non-BCS conference affiliated schools, when their ‘at large’ bid proposals offer very little chance of participation for non-BCS affiliated conference schools. For example almost never will two undefeated teams from a non-BCS affiliated conference have an opportunity to participate in a playoff system. In fact realistically only one would even have an opportunity, especially if the ‘at large’ bids were decided by a BCS ranking type system due to the on-going bias against non-BCS conferences in relation to BCS conferences.

A superior system would eliminate all ‘at large’ bids and instead focus on conference champions. For example the playoff would consist of 8 teams, the 6 conference champions from the 6 BCS conferences and the 2 highest ranked conference champions from non-BCS conferences determined by a BCS ranking system. Of course some may argue that his/her team only had one loss in a given year and also deserves to be in the playoff even though that team did not win their conference. Such an argument is utterly meaningless because if a team cannot win its own conference it is clearly not the best team in the nation and has no business being in a tournament to determine the National Champion. The counter argument regarding how a 3 loss conference champion from Conference A is more deserving than a 1 loss team from Conference B that did not win its conference is made through the acknowledgement that different conferences have different levels of quality depending on the year. It is not hard to come to the conclusion that the 3 loss conference champion may have played higher caliber teams than the 1 loss team from Conference B.

Also a conference championship only requirement ensures that the regular season still has significant meaning, a reality that would be diminished if ‘at large’ bids existed. This factor is important because one of the major complaints regarding the establishment of a playoff system is stripping away the importance of the regular season where a single loss may be the difference between going to the National Championship game and not going. In any proposed playoff system with ‘at large’ bids a team could get into the playoff with 1 to 3 losses and no conference championship, hardly a team deserving of the National Championship. For example in a playoff system with ‘at large’ bids, the 2009 SEC championship game between Alabama and Florida would have had almost zero meaning because the loser would have simply claimed one of the available ‘at large’ bids in the playoff leaving an undefeated TCU or Boise State (more than likely Boise State) out in the cold. However, in a playoff system with no ‘at large’ bids that SEC championship game still would have had all of the meaning it had originally.

One significant flaw to the above set-up is the probability of an undeserving team making the playoffs through a conference championship game. With respect to the above system, ideally the conference champion would be determined similar to how it is determined in the Big-10, Pac-10 and Big East where every team plays a vast majority of the teams in the conference and then the conference champion is determined through conference record or if needed a series of tie-breakers.

Unfortunately in the above regard the Big-12, SEC and ACC determine their conference champions through a single championship game due to the fact that these conferences have elected to divide their conferences into two sub-divisions. The decision to create this division is largely driven by the money the conferences receive through sponsorship and television rights to the championship game. However, such a system creates a problem with the ‘purity’ of a playoff in that in such a system a team with 4 losses from one of the divisions could defeat a team with 0 losses in the championship game and claim that conference’s spot in the playoff. Overall such a situation leaves a bad taste in the mouth because on the strength of a single game a team with a mediocre record would be able to compete for the National Championship which would eliminate significant meaning from the regular season.

Hopefully this problem will be solved, but as it stands it would have to be solved through the use of the current championship game system because the aforementioned 3 conferences are making too much money through those games to abandon them. One possibility would be to take the two teams from the conference with the best records regardless of which sub-division they are in and have them play in the conference championship game. This strategy would at least ensure a higher probability that a deserving team came from the conference in question. However, it does raise another concern in that if the teams already played during the regular season why should they have to play again to determine the conference champion?

The application of the above playoff qualification structure could also go a long way to solving the money question in that the playoff system could exist apart from the bowl system. Instead of using the BCS games as part of the playoff system, the playoff system would exist alone which would allow a separate set of sponsor and promotional contracts for the playoff system and the BCS Bowl system. To accommodate such a system the BCS would have to give up playing champions in those bowls and drop each position in all remaining bowls by a single place. For example the Rose Bowl would no longer host the Big-10 champion and the Pac-10 champion, but instead would host the Big-10 runner up and the Pac-10 runner up. Similar changes would occur for all other continuing bowls. Overall in such a system the tradition of conference match-ups for each bowl will be continued, which as previously mentioned is important to powerful people, and due to the depth of each BCS conference, bowl quality should not drop significantly.

Note that this system works well monetarily for each conference because of how bowl money is distributed. Recall that conferences distribute bowl money from one lump sum accumulated by all of the teams in the particular conference that went to a bowl. Therefore, it does not matter if the conference champion plays in the respective BCS bowl or the conference runner-up as long as the money awarded from the playoff and the BCS bowls fall within at least the same tier of expense account for a given conference. Thus as long as the conferences are still represented in their respective bowls they still receive their money. The amount of money awarded for teams and their respective conferences that participate in the playoff would be scaled based on how far the team advanced and reflect a significant portion of the money generated from the sponsorship and promotional contracts generated from the playoff.

Of course the addition of what can be viewed as seven new bowl games would increase the total number of bowl games to 42 (if one counts the 2 anticipated future games and eliminates the current rotating National Championship BCS Bowl game which would be unnecessary in a playoff system). Realistically 41-43 bowl games could be viewed by a sufficient amount of people as just too many. Thus, if a playoff system without incorporating the BCS bowls was established it would probably be prudent to eliminate some of the lower totem pole bowls. These ‘low totem pole’ bowls can be identified as those bowls that have the more recent establishment dates and/or the lowest payouts with payouts being a higher determining factor. Also preference should be given to bowl matching 6th and 7th place finishers in a BCS conference over 2nd or 3rd place finishers in non-BCS conferences. Prime candidates for elimination would include: the Little Caesars Pizza Bowl; the St. Petersburg Bowl; the New Orleans Bowl; the Emerald Bowl; the Hawaii Bowl; the Papa John’s.com Bowl;

After determining the conference champions, an 8-team playoff would require a methodology for determining the match-ups. There are two schools of thought for seeding if no BCS bowl tie-ins are utilized. The first option is rather popular in that qualifying teams are seeded 1-8 according to their BCS ranking with 1 playing 8, 2 playing 7, 3 playing 6 and 4 playing 5. Although such a methodology is standard some may object to such a system because there is a very high probability that the two teams from the conferences not affiliated with the BCS will always draw the 7th and 8th seeds whether or not they are deserved due to BCS conference bias in ranking. Therefore, these non-BCS teams will frequently be placed at a disadvantage, hardly the fair shake that some believe a playoff system should be.

The second option would involve a random draw to determine the seeding, similar to the World Cup. The first and chief objection one would have to a random draw system would be the possibility that the two highest ranked teams in the BCS would meet in the first round. Such a pairing could be disastrous for a playoff system in what some would regard as the best game being played earlier than it ‘should’ be. Fortunately when ignoring the hysterics one realizes that there is only a 14% chance of such an outcome. Also rarely is there a college football season where the top two teams in the BCS rankings are clearly regarded as head and shoulders above all of the remaining teams in quality. Such a trend is why there is a demand for a playoff in the first place. Therefore, there is no reason to panic and instantly eliminate the potential for a random draw as the determining mechanism through citation of a possible watered-down championship. Heck, a watered-down championship happens almost every year in the actual BCS system due to uncertainty.

The playoff draw would be determined the following Sunday after the conclusion of the last BCS affiliated conference championship game. First round games would begin two Saturdays from the last regular season game. Note that if the random draw procedure is used to determine pairings for the first round, the draw will not determine where the teams play versus a seeding system that would likely lead to a home field advantage reward location system. The lack of efficiency in the expenditure of money restricts using the random draw to determine game location. For example suppose TCU is matched up to play against the University of Texas in the first round. It would make little sense for those teams to travel to the Orange Bowl to play the game instead of Texas Stadium. Game start times will follow the obvious rationality of East to West where East Coast games are played prior to West Coast games.

There are two strategies regarding where these games are hosted out of a random draw system. First, games could be hosted at a series of pre-determined neural sites throughout the country. For example based on the timing of the games, six common sites for first and second round playoff games could be the Rose Bowl, University of Phoenix Stadium, the Cotton Bowl or Texas Stadium, the Orange Bowl, the Georgia Dome, and the Horseshoe or the Big House. The championship game could be played at a rotating site between those six or an entirely new site determined later.

Note that the above sites are merely suggestions based on an attempt to maximize the potential for ticket sales, ease the question of fan fatigue and create an ambiance that an attending, television and Internet viewing audience would expect for a playoff. One may argue that the above suggestions create too much of a possibility at favoritism for a specific team due to proximity, but such concerns have hardly been raised in the past. Where is the outcry that the Big-10 and Big East almost always have to go on the road for their Bowl Games. Heck the Rose Bowl is played at Pasadena in UCLA’s home stadium and a hop, skip and jump from USC. Overall there is the potential for home field advantage issues, but the committee staffed with creating the draw and the respective playing locations should do their best to neutralize this issue as much as possible.

To better illustrate how such a selection process would transpire suppose in 2020 a playoff system similar to the one above is in place.

Conference champions are as followed:

ACC – Florida State;
Big-10 – Michigan;
Big-12 – Texas;
Big East – Pittsburgh;
Pac-10 – Oregon;
SEC – Georgia;

the two non-BCS affiliated qualifying conference champions are:

Mountain West – BYU;
WAC – Boise State;

the random draw generate the following match-ups:

Boise State – Michigan;
Oregon – Georgia;
Texas – Pittsburgh;
BYU – Florida State;

Based on these match-ups the committee would then determine the most appropriate playoff locations for both the first round and the potential second round match-ups. In the above example the selection of the following locations would be appropriate:

First Round:

Boise State – Michigan [University of Phoenix Stadium]
Oregon – Georgia [Texas Stadium]
Texas – Pittsburgh [Georgia Dome]
BYU – Florida State [Horseshoe]

Second Round:

Top Bracket Winners – Rose Bowl
Bottom Bracket Winners – Orange Bowl

Through its location assignments the selection committee attempts to assign games to the most neutral sites at the closest joint proximity to each school to ease fan and team travel expenses. Note that if workable the second round locations could be delayed until the teams that are playing in the second round are determined. For example in the above example if Texas and BYU both win it would make more sense to host that game (the bottom bracket game) in the Rose Bowl instead of the Orange Bowl.

Based on the stadium selections the first round would begin at 11:00 am EST moving East to West with a 3 hr buffer between the start of each game. Due to two fewer games the second round could have a little more flex time between games allowing for more elaborate halftime performance or pre/post game preparations. Thus in the above example the official line-up would be:

Boise State – Michigan [University of Phoenix Stadium @ 8:00 pm EST]
UCLA – Georgia [Texas Stadium @ 5:00 pm EST]
Texas – Pittsburgh [Georgia Dome @ 11:00 am EST]
BYU – Florida State [Horseshoe @ 2:00 pm EST]

Top Bracket Winners – Rose Bowl @ 2:00 pm EST
Bottom Bracket Winners – Orange Bowl @ 7:00 pm EST

The second solution to the playoff location question is to utilize the aforementioned seeding system. The advantages of the seeding system is that more than likely on a universal scale fan fatigue is lowered vs. selection of a neutral site. However, this reduction possesses a higher standard deviation in that fan fatigue will be inversely proportional to the seed of the given team. Basically the better the seed the lower the fan fatigue. There is also another potential concern relating to how the money from ticket sales are distributed. Does the hosting school keep the funds or are they funneled back to the sponsor/BCS? How is the bowl payout influenced by the decision regarding ticket sales? Overall instrumentation of a seeding system would probably require transparency to avoid bias.

As previously stated the championship game would be either at a pre-determined rotating site between the six original sites or at an entirely new site. A rough schedule of events for the bowl/playoff season in college football would look like:

Dec 5th – ACC, Big-12 and SEC Championship games
Dec 6th – Final BCS Ranking to determine the two non BCS-affiliated conference champion participants and the draw is determined through whatever prescribed methodology;
Dec 19th – First round of playoff games
Dec 20th – New Mexico Bowl;
Dec 22nd – Las Vegas Bowl;
Dec 23rd – Poinsettia Bowl;
Dec 26th – Second round of playoff games;
Dec 27th – Meineke Car Care Bowl; Music City Bowl;
Dec 28th – Independence Bowl;
Dec 29th – Champs Sports Bowl; Eagle Bank Bowl;
Dec 30th – Holiday Bowl; Humanitarian Bowl;
Dec 31st – Texas Bowl; Armed Forces Bowl; Sun Bowl; Insight.com Bowl; Chick-fil-A Bowl;
Jan 1st – Outback Bowl; Capital One Bowl; Gator Bowl; Rose Bowl; Sugar Bowl;
Jan 2nd – Cotton Bowl; Liberty Bowl; International Bowl; Alamo Bowl;
Jan 3rd – GMAC Bowl; Fiesta Bowl; Orange Bowl;
Jan 4th – National Championship Game;

One of the final issues that needs to be addressed is the number of games that college football players will be expected to play in a playoff system vs. the current system. Currently top quality programs (those that would qualify for a playoff in the first place) play 13-14 games when including the bowl game. In an 8-team playoff the teams playing in the championship game will have played 15-16 games at its conclusion, which is basically an NFL season and is clearly too many games. The chief concern is increasing the probability of players suffering from physical injury, especially as the season drags on in which player fatigue increases and recovery time decreases. With the way players play in the modern era, increased probability of suffering a concussion should be of special concern with the expectation of playing additional games.

There are two rational possibilities that jump to mind to alleviate this concern. The first solution involves lengthening the season to generate more down-time to stimulate recovery ensuring a lower probability for injury. Unfortunately this solution is not very viable because the college football season is already fairly long and generating this extended rest very well could push the season in late January or even early February which would significantly impact the viewing audience and would probably negatively influence the academics of the players.

The second solution would be to remove a number of games from the schedule to compensate for the potential increase in games from the playoffs. This solution seems to be the better of the two, but the immediate issue is how to go about removing games from the schedule? The type of game removed would heavily depend on the playoff qualification structure. For example in the above playoff example qualification occurs through acquisition of a conference championship. Therefore, the typical 3-5 non-conference games played by teams each year are irrelevant in determining eligibility for the playoffs for BCS affiliated teams and excessive for non-BCS affiliated teams. Thus it would be easy to drop the number of non-conference games by 2 in order to accommodate the potential playoff games.

Another side benefit of this system is if non-conference games no longer influence whether or not a BCS team enters the national championship playoff, there is no need for these teams to play generally inferior quality teams out of a concern that they could lose an early game to another high quality team and be out of the National Championship picture. Instead such a system would encourage high quality teams to play other high quality non-conference teams in order to generate a better understanding of how their teams are developing and to prepare for the conference season by playing teams that may be better than most of their conference opponents. Such a system should increase the probability of more USC-Florida match-ups over Florida Atlantic-Florida match-ups.

Noting academics in general the current scheme of the playoff as outlined above should probably not interfere with student academics because athletes, especially football and basketball players, have a greater level of flexibility in when they can take their tests. There should be enough free time with the time before the start of the playoffs and the time in-between the second round and the championship game for players still playing to take care of any academic business regarding finals and the like. However, each university may have different policies which would have to be considered.

In closing the first step to opening a discussion regarding the potential of a playoff system to determine a college football national champion is to understand that there is no logical reason for the BCS to reject a playoff on a financial basis. However, the sword is two sided in that a playoff cannot be viewed as manifest destiny for college football. Although a playoff can follow many different methodologies there are some critical elements that must be addressed by each different strategy if it is to have any probability of success.

1. Do not forsake the Rose Bowl or its handlers the Tournament of Roses Association; in a given year the Rose Bowl generates 20-25% of the total BCS revenue.1 It does so through its tradition, pageantry and quality. It is highly probable that any attempt to initiate a playoff will fail if the tradition of the Rose Bowl is not upheld. Therefore, the Rose Bowl must either host the Big-10 and Pac-10 runner-ups because their conference champions move to the playoff or it must be one of the first round playoff games where the Big-10 champion faces the Pac-10 champion each and every year in the first round regardless of BCS ranking.

2. The problem of fan fatigue must be solved. The expectation of fans to follow their team for up to three playoff games is unrealistic, especially for college students in an environment where college tuition continues to increase. Depending on the size of the promotional/television contracts that are acquired for a playoff one possible strategy for neutralizing fan fatigue is for a university to ‘eat’ the costs of the tickets for each game and donate the tickets to fans, so they only need to provide for their travel. Another option is if the venue is within 500 miles, the university could provide bus transport to the game site for the fans. Any steps the university can take to alleviate the cost of attending playoff games for fans without resulting in a loss for the university would go a long way to supporting the generation of a playoff system. Overall a playoff system that stood alone from the other traditional BCS bowls would probably have more success in this arena than a playoff system that incorporated the BCS bowls due the a greater windfall of monetary awards.

3. The playoff system must allow for the participation of teams from conferences not currently affiliated with the BCS. One of the driving reasons behind the movement to establish a playoff is the thought of unfairness in the current system because the ‘little guy’ is not afforded the opportunity to consistently erase or confirm the bias against it by playing the ‘big guy’. A playoff system that does not increase the probability of BCS vs. non-BCS match-ups is no better than the current system.

Overall the possibility for a playoff is viable, but its proponents must be more extensive in how they would go forward in establishing such a system. The analysis and example presented here is just the minimum of what should be presented as an argument by supporters. A vast majority of playoff or even anti-playoff arguments do not even scratch the surface of what elements will be required for the playoff or the maintenance of the current system. If one is not going to do a reasonable job at presenting an argument what is the point of presenting one in the first place?

==
1. Bowl Championship Series Five Year Summary of Revenue Distribution 2004 – 2008.

2. BCS revenue sharing: It's pretty simple. BCSFootball.org. http://www.bcsfootball.org/cfb/story/10297120



































Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Changing the Strategy – Planning for the Future

In the past months, including at the COP15 at Copenhagen, a large number of individuals have called for a scale of mitigation and remediation in global emissions of CO2 that would rapidly reduce the atmospheric concentration to at least 350 ppm. The target of 350 was selected, in part but not entirely due to the findings of Hansen et Al.1 which considered the current influence of climate forcings and what climate changes could be adapted to by human civilization at reasonable financial and human costs. Other goals have been proposed for 450 ppm where it is believed that average global temperature would not exceed 2 degrees C, which allows maintenance of a generally stable human society with proper adaptation strategies. However, the 350 camp adamantly believes that stabilization at 450 ppm would not be tenable to the comfortable survival of the human species on Earth, thus although 450 ppm would be acceptable for a very brief period of time, 350 ppm must be the plateau for a final CO2 atmospheric concentration.

Depending on what measurements one uses, the current atmospheric concentration of CO2 resides between 386-388 ppm.1,2 Unfortunately most proponents of the 350 movement fail to realize that this number represents CO2 concentration and its resultant climate forcing and not any of the other greenhouse gases which can be measured in CO2 equivalency. The atmospheric concentration for CO2 equivalency ranges even higher with a very high likelihood of being in the low to mid 400 ppm. Overall the 350 ppm goal must involve CO2 equivalency and not just CO2 alone otherwise the goal is structured in a way where direct achievement may not result in principled success.

Now one may find fault with the statement that CO2 equivalency is over 400 ppm, so how was that statement derived? The IPCC uses the following formula to calculate CO2 equivalency:

Total Climate Forcing = 5.35 ln(CO2 equivalency / CO2 pre-industrial);

First, note that CO2 pre-industrial is equal to the atmospheric CO2 concentration before humans began emitting large amounts into the atmosphere due to advances from the industrial revolution and beyond; this concentration is commonly viewed as 278-280 ppm.1 Most people view total climate forcing as the forcing from all significant greenhouse gases, significant greenhouse gases are defined by the Kyoto Treaty (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs and CFCs etc.).

Using these elements alone a total climate forcing relative to 2007 of approximately 2.71 W/m^2 can be calculated. This value leads to a CO2 equivalency of approximately 461.35 ppm to 464.67 ppm. However, this methodology does not take into account the fact that there are other forcings in the atmosphere as well which influence the climate such as areosols, surface albedo, clouds and ozone. In 2007 when the IPCC 4th Assessment Report was released due to a filing deadline it used empirical information from 2006 and earlier. This information generated a forcing map that defined a total climate forcing of approximately 1.6-1.7 W/m^2 when taking all relevant factors into consideration. The figure below outlines these forcings.3



These climate forcing numbers result in a CO2 equivalency of approximately 374.9 ppm to 382 ppm (very similar to the concentration of atmospheric CO2 at the time). The new CO2 equivalency numbers drop significantly due to the inclusion of the negative forcing influence assigned to aerosols, clouds and surface albedo among other elements. Unfortunately since the publication of the 2007 IPCC report new empirical evidence has re-evaluated the forcing influence of aerosols calculating a lower than previously thought negative climate forcing.4 Also new information has been discovered regarding clouds and the sustainability of their impact on climate forcing. Similar to aerosols, clouds provide a negative climate forcing which reduces the overall rate of increase in surface temperatures; however, this new information suggests that as sea surface temperatures increase low-level stratiform clouds decrease in both size and frequency.5 Thus the influence of clouds at reducing the severity of climate change is reduced as temperatures increase, so the influence of clouds will significantly wane over time.

In addition to the loss of influence from aerosols and clouds, surface albedo both on land and on sea, especially sea, have been taking a beating in recent years reducing their influence on limiting the rate of climate change. Finally logical intuition when viewing current empirical evidence suggests a higher atmospheric CO2 equivalency than a value equal to the current atmospheric CO2 concentration. For example the rate of ice melt in the Arctic, Greenland, Western and even Eastern Antarctica significantly eclipse the predictions made in the IPCC 4th Assessment Report, which suggests either incorrect assumptions regarding climate forcing or the exclusion of a significant factor influencing climate change in a negative (temperature increasing) way. With the size of most of the error bar associated with previous climate forcing calculations, the first option seems more probable. Overall with such rapid and negative changes to the climate everyone better hope beyond hope that CO2 equivalency is in the 400s and not the 300s, otherwise the situation is much worse than anyone previously thought.

With all this said there are a number of people that believe the target of 350 ppm is unrealistic in that humans do not possess the necessary tools and/or determination to accomplish such a goal and that humans are better off preparing for a world that has a greater average temperature of at least 2 degrees C. Proponents counter with claims that a phase out of coal in the next 20 years and aggressive anti-deforestation and reforestation programs would go a long way to reaching the 350 goal at modest costs. Unfortunately for the 350 ppm proponents the real failure in achieving maintenance of a familiar ecosystem and environment may not come from a failure in human will, but instead a failure in tactics based on inaccurate information. The chief concern is that improper tactics are being suggested to reach a goal due to incomplete information based on the warming trend.

There are two crucial elements pertaining to the probability of achieving a specific ceiling and stabilization of global surface temperatures: the climate sensitivity of the Earth and the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Climate sensitivity describes how the surface temperature changes in response to a stabilized doubling of atmospheric CO2. The reason climate sensitivity is important is it tries to provide a direct correlation between surface temperature and changes in CO2 concentration. Basically climate sensitivity describes the influence of greenhouse gases on temperature change. In 2007 the IPCC 4th Assessment Report defined the range of climate sensitivity between 2 and 4.5 degrees C.3 For 350 and other temperature ceiling movements such a range should be troubling because the lower range was raised by 0.5 degrees C from the IPCC 3rd Assessment in 2005 which defined climate sensitivity between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees C,3 in only a few years the estimated lower floor jumped 33%.

The primary means of deducing climate sensitivity is correlating known temperature change trends in the past with changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The best historical data comes from the Last Glacial Maximum because of the size and accuracy of the temperature and CO2 concentration shifts. For example during the Last Glacial Maximum CO2 concentration where approximately 180 ppm vs. 280 ppm for typical pre-industrial times and the 386-388 ppm that current exist.6 Average surface temperatures dropped 7 degrees C in relation to this CO2 concentration which generated a climate sensitivity of 11.2 degrees C.6 Despite this number most climatologists consider it flawed due to questions surrounding how feedbacks like existing sea ice, clouds and water vapor with other particulates were factored in its calculation. Most believe that these feedback elements were more pronounced during the Last Glacial Maximum then they are now which significantly reduces climate sensitivity in the present.

Overall the most widely accepted value for climate sensitivity comes from Charney who calculated a climate sensitivity of 3 degrees C when incorporating fast feedbacks.7 Unfortunately this calculation assumed an instantaneous doubling in CO2 with no surface changes. Eliminating any surface changes limited the accuracy of the calculation. Hansen et Al.1 used paleoclimate data when including slow surface albedo feedback while assuming a first order relationship for the area of surface/sea ice as a function of global temperature to calculate a climate sensitivity of approximately double Charney’s calculation (6 degrees C vs. 3 degrees C). Normally such a calculation would not be a huge deal because slow feedbacks operate over centuries to millennium, but these operational ranges were only experienced through natural cycles, not with humans dumping hundreds of gigatons of CO2 into the atmosphere. Thus, it is difficult to rule out these slower feedbacks exerting an influence after decades instead of centuries. Empirical evidence especially demonstrates significance for these slower feedbacks because of the rapidly melting surface ice in the Arctic.

Determining a reasonable climate sensitivity is important because it is a principle element in how predictions are made regarding future changes in surface temperature and the overall climate in general. The principle elements that allow predictions on the future climate come from many different climate models and current empirical observations. Modeling the climate is incredibly complicated requiring thousands of different variables as well as the inclusion of hundreds to thousands of interactions between those variables to generate results that can even only be considered ‘in-the-ballpark’. The application of these interactions and variables creates a tremendous demand on time and energy for the computers involved in the modeling. Therefore, to ensure that the generation of a single result does not take weeks/months, certain elements are removed from consideration in the final results. In addition there are some gaps in knowledge regarding how certain variables interact with other variables and in an attempt to ensure some level of accuracy, these types of interactions are also removed or estimated as best as one can and modeled accordingly.

Unfortunately these omissions create inaccuracy in the ability of the model to predict how the climate will change relative to how it actually changes. It is in these omissions where most climate skeptics have attacked with the claim that because x model is potentially inaccurate then the very essence of climate change is wrong. Of course any rational person realizes that such claims are utter nonsense as all of the valid empirical evidence still demonstrates that climate change is occurring almost entirely due to the actions of humans and the lack of a completely accurate model, something that probably will never be generated in the first place, does nothing to taint that evidence. However, in the past few people have considered that the predictions made by climate models were incorrect on the other side of the coin, that they are underestimating the rate of climate change. Due to new empirical evidence, largely surrounding the much more rapid ice and glacier melt in the Arctic,8 more individuals are questioning whether the results of the 4th Annual IPCC report were inaccurate, predicting too slow of a surface temperature shift.

When predicting future temperature changes climate models tend to generate either a linear or a quasi-exponential change in the increase in average global air temperature over future years. For example after modeling four distinct scenarios of human action for the future, the 4th Annual IPCC report illustrated surface temperature changes as shown in the graph below.3


At first glance such predictions may seem practical based largely on how much CO2 and other greenhouse gases humans continue to emit into the atmosphere through future action. However, when considering all of the potential environmental feedback elements that could trigger during warming such results seems less and less plausible. The more noteworthy feedback factors that have a high probability of playing a role in additional future temperature increase include: increased water evaporation leading to more water vapor in the atmosphere,9,10 CO2 and methane release from melting permafrost,11,12 nitrous oxide release from peat sources,13 increased ocean albedo due to Arctic ice melt,3 new cloud synthesis or disappearance at different altitudes,5,14 increased rainforest dry season reversing sink to source behavior,15,16 and increased ocean temperatures resulting in conversion from sink to source. Although all of the previously listed feedback elements demand concern, permafrost melt and ocean out-gassing demand the most concern due to the sheer amount of CO2 that either process could eventually release into the atmosphere. Both of these problems have previously been addressed on this blog at the following links:

Permafrost: http://bastionofreason.blogspot.com/2009/08/permafrost-and-carbon-stores.html

Ocean Out-Gassing: http://bastionofreason.blogspot.com/2009/09/ocean-acidity-danger-and-remediation.html

It must be noted that the IPCC report identifies the potential inaccuracy in its conclusions due to feedback processes that were not included in the modeling. The decision to exclude most of the feedback information seems to stem from the lack of conclusive and accurate empirical information pertaining to those feedback processes. Basically the mindset of ‘some inaccuracy by not including feedback process A is better than gross inaccuracy through interpreting the feedback process incorrectly.’

Even though the potential inaccuracy is discussed, sadly enough it appears that increased water vapor was the only significant one attempted with varied results.3 A discussion was also given regarding the potential reduction of land and oceanic sinks due to surface temperature increases, but no direct comments regarding sink to source transformation were made. The inaccuracy of the IPCC used models and some of its conclusions have become quite evident most notably in the rapid pace of ice melt in the Arctic and new conclusions that the Arctic may be completely free of summer ice by only 2015-2020 instead of 2080-2100. The most unfortunate element in all of this seems to be the fact that most climate proponents themselves do not incorporate the potential feedback elements into their strategies with regards to limiting surface temperature increases to a certain boundary ceiling. Overall with the inclusion of feedback elements future average global surface temperature increases will more than likely follow a more severe trend than shown in the above graph.

The assumption of a more severe trend in temperature warming finds support when one considers the influence of the ocean in the carbon cycle. In large respects the ocean can be viewed as a dynamic replenishing buffer of some sorts. Various denizens of the ocean, most notably phytoplankton, are able to absorb CO2 either directly from the atmosphere or in the ocean for photosynthesis. When these organisms die, the CO2 that was used in photosynthesis is typically confined to the bottom of the ocean in sediment. After confinement to sediment the capacity of the ocean to absorb CO2 increases. In short due to the interaction of oceanic organisms the ocean is able to continually and consistently increase or at least maintain its ability to draw CO2 from the atmosphere.

Unfortunately buffers can only neutralize pH changes to certain concentrations. When a counter-agent (acid or base) is added at a high enough concentration the buffer collapses and the pH shifts. Such is also true for the ocean and its ability to absorb CO2. As the concentration of CO2, largely due to human driven activities, increases the ocean continues to absorb that CO2, but the rate of absorption is faster than the action of the pathway responsible for burying CO2 in sediment. Thus, concentrations of CO2 in the ocean build-up both by reducing the ability of the ocean to absorb further CO2 from the atmosphere as well as decreasing the efficiency of the CO2 removal pathway by limiting the available organisms responsible for that CO2 removal. The number of organisms is limited due to increases in acidity which result in less available calcium carbonate for certain food chain critical organisms to construct calcium carbonate infrastructure. When these creatures, like coral, are unable to create calcium carbonate shells it negatively affects large portions of the oceanic food chain including organisms that aid in CO2 removal. Eventually this process will conclude at a concentration equilibrium point where the ocean will no longer be able to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere eliminating its CO2 sink capacity.

Now while the loss of the ocean as a sink is bad enough, there is a very real possibility that the ocean will eventually become a source for increasing atmospheric CO2 instead of a sink. Most of the warming due to the excess CO2 in the atmosphere has not occurred on land, but in the ocean. This warming is important because gas solubility in a liquid decreases as temperature increases because increasing temperature increases available kinetic energy which increases molecule movement. Greater molecule movement increases the probability of bond breaking which reduces the ability of the gas to remain in solution. Therefore, as the ocean continues to warm its maximum capacity for CO2 storage in a dynamic equilibrium with the atmosphere will decrease causing it to release CO2 into the atmosphere until it is able to establish a new lower storage equilibrium. Although it is unclear how much CO2 could be released as a result of a negative gas solubility shift in the ocean, the fact that the ocean has increased in CO2 concentration by 118 +- 19 gigatons in the last 200 years17 and absorbs approximately 8-10 gigatons of CO2 a year from the atmosphere paints a dreary picture. Overall although out-gassing would be horrible, the loss of the ocean as a CO2 sink would be far worse over the course of decades.

Tie in the feedback resultant loss of the ocean as a CO2 sink with the potential of out-gassing to the prospect of a continual release of CO2 and methane from the potential 1,672 gigatons of carbon storage load in permafrost18,19 and those two feedback elements alone could create a huge shift in surface temperatures regardless of what humans emit in the decades to come.

Suppose one rejects the above contention of rapid severe warming due to these feedback effects? Even if such warming is rejected and such a rejection turns out to be correct in reality, those wishing to hold temperature increases at a ceiling of 2 degrees C still have the problem of ‘backwash warming’, warming that has yet to catch up with the influence of the current level of climate forcings. Basically the amount of climate forcing that has currently been applied to the environment has not been fully compensated for through change in average surface temperature largely due to slow feedbacks. That is to say that if all human based CO2 emissions were ceased tomorrow, the average global temperature would still increase another x degrees. Although it is not clear how much actual warming will occur through this ‘backwash’, Hansen et Al.1 estimate an additional global temperature increase of approximately 1.4 degrees C. Add that increase to the current increase from pre-industrial times of 0.6 to 0.9 degrees C (depending on what track information is used) and an increase of 2 degrees C is extremely probable regardless of what actions humans take. The graph used by Hansen et Al.1 to illustrate this additional future warming is shown below.


However, regardless of these concerns there is still time to successfully derail significant climate change, but only if the proper strategy is taken. Although the hot topic, the more trendy and popular geo-engineering strategies are unlikely to prove useful in short-term because of two significant flaws. First, they do relatively little, if anything, to alter the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere instead they work to mask some percentage of the warming driven by this CO2 concentration. Second, they do nothing to change the concentration of CO2 in the ocean, which maintains ocean acidity and limits the ability of the ocean to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Therefore, if geo-engineering is to be utilized the strategy must attack one of these two issues otherwise it would lack usefulness. Strategies like reforestation or bio-char would be useful, but would also fall far short of drawing out the required CO2. Also it is unlikely that exportation of CO2 into the upper atmosphere and eventually space would prove useful or even viable.

Reduction or mitigation of future emissions is an important element for limiting the total amount of temperature increase, but it is clear that the governments of the world are unwilling to create the cuts that allow mitigation to be an independent strategy that lacks further technological intervention. Currently despite the cries and curses from the environmentalist moment, it is unlikely that enough viable trace/zero emission energy can be generated to compensate for the draw down from coal and natural gas at the speeds required. Also regardless of how some environmentalist spin it, like Joe Romm of Climateprogress, China issuing a non-binding pledge to reduce carbon intensity is rather meaningless because reducing carbon intensity (with the economic growth still to available for China) instead of doing nothing is like getting a 32% on a test instead of a 19%, it is still failure. As it currently stands if the required cuts to avoid significant increases in surface temperature (2-3 degrees C) were to be made it would be a significant detriment to the overall global economic output due to less available energy. The energy gap that is created through emission mitigation for the United States was previous discussed in detail here:

http://bastionofreason.blogspot.com/2009/07/emission-adherence-in-2020-and-2030.html

So if mitigation is not occurring rapidly enough and generic geo-engineering tactics are basically worthless, what is to be done? The principle action beyond mitigation must be to draw CO2 out of the atmosphere via technological means. Technology must be harnessed solely because natural methods are just not fast enough. Not only are current carbon sinks becoming compromised due to current warming,20 but it is highly unrealistic that enough trees can be planted in the near-future to enhance land sink capacity especially when REDD, the most promising anti-deforestation proposal, has yet to expand in any significant capacity. Soil strategies using various tilling methods or bio-char may increase sink capacity by very minute amounts, but nothing to the level that is required. Thus, technology must be used.

In short all research funds that individuals want direct towards point-source carbon capture (a.k.a. clean coal) must instead be directed to non-point-source carbon capture (a.k.a. air capture). This blog has previously discussed the outstanding concerns with air capture and they are significant, but realistically the only way humans stop an increase in average surface temperature of even 3 degrees C without a miracle occurring is a combination of reducing carbon emissions and some form of air capture. Finally the development of a technology that could draw CO2 from the ocean would be an exceptionally useful tool in furthering mitigation by increasing the sink capacity of the ocean.

Overall the environmentalist movement needs to shift gears; it is somewhat humorous in that its members vent frustration at the portrayal of the question of global warming like it is a legitimate debate, yet these same individuals do the same by continuing to talk to species annihilators (global warming deniers) in a context of trying to convince them. At this point in time the debate is over; anyone who believes that humans are not the driving force behind climate change will not change his/her opinion regardless of what facts and evidence are highlighted, it is not worth wasting more time trying to convince them. The only thing that will convince these individuals are negative climate events that directly affect them, nothing which can be provided by environmentalists. In addition further discussion and proposition of foolish and inefficient boycotts of high emitters bad guys like Exxon should cease because truly such a strategy would be ineffective and just take time away and personnel away from more meaningful and effective endeavors. Instead it is time to move into research and innovation mode.

Solutions and strategies need to be prepared for when they are needed in the future. An honest assessment of what energy technologies will be needed to replace coal and natural gas will need to be identified. Just a quick note for those wind supporters, wind will not even come close to providing the necessary energy for global growth or even growth in the United States, especially if wind speeds continue to fall. Is nuclear really that expensive, preventing its widespread adoption, or is the expense only contingent on using 2nd generation technology over 3rd or 4th generation? What new energy strategies will need to be researched? There are many more questions beyond the few mentioned above that demand discussion and attention. Also these discussions cannot be broad based with weak statements like ‘oh all sorts of trace emission energy sources like wind, solar, nuclear and geothermal will be needed for the future’. No, these discussions must be full of details and specifics, so businesses and researchers know exactly what the future markets demand and expect.

In the end although mitigation is important, remediation is also important because the environment has reached a point where nature cannot restore the balance on its own. There are important questions to be asked regarding remediation and it is time for the environmental movement to start focusing in on those questions rather than lamenting or championing the latest meaningless poll regarding the public’s view of global warming, clean energy or whatever else is the subject of the poll de jour.

==
1. Hansen, James, et, al. “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?” The Open Atmospheric Science Journal, 2008, 2, 217-231.

2. Tans, Pieter. NOAA/ESRL (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends)

3. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

4. Myhre, Gunnar. “Consistency Between Satellite-Derived and Modeled Estimates of the Direct Aerosol Effect.” Science. June 18, 2009. DOI: 10.1126/science.1174461.

5. Clement, Amy, Burgman, Robert, and Norris, Joel. "Observational and Model Evidence for Positive Low-Level Cloud Feedback." Science. July 24, 2009. 325: 460-464. DOI: 10.1126/science.1171255

6. Kohler, Peter, et, Al. “What caused Earth’s temperature variations during the last 800,000 years? Data-based evidence on radiative forcing and constraints on climate sensitivity.” Quaternary Science Reviews. 2009. 1–17. doi:10.1016/j.quascirev.2009.09.026

7. Charney J. “Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment.” National Academy of Sciences Press: Washington DC 1979. 33.

8. Hawkins, Richard, et, Al. “In Case of Emergency.” Climate Safety. Public Interest Research Centre. 2008.

9. Santer, B, et, Al. “Identification of human-induced changes in atmospheric moisture content.” PNAS. 2007. 104: 15248-15253.

10. Dessler, A, et, Al. “Water-vapor climate feedback inferred from climate fluctuations, 2003-2008.” Geophysical Research Letters. 2008. 35: L20704.

11. Åkerman, H, and Johansson, M. “Thawing permafrost and thicker active layers in sub-arctic Sweden.” Permafrost and Periglacial Processes. 2008. 19: 279-292.

12. Jin, H.-j, et, Al. “Changes in permafrost environments along the Qinghai-Tibet engineering corridor induced by anthropogenic activities and climate warming.” Cold Regions Science and Technology. 2008. 53: 317-333.

13. Dorrepaal, E. et, Al. “Carbon respiration from subsurface peat accelerated by climate warming in the subarctic.” Nature. 2009. 460: 616-619.

14. Booth, B, et, Al. “Global warming uncertainties due to carbon cycle feedbacks exceed those due to CO2 emissions.” Geophysical Research. 2009. 11: 4179.

15. Cook, K, and Vizy, E. “Effects of Twenty-First Century Climate Change on the Amazon Rain Forest.” Journal of Climate. 2008. 21: 542-560.

16. Phillips, O, et, Al. “Drought sensitivity of the Amazon rainforest.” Science. 2009. 323: 1344-1347.

17. Sabine, C, et, Al. “The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2.” Science. 2004. 305: 367-371.

18. Schuur, E, et Al. “Vulnerability of permafrost carbon to climate change: Implications for the global carbon cycle.” BioScience. 2008. 58: 701-714.

19. Tarnocai, C, et Al. “Soil organic carbon pools in the northern circumpolar permafrost region.” Global Biogeochemical Cycles. 2009. 23: GB2023.

20. Canadell, J, et, Al. “Contributions to accelerating atmospheric CO2 growth from economic activity, carbon intensity, and efficiency of natural sinks.” PNAS. 2007. 104: 18866-18870.





The Value of Economic Sanctions

The administration of economic sanctions by a country or group of countries against another country as a means to induce certain policy changes has been a staple of foreign policy for decades. The use of sanctions is popular because it is viewed as a viable alternative to taking costly and frequently unpopular military action. One powerful preconceived notion involving economic sanctions seems to be that it offers the greatest probability of success for the lowest possible cost. Decades ago there was a significant probability that economic sanctions could be utilized as an effective means to influence policy or strategy change because the global economy was still reliant on a small number of countries. However, due to globalization and the emergence of a significant number of new economic players, it is much more difficult to influence policy change through economic sanctions. The biggest problem with modern economic sanctions is their structure and execution did not evolve as the global economic and political community evolved. This lack of evolution has left economic sanctions that may have worked in the 1950s and 60s flawed and with a much lower chance for success in present day. The continued use of economic sanctions with little alteration in application demonstrates a large disconnect between theory and reality for those responsible for the administration of these sanctions.

Improperly designed economic sanction policies actually have a greater probability of doing more harm than good; creating a greater divide in the relationship between the sanctioning and the sanctioned countries further reducing the probability of success in future diplomatic engagements. This possibility is one of the reasons the application of economic sanctions can be detrimental because they frequently act as an accelerant in conflict between two countries. Typically economic sanctions are levied by one country against another country because the sanctioned country is taking an action, be it economic, political or militarily, that the sanctioning country disapproves of and possibly believes to be dangerous. In large part economic sanctions can be regarded as the last step before a military conflict/intervention, so clearly when a country uses economic sanctions that country normally does not currently have a quality diplomatic relationship with the sanctioned country where rationality and even quid pro quo diplomacy can be utilized.

Unfortunately when friction exists between two countries the governments of those countries use political propaganda to further increase distrust of the opposing country in their citizens. This propaganda can facilitate a nationalist response when faced with economic sanctions from a country viewed as the enemy where instead of capitulating to the threat of or actual economic sanctions, the citizenry of the sanctioned country unites in defiance with their leaders. Such an attitude is characterized by those citizens digging in even harder rather than be characterized as weak, which would establish a precedence that they can be pushed around at the sanctioning country’s whim.

The two most notable historic examples illustrating the failure of economic sanctions are between the United States and Cuba and the United States and Iraq. For over 40 years economic sanctions have been the policy of the United States towards Cuba and yet a Castro still remains in power (Fidel to Raul) and the economic system is still socialist (those who refer to the economic system of Cuba as Communism need to actually research the definition of Communism). Realistically there are only two reasons economic sanctions remain on Cuba. First, for simple vengeance as the initial reason for enacting economic sanctions was due to Fidel Castro illegally seizing U.S. property and assets in Cuba when he seized power. Clearly those in power who owned those assets did not look upon such an action favorably. Second, a fanatical anti-Castro movement by Cuban-Americans in Florida and other places around the U.S. continues to provide heavy political pressure on the federal government to continue the economic sanctions; ironically pressure which the government caves to for no real legitimate reason because the voting power of these individuals as a whole is rather pathetic.

Economic sanctions on Iraq lasted for over a decade and still did nothing to induce revolution to overthrow Saddam Hussein or change Saddam’s policy towards his own citizens or the rest of the world. Instead military force was used to remove Saddam from power. In both situations all economic sanctions really did was hurt the citizens of those sanctioned countries as well as hurt the economy of the United States. Most free-market proponents believe that utilizing capitalism and free trade would have influenced the desired political change much faster and efficiently by providing incentives to maintain a positive relationship through the purchase of goods. Basically if Country A sells Country B a lot of product x and product x is valued Country B will have a more friendly relationship with Country A. So why do policy makers skill believe that economic sanctions under their current design are a viable strategy for inducing foreign policy changes?

Why has the generic blueprint for the general economic sanction remained the same for over six decades with the only improvement being the advent of ‘smart sanction’, which has had mixed results at best? One possible explanation is that in the early post-World War II period economic sanctions, most initiated by the United States, were successful a vast majority of the time. Unfortunately that early success turned out to be a negative influencer for future results, convincing U.S. authorities that economic sanctions would frequently work and that the structure of those post-war sanctions was the proper structure to achieve success. In addition most of these successful economic sanctions were unilateral further fostering confidence in the superiority of the U.S. economic system and its influence aboard. Interestingly enough this mindset has yet to truly change despite significant failures of unilateral U.S. economic sanctions to generate change from the late 1970s to the present.

Overall there appears to be no good explanation for why the basic structure and methodology behind economic sanctions has not changed significantly. The sad reality is that even when economic sanctions are successful they rarely induce long-term significant change; instead the successes derived from economic sanctions are short-term, typically single event victories. So realistically economic sanctions can only achieve moderate goals in the first place and even those goals have become less attainable in modern society. Perhaps the reality of the situation is that world leaders have concluded that any variation in the economic sanction design will not significantly change the low probability of success, so they have elected to not waste time and resources by modifying the old strategy. Instead economic sanctions are viewed as a policy designed to make the public believe that something is being done about country A that is perceived to be threat for given reason B when in reality nothing of significance is being done. Of course if this is true, economic sanctions are a rather harmful ‘do nothing’ policy for they are detrimental to U.S. based exporters and in some respects U.S. based importers.

If economic sanctions are ever going become a viable alternative to military action its failings must be identified and corrected. The chief problem with economics sanctions is that originally there was motivation to facilitate such sanctions through the United Nations; in fact that facilitation was part of the motivation for establishing the United Nations where the sanctions would have multi-national support, but such a strategy was never really established; therefore most economic sanction strategies became unilateral or at best a small network of countries seeking a common goal. Through most of the 20th century, especially after World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the economic clout to influence policy through the use of economic sanctions, but globalization has increased the number of effective economies in the global trading game reducing the overall influence of each single economy. Now unilateral sanctions regardless of who imposes them have a much smaller probability of success.

Unilateral sanctions are difficult to successfully administer on two different counts. First, the country being sanctioned needs to have a strong economic relationship with the country that initiates the sanction or the sanction will have little to no effect. Second, the sanctioned country must not be able to acquire a significant amount of resources to neutralize the effect of the sanction. Failure in this second criterion is why most unilateral sanctions fail as even though a powerful economy may elect to cut trade ties with a country only in the rare situation of a global product monopoly will the sanctioned country not be able to receive necessary resources from another country. Countries, like individuals, tend to look out for their own interests first and there is no reason for these other trading partners to agree explicitly with the policies suggested by the sanctioning country without analyzing how such a policy change would influence them. It is irrational for the countries pushing for the sanctions to expect other trading partners to abide by the proposed sanctions because their desired policy is righteous and correct.

Additionally if the first parameter is met, the sudden depression in supply to certain resource sectors of the sanctioned economy can create new opportunities for existing and possible future trade partners to capitalize on the product shortfall. Instead of adhering to the sanction these countries could look to make-up the lost supply carving out a new piece of a foreign market that might not have been otherwise available. Understanding these realities lead to the reasonable conclusion that the goal of the sanction will rarely succeed if it is politically unilateral. The best way to circumvent the economic advantages that non-sanctioning countries receives by not adhering to the sanction is to convince the non-sanctioning countries that the policy the sanction seeks to change is critical for their own national interest. Basically the sanctioning countries should try to convince other possible trading partners that without a policy change in the sanctioned country the future detriment will exceed any short-term economic gain.

If the policy that the sanctioned country wants changed is not critical for the additional trading partners or it is, but they cannot be convinced of such, then the best way to establish policy change is for the sanctioning country to remove a sufficient number of the other potential trading partners from the equation by offering them a better deal. To eliminate the possibility that other countries trade with the sanctioned country, the sanctioning country should negotiate short-term trade agreements with those other partners under the condition that they will not trade with the sanctioned country. These trade agreements should have similar structures and product movement that would be seen between the partner in question and the sanctioned country. Note that only enough trading partners need to be neutralized so that the sanctions will negatively affect the economy of the sanctioned country. Of course such trade agreements will probably increase the total cost of the sanctions for the sanctioning country as well, so the policy change that is being targeted must continue to exceed these costs in overall benefit. Fortunately these trade agreements also may mitigate some of the job loss and capital loss from ceasing trade with the sanctioned country.

In the end even if the proper allies are created, the overall policy change goal when considering the ramifications of the economic sanctions must be rational. A good example of an irrational goal is a portion of the goal involving the economic sanctions placed on Iraq by the United States. Part of the reasoning behind the economic sanctions was to induce rebellion in the Iraqi populous in order to overthrow Saddam; however, such a revolution is improbable when your rebels are sick and dying because they are not getting enough food and medicine because of the economic sanctions placed on their country. Remember that product distribution regarding economic sanctions will typically go from top to bottom. The have-nots will be hurt more often and more severely than the haves. Hence planners need to keep these realities in mind when determining goals for economic sanctions.

Overall before embarking on a proposal to engage economic sanctions against another country it would be wise to consider the following factors:

1. Make sure the eventual policy change goal of the economic sanction is rational and attainable;
2. Ensure enough economic clout to negatively affect the economy of the target country;
3. Neutralize other possible trading partners by convincing them that it is in their best interest to join the sanction or by entering into short-term trade agreements to neutralize the economic gain from trading with the sanctioned country;
4. Immediately cease trade with the sanctioned country as the faster and more forceful the disconnect the greater the probability that the sanction will work at a reasonable cost to the sanctioning country;
5. Do not be afraid to negotiate with the sanctioned country after a fixed period of time under the sanction, the policy change goal does not need to be all or nothing;

Monday, December 7, 2009

A Brief Discussion about Change

An old cliché is that change is not easy, which like most clichés is true because unfortunately there are significant obstacles to transformation especially in either behavior or thinking. First, an individual has to believe that there is a problem with their behavior or thought process that demands change. Belief in such a reality is a complicated issue because of different perspectives regarding how one should think. Also one must also take into consideration the absolute level of change demanded for a particular individual, for some individuals simply may not be able to think to an advanced stage due to limitations beyond one’s control, not everyone in life is a philosopher.

However, the biggest obstacle to overcoming this condition is the simple fact that most people do not like to admit when they are wrong about something, even when presented with overwhelming evidence to the contrary. There are two basic options to defeat such a psychological imperative: first tap into personal pride. Sticking to one’s ‘guns’ even when wrong should be viewed as a poor light, not revered like it tends to be. Basically an individual should feel shame for being wrong and resolve to correct those error(s). The second option is to penalize the individual for being wrong. Thinking that 2 + 2 = 5 should come with a huge financial or personal penalty because if an individual is not going to have enough pride to accept when he/she is wrong then society must correct that behavior not through incentive, but through punishment.

Second, the participants have to have the capacity for change. Change typically requires strength of will, a characteristic that is not common place in most individuals. There is something that can be said for blind faith being a driver of change, but the general outcomes generated by blind faith are more randomized than typically desired. The reason strength of will is required is because change demands, as previously mentioned, admitting that the current course of action or behavior is wrong. Humans tend to shun the prospect of confirming that they are wrong about something, thus one must have a psychological means to overcome this distaste and the cognitive dissidence defense mechanism hence the strategy of tapping into personal pride.

Third, even if an individual is aware of their superficial or inappropriate behavior and/or erroneous thought process it may be by design. For example the individual could have tried to be him/herself at one point in time and was just unhappy for some reason, either he/she did not like him/herself or society did not like him/her and behaving in a disingenuous manner is a mechanistic attempt at creating happiness. Of course an argument can be made that such happiness is simply a lie, but that leads to the deeper question: is it better to live a happy lie or an unhappy truth?

The second rationality for behaving against one’s true nature may be to advance in a particular social or occupational infrastructure. It cannot be intelligently argued that human society does not favor certain characteristics and attitudes over others; although society claims to desire diversity, reality paints a different picture. Thus, an individual may think the best course of action is to change behavior to represent something society or a potential mate may want instead of who they truly are. Unfortunately such action seems rather detestable in that to achieve such a standing a person has to destroy the sense of self. What is worse an individual behaving/thinking in a despicable manner or an individual play-acting in a despicable manner solely to advance in society?

Such a question is interesting in that some could argue that clearly the former is worse because if one is clever enough to realize how a certain aspect of society is exploitive and chooses to exploit that aspect to his/her own advantage that individual should be praised. However, the thought of such praise leaves a bad taste in the mouth because such action does not change the fundamental flaw in the system instead it indirectly supports that flaw.

For example one is reminded of the verbal confrontation between John Stewart and Tucker Carlson on the now defunct CNN show “Crossfire” in 2004. Mr. Stewart opened the question and answer portion of the show involving him with an unexpected significant criticism regarding the validity of "Crossfire" as a genuine debate and information source. In response Mr. Carlson criticized the seriousness and usefulness of the news commentary provided by "The Daily Show", which Mr. Stewart hosted at the time and still currently hosts. Mr. Stewart appeared to view this criticism as comical because "The Daily Show" was supposed to be satirical and comedic in nature; bolstering this point Mr. Stewart cited that at the time puppets making crank phone calls was slotted right before "The Daily Show" whereas CNN claimed, and still does, to be the most trusted name in news and Mr. Stewart’s criticism was directly related to not living up to such a boast.

By Mr. Carlson criticizing "The Daily Show" instead of defending "Crossfire" he was basically telling the public that both "The Daily Show" and "Crossfire" were ill equipped to properly disseminate and analyze the news, thus limiting the quality of either show. Mr. Carlson should have instead defended "Crossfire" in effort to demonstrate its importance in the news community and simultaneously hurting Mr. Stewart's credibility to lodge future criticism of similar nature. Although one can somewhat understand the attack strategy as the criticism of "Crossfire" could have been viewed by Mr. Carlson as a criticism of him because of his direct involvement with "Crossfire", such an emotional response seems to be typically more detrimental than beneficial. This example relates back to the exploitation situation in that society as a whole is better served if the exploitation is brought to light instead of kept in the shadows because a particular individual wants to use it to his/her advantage. Basically a wrong should be corrected, not defended through manipulation or citing wrong in that which is trying to correct the wrong.

The fourth barrier to behavioral change is the knowledge of change. One may want to build a better clock, but if one does not know how to build clocks that desire to build a clock is wasted. The knowledge could come from the individual, but not all individuals have the experience or intelligence to know what needs to be done to change. Therefore, if an individual is to change a means to initiate that change must be outlined to the given individual otherwise how will change occur?

Environmentalists have this problem in that they frequently suggest that individuals cut their carbon footprints in effort to derail the prospects of serious global warming. Some even go into more specifics on how to achieve a reduction like improving the energy efficiency of their homes. Unfortunately that is where almost all of them stop, failing to realize that improving energy efficiency is still a rather complicated endeavor when factoring in which contractors to use, how to get started, rates of return on investment, etc. Perhaps more people would pursue energy efficiency if someone created almost a step-by-step guide. Paging the authors of the ‘for dummies’ books, the environmentalists need you.

Due to these four elements a simple ‘call to arms’ type statement for change, again something commonly used by environmentalist, will more than likely be ineffective. Each of these elements must be dealt with effectively if any real and lasting change in behavior is to occur. Logic seems to dictate that the second and third barrier make up the principle reasons individuals behave/think in a certain way. Unfortunately such a situation creates a significant problem. Regarding the third barrier, the individual is playing a disingenuous role that creates a net advantage in existence over acting in a genuine manner. It makes no logical sense for an individual to exhibit his/her genuine character if the individual can effectively manage life as that fake person. Therefore, the only means to initiate change in those individuals is to remove the greater benefit from the false persona.

The problem with fostering change when faced with the first aspect of the third barrier is the psychological phenomenon of inclusion. Recall that although individuals say the politically correct things, in reality life and society do not like diversity (otherwise most of the issues involving ethnicity and race would have ended a long time ago), instead they are like chemistry: like dissolves like. People prefer dealing with people that do not exist outside of the realm of their own expectations. Interacting with those that do makes them uncomfortable and typically drives them away from those individuals towards safer and more familiar pastures.

Equally influential is the prospect of being alone which is a powerful negative force that again only the strong can truly neutralize as a mover in their life. Humans by evolutionary nature are social beings. If one acts in such a way that limits the potential for social interaction, it is understandable although unfortunate, that the individual would readily abandon true self to ensure positive social interaction. Tying the issue of change to the field of relationships, despite fairy tales to the contrary, there is not someone out there for everyone and a vast number of individuals do not recognize ‘Boulevard of Broken Dreams’ as their personal theme song. In short it is difficult to be you when life kicks you in the teeth for being you.

In large context conquering the third barrier may be simple relative to conquering the second barrier. The third barrier involves balancing any differential rewards to a given personality or mindset regardless of factual or empirical correctness. One particular mindset cannot be rewarded beyond another particular mindset with regards to a given issue without empirical evidence demonstrating factual superiority on that given issue. Basically being right and logical needs to be the driver in how a particular mindset is rewarded. The problem is prying away enough power from those that prefer to be wrong that such a change can occur. For the second problem people must be instilled with a level of personal pride where they rebuke anyone that does not accept them for themselves within the context of social norms and the legal system.

Make no bones about it change is indeed a tall order. However, the second barrier cannot be fully conquered until society as a whole can understand the unique offerings of each individual and how they can contribute positively to society. Otherwise the probability of any successful mass unmasking of those hiding behind facades unfortunately remains low. Thus steps must be taken to facilitate and nurture this potential for a new mindset. Overall society must demand that individuals focus on casting aside those elements that are statistically false, which will involve change for many, in order to optimize not only present benefits, but future benefits as well.