Why is Society Ignoring the Easiest Path to a Low Carbon Energy Infrastructure by Rejecting Nuclear Power

For decades certain parties have dreamed of the reality of “renewable” energy generation with the sun and/or wind providing the lion’s share, if not all, of the energy for a given society. Unfortunately decades removed from those initial dreams, society is little closer to that reality. Solar and wind proponents would argue that such a statement is foolhardy for the total percentage of energy generation from these sources rises ever higher year after year. However, these same proponents fail to acknowledge, or even realize, that neither solar or wind have had to face any real test supporting their viability as the chief energy generator. Can one say that an individual is really closer to passing a test when his percent correct has increased from 1% to 6%?

The lack of sufficient penetration has tabled effective identification of what type of integration methodologies will be required to evade consistent brown outs due to the intermittency of these technologies. However, it is known that battery technology for storage is still in its infancy, especially on a mass scale, and little discussion is given towards the significant shortfall in numerous rare earths to ensure solar and wind economic viability relative to the scale demanded; for solar economic viability is questionable even with these rare earths. Also there is a lack of general understanding regarding the required levels of redundancy to create the storage reserve. Despite these real unanswered questions where theory is stacked against solar and wind supporters, groups like ARPA-E continue to search for the “next energy breakthrough” commonly to support the expansion of wind and solar while seemingly ignoring the fastest and most stable route to a no/low carbon emission energy future… nuclear power.

No one can dispute the stability, low to no carbon emission and base-load power generation ability of nuclear power. The failures associated with the widespread adoption of fission based nuclear technologies, including the development of breeder reactors, have not be the result of technical flaws, roadblocks produced by the laws of physics, safety profiles or even overall capital and operational costs, but instead has been the result of a direct campaign against nuclear power based only upon paranoia, overreaction, fear and opposing economic interests.

Some may argue against nuclear power by citing certain projects that experienced large delays in construction and cost overruns. This criticism has valid and invalid points. The problem with simply citing a construction delay or cost overrun is that almost no construction project in the history of humanity be it a complex structure like a nuclear power plant or wind farm or a more simplistic structure like a corner grocery store have come in on-time and on-budget. The entire predictive process for the construction is consistently fraught with optimistic estimations and assumptions in effort to win the “bid” for the project either through associated agencies like subcontractors or to win approval for the project as a whole. Therefore, time and cost overruns should be treated as the norm, not the exception for any construction project.

However, optimistic estimations cannot explain all of the cost overruns. Another reason nuclear power appears more expensive than it actually should be is the lack of uniformity/standardization in design. For example when considering breeder reactors several different reactor prototypes have been proposed and even had initial construction periods. Anyone with any design experience knows that the most expensive type of product is the first working prototype (i.e. version 1.0). Due to the lack of coordination and cooperation between nations, instead of six or seven countries working together on one universal reactor design, economic competition has created an environment with numerous high level generation II to generation III breeder reactor version 1.0s, which has further increased costs.

Another rationality for cost increases with regards to nuclear power, especially breeder reactors, is simple short-sighted analysis regarding long-term cost benefit analysis. Basically breeder reactors remain more expensive (i.e. not directly cost-competitive) with more standard thermal reactors because research and development into breeders was quasi-sabotaged for decades by cheap uranium prices and corresponding economic incentives. So instead of acknowledging a time in the future when uranium may not be cheap due to potential shortages or more expensive extraction methods or simply understanding that nuclear power needed to evolve to be more effective in general and preparing for this reality with proper planning, both private corporations and government elected to take advantage of short-term gains that have now created long-term losses.

Basically capital costs associated with breeder reactors have been heavily influenced by the lack of standardization and the lack of a devotion to the continuous evolution of their design and construction. Any economist will sing the praises of assembly line and scale economics at dramatically reducing costs. Nuclear, especially breeders, has not been able to engage in these types of processes because of this “start-stop” mentality due to uranium prices, lack of long-term thinking, which is still plaguing the energy environment with so much short-term focus on solar and wind, and lack of cooperation among companies and governments.

Another issue that has been blown out of proportion is the danger of reprocessed material being siphoned off and/or stolen for the production of nuclear weapons. One of the original reprocessing methodologies, PUREX, certainly warranted concern because it is able to produce concentrations of pure plutonium after completion; however, PUREX is certainly not the only reprocessing method. There are a number of other methods most of which make plutonium isolation and extraction nearly impossible, thus making weaponizing the reprocessed material nearly impossible. Also appropriate safety measures can easily be applied to eliminate the potential seizure of any “weaponized” material. If terrorists acquire nuclear weapons it would be from some secret lab in Iran or from North Korea over a modern nuclear breeder reactor.

The final issue is the most depressing one when it comes to nuclear opposition, the overreaction to a meltdown. Overall there have only been two legitimate meltdowns in history, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. The events on Three Mile Island actually demonstrated what is supposed to happen when safety procedures are properly applied. The “demonization” of nuclear power at the hands of Chernobyl is especially ridiculous when considering both the technology at the time and the circumstances of the meltdown. If similar consideration was given to the airline industry then modern aviation would shutdown because a Wright Brothers’ era plane happened to crash. Of course that would never happen, which demonstrates the serious bias towards nuclear power possessed by certain entities.

Concerning Fukushima Daiichi, a power plant from the 50s built in one of the worst regions of the county it could have been relative to safety, it still required a once in a 1000-year natural disaster event to produce any negative outcome, which was in large part thanks to a lack of basic contingency safety protocols; yet these failures were heavily unjustifiably propagandized as inherent to nuclear technology instead of what they actually were: simple economic laziness/greed.

If nuclear power is the answer to addressing global warming what does that make of the other contenders? Clearly anything that produces significant quantities of CO2 or other greenhouse gases is out due to global warming issues, thus coal, oil and natural gas are non-starters. The idea of natural gas as a “bridge” from coal to a low-CO2 emission source may have been an option two or three decades ago, but is certainly not a cost-effective transition option now, despite the money the U.S. is wasting, relying on natural gas is a fool’s errand.

Geothermal is an option that would have been interesting to study regarding the enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) methodology as a realistic competitor to nuclear, but with the pertinent issue involving the potential progression of tectonic activity (periodic 2-3 Richter scale earthquakes under initial EGS tests, with time would this magnitude increases?) there does not appear to be adequate time to return to the start so to speak if earthquake magnitude progression was indeed a feature of EGS. Pipe dreams like tidal power and microwave/satellite solar are either boondoggles or do not have nearly enough momentum and potential to even be considered viable responses. Fusion, either of the hot or cold variety, seems no significantly closer now than two/three decades ago. Thus, the only valid competitors for nuclear appear to be terrestrial solar and wind power.

The biggest problem with both wind and solar is the intermittency associated with their energy generation. Try as they might to mitigate its importance, wind and solar proponents cannot in good conscious ignore the additional costs, maintenance, storage and redundancies required to compensate for this deficiency, which raise the costs associated with both solar and wind to levels that far exceed nuclear power. Without the need for storage and redundancy capacity to fill that storage then solar and wind are cheaper, which is the story solar and wind proponents sell the public; however, without storage and fill redundancy, it is logical to suggest that solar and wind will do nothing but produce rolling brownouts to blackouts as the principal energy provider. Unfortunately the current penetration structure of wind and solar does not provide any test cases to demonstrate these realities.

Another problem associated with wind and solar is that measuring their production via nameplate capacity commonly results in optimistic to unrealistic analysis. For example a wind farm reporting a nameplate capacity at 200 MW means that it produces 200 MW when functioning at optimal capacity. Unfortunately to actually achieve this maximum generation result, the wind needs to be blowing within the optimum speed range over the entire farm simultaneously, which is a meaningful statistical achievement; can it happen… yes; does it happen frequently, not even close. Furthermore the statistical probability of this occurring over multiple wind farms is even more unlikely. Basically the greater nameplate capacity built into this type of system, either within a single farm or throughout multiple farms, will result in an overall reduction in the expected maximum capacity that can be feasibly attained relative to the actual nameplate capacity.

In short it is unrealistic for a large wind producer to ever reach 100% nameplate at any given time and the more capacity that exists the lower percentage of the maximum that can actually be reached. For example (note these numbers are for explanation purposes not empirically derived, but accurately demonstrate the trend) a wind system with 3000 MW of nameplate will be able to achieve an average maximum generation of 2500 MW (83%) whereas a wind system with 4000 MW of nameplate will be able to achieve an average maximum generation of 3100 MW (77.5%). Of course these are only maximum values that are attained for a few seconds to minutes at a time; actual average wind capacity values for days to months range from 25-35% and have remained within this range for decades and show little sign of changing, despite certain levels of hype, hence the need for storage and redundancy to fill that shortage.

Another concern with both wind and solar generation is that their production potential changes significantly during winter months. The loss of solar during the winter is of no surprise to anyone that actually pays attention to general climate patterns; however, wind is trickier because while the overall average “amount” of wind does not seem to have any significant level of variance between seasons, its daily levels typically vary more during the winter than other months. Basically during winter months there is a higher probability that wind values depart from the mean both in magnitude and direction (i.e. positively or negatively). These larger departures place greater pressure on plant operators to smooth power curves and properly incorporate the energy produced from wind into the mix with other energy mediums. Remove those other more stable energy mediums and integration becomes even more difficult.

A number of solar and wind proponents have put forth the idea that smart grids will act as a panacea of sorts for the issues associated with integration addressing load balancing, peak curtailment and demand response among other potential problems. However, the scale of application associated with smart grids has been much lower than expected over the last decade despite attempts to invest billions of dollars in the process. Part of this significant delay is that some communities are rebelling against the installation of smart meters, central elements to the smart grid, even when costs of maintenance and installation are deferred to the utility company. While most of the reasons for the rejection of smart meters are thought to be questionable, it does not appear that smart meter detractors will be easily convinced off of their current position.

For example a portion of this resistance is the concern about the safety of potential electromagnetic and/or radiation that could emanate from the smart meter. Unfortunately smart meters may have entered that cell phone zone when it comes to radiation in that even if they are safe it may be impossible to convince some people of that fact and you can easily have an environment of “dueling” experts. Also unlike cell phones, smart meters do not have that “necessary for existence in society” reputation that cell phones seem to have.

Another problem for smart meters is a resistance by utility companies themselves to install them unless someone else is paying the bill due to a lack of standards through how the devices are connected to grid and communicate with each other. Basically no utility company wants to commit to a given format/design because that format may not be the one that “wins”, thus that preemptive commitment will result in significant financial losses. The situation is similar to the problem with the expansion of electric cars. Currently the existing infrastructure to support electric cars is basically non-existent outside of certain areas in California because those responsible for building it are waiting for electric car sales to increase to the point that justify building it, but without an infrastructure few individuals have interest in buying an electric car in part due to the worry that the infrastructure will never be built to support the purchase. One side has to take the leap, but neither side is willing to do so.

Even if smart meter installation was as widespread as hoped, smart grid proponents have acknowledged the problems associated with securing the flow of information and energy within the system. Currently there are valid concerns regarding how prone the system is to being hacked, which raises questions regarding the long-term security and safety of a smart grid. This is not to say that smart meters, and in large part a smart grid, do not have a role to play or cannot be safe, but the issues associated with their adoption and safety place a burden on their speedy application and mass testing that significantly damages the viability of a dominant wind and solar energy infrastructure.

Another issue with wind power that is not commonly considered is whether or not the general price of wind power is close to its minimum in that with a vast majority of the high-value wind collection land masses already being utilized, newer wind turbines will have less naturally efficient areas to generate power. Realistically this issue should not produce an environment were traditional wind power will significantly start increasing in price, but instead it would counteract any cost savings from any further technological advancement in wind turbines. The real question regarding future costs associated with wind power is storage level and medium.

Further problems for solar/wind supporters is even some of the “champion countries” of renewables are not seeing the carbon emission reduction numbers theory and general behavior would suggest. While in isolation Denmark’s wind generation numbers look impressive, they are not consistent, to the point where Denmark relies heavily on energy transfers to and from neighboring countries. Basically if these transfers did not exist Denmark would be in a state of constant brownout due to wind intermittency.

Currently this transfer process is stable because of the more consistent generation mediums possessed by other European countries, most notably natural gas and Swedish and Norwegian hydropower. At the current time and in the foreseeable future the ease of transfer to reduce volatility in Denmark’s energy markets would become incredibly difficult, if not impossible, if Europe adopted similar wind percentage generation profiles. Basically while wind proponents like to cite Denmark as the poster child for “what wind can do for you” its close proximity to Swedish and Norwegian hydropower provides a very unique environment that is not technically or economic replicable for other countries.

Also despite investing heavily in wind and solar power over the last decade Germany has not meaningfully reduced the level of coal and natural gas derived energy production. In fact for Germany CO2 emissions in the energy sector, the most critically relevant area for judging the impact of renewables, have increased relative to the past year (2012 vs. 2011, etc.) in 3 (2012, 2013 and 2015) of the last 4 years for when information is available. The reduction of CO2 emissions in 2014 relative to 2013 is also somewhat marred for it is highly probable that these reductions occurred because of lower energy consumption during the winter due to much warmer than average temperatures over that winter. So while the share of renewable sources of energy in Germany continue to expand, the CO2 emissions from its represented sector are not dropping, which speaks poorly towards the ability of renewables like solar and wind to quickly drop energy derived CO2 emissions, which is exactly what needs to occur to combat global warming.

Note that the issue concerning winter temperatures is also a big deal in Germany because of the lack of available renewables during that time period; solar is almost non-existent in Germany during the winter netting a typical average capacity of 10-11% and wind generation is rather erratic.

Some could argue that this result has been heavily influenced by the decision to suspend operation of the German nuclear power plant fleet with the intent of its future decommission. While this decision certainly has resulted in greater coal and natural gas use, the problem is that there was little reduction of energy derived carbon emissions even before the decision to suspend nuclear power use in Germany instead most of the overall reduction stemmed from the measurement point being 1990 right after the integration of heavily industrialized East Germany into West Germany producing an artificially high point of reference.

Finally one of the troubling aspects of the solar and wind proponent argument is a questionable interpretation of time. They properly acknowledge that ceasing carbon emissions must occur quickly, yet do not acknowledge that creating the type of solar/wind energy infrastructure to actually accomplish this reality will take a long time. Part of this apparent contradiction is that supporters are emboldened by the solar and especially wind percentage growth rates over the last decade as justification for the superiority of wind and solar despite these growth rates not representing meaningful penetrations into global energy markets. Basically wind and solar are still at best small supplemental energy producing elements.

Furthermore another problem, as mentioned before, is a number of proponents believe that once society “actually” commits to a solar/wind energy infrastructure future, the problems and issues associated with this system will magically disappear with Master Plan #1 succeeding without qualm or fail. It is akin to attempting to build a railroad track ahead of a speeding train… everything must go perfectly for it to work and anyone who thinks that any of the current infrastructure plans pushed by solar and wind proponents is anywhere remotely viable is, quite frankly, a fool.

At the present time the best idea to combat global warming is for the entire global community to agree on a single design for a nuclear fission breeder reactor and then allocate resources to begin the specialization required for manufacturing the required components and training the necessary construction and operational personnel. The simple fact is that too many questions and inefficiencies exist in any feasible plan to defeat global warming via the utilization of mass solar and wind energy generation; so much so that foregoing nuclear in favor of solar and wind is a recipe for disaster. Overall global cooperation through the initiation of a real and new nuclear renaissance is the most effective, economical and direct way to combat global warming while maintaining a consistent and reliable energy infrastructure in the developed world as well as allowing energy impoverished nations the ability to advance their energy consumption profiles without endangering the environment.

Where is my Solar and Wind Only City?

Two years ago this blog proposed a challenge to solar and wind supporters that if solar and wind were indeed the energy mediums of the future and did not require the assistance of other energy mediums (most notably fossil fuels like coal and natural gas) then they should empirically demonstrate this potential by transitioning a single medium sized city (10,000 – 15,000 individuals) to a grid where at least 70% of the electricity, not even all energy, was produced by solar and/or wind sources. Unfortunately despite the passage of two years and the so-called further expansion of solar and wind technology no such experiment has been conducted.

This lack of attention to detail in producing a model city that would empirically represent and support the actual ability of solar and wind to produce the bulk of electricity and even possibly all energy in the future beyond simple hype is troubling. Are solar and wind proponents so irresponsible that they are willing to gamble the future of society on merely their hopes, dreams, and personal preferences rather than raw data? Do they think that incorporation of solar and wind to a grid steadily advancing from 10% to 20% then 30% then 40% then 50%, etc. will run perfectly with no significant problems? If so, then the solar and wind supporters who believe these things should be stripped of all of their credibility and influence; those who do not believe in such a perfect transition should begin immediately petitioning to accept the challenge.

To the solar and wind proponents who object to the above characterization due to the notion that in March Georgetown, Texas (population approximately 48,000) proposed a plan to get all electricity from solar and wind sources, in essence meet this challenge, hold your horses. While it is true that there has been an initial arrangement between the Georgetown Utility Systems and Spinning Spur Wind Farm (owned by EDF Renewable Energy) and SunEdison to purchase 294 MW (144 MW wind and 150 MW solar) from their installations, this is only an initial arrangement, no actual testing or application has occurred yet.

A more pertinent issue regarding the use of Georgetown as an example is that there is no specific information pertaining to the details of how Georgetown Utility Systems will manage this change in supplier. Basically the only public reporting on this strategy have been puff-hype pieces with no real substance or details. Both Spinning Spur Wind Farm and the yet to be identified SunEdison site have not been fully constructed, are not operational and do not have any secondary storage capacity; thus any electricity produced by these institutions will be live and when those institutions are not producing electricity there will be no electricity to provide to Georgetown.

Initially there are at least three major questions that must be addressed to legitimize Georgetown as a model for a solar/wind only powered city. First, where is the detailed analysis of how electricity, and possibly even energy flows, would be properly compensated to avoid brownouts in times when there is insufficient electricity being produced by solar and wind sources? Simply saying “the sun shines in the day and the wind blows when the sun is not shining” is laughable and severely damages credibility. Anyone who thinks that there will not be periods of intermittence from both Spinning Spur and the SunEdison site is harboring an inaccurate belief. Basically show that 100% renewable can be done using math, not flowery words and misplaced hype; note that it is important to also include any transmission and inverter losses in the calculation and separate nameplate capacity from actual operational capacity.

Second, it stands to reason that proponents of a solar/wind only city will not allow the use of natural gas or coal to act in a backup capacity during these periods of intermittence; therefore, during periods of excess solar and wind, electricity must be stored in a battery for use at a future time. So what type of battery structure(s) is going to be utilized to store that excess energy and what is the economic feasibility of using this structure? If no battery infrastructure is believed to be feasible or economical then what type of energy medium will be tapped to act as backup in lieu of a fossil fuel medium and how will it be properly incorporated?

Third, how will consumer costs for energy change from the transition away from fossil fuels over time, i.e. what will costs be in year 1, what will costs be in year 10…? To simply say it will cost less is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated that it will cost less both now and in the future and if it will not cost less in the future what forms of compensation, if any, will be provided to the residents of Georgetown?

Overall these are just the three most basic questions that must be addressed before anyone should accept the idea of Georgetown, Texas being a legitimate 100% solar/wind powered city when their plan is put into place a few years from now. If these questions are not answered with accurate specifics that are later properly executed over time then Georgetown loses all significance as both a legitimate and symbolic experiment for the validity of a solar and wind “future”.

Of course it must be understood that the results in Georgetown are only an initial step, success only provides support to the possibility, not any guarantee for national eventuality. So how about it solar and wind supporters are you actually ready to put your theories to the test or are you simply content with the unscientific and irrational belief that everything will magically work out without the need for essential specifics, realistic assumptions, honest economics (which is incredibly lacking in most pro-solar and wind papers) and valid proof of concepts?

Solar and Wind Need to Step up to the Plate

Over the last few years there has been a steady back and forth between various individuals and groups about the viability of wind and solar power to account for a vast majority of the future energy infrastructure. Despite legitimate concerns with the potential effectiveness and consistency of such a system, wind and solar proponents continue to place their faith in its viability with no scale evidence validating this faith. In addition proponents of these technologies believe that the public must be made more aware of the “adaptability” of solar and wind versus fossil fuel generators. However, why does the solar and wind manufacturing and deployment community allow this uncertainty to linger instead opting for its new plan of engaging in a new more aggressive marketing plan to “sell” the public on the idea of solar and wind? Providing evidence to support one position or the other is quite possible; at least it must be for numerous wind and solar power supporters continue to claim that the limiting factor to “greening” the energy infrastructure is the deployment rate for wind and solar plants over existing technology.

Note that this experiment must exceed the testing irrelevancies of electricity aggregation or renewable energy credits (RECs), which do nothing significant to demonstrate the reliability of wind and solar energy providers. Wind and solar proponents envision an energy infrastructure that incorporates wind and solar into comprising at least 70%+ of the entire electricity providing system (maybe even 70%+ of all energy at some point eventually), thus that number seems to be a good threshold point. However, this dream should only be pursued if these technologies are actually able accomplish this goal; therefore, as stated above the current legitimacy of this system must be tested and its strengths and weaknesses must be adjudicated. So how would such an experiment be conducted?

A simple starting methodology must include, but not be limited to, the following boundary conditions/rules:

- Approach a small city (approximately 10,000-15,000 population) and receive permission to change the electricity provision infrastructure from the current existing mix to 70% solar/wind with a 30% other;

- At no time could the electricity provided to the city from non-solar or wind sources exceed 30% or the test would be considered a failure of the experiment (note this condition includes all electricity derived from storage sources like batteries); note that this condition could be modified based on how many brownouts/blackouts the selected city was willing to accept;

- All participating companies will have a year to prepare for the switch from existing mix to solar/wind dominated mix; a good idea would be for a coalition of solar/wind companies to select a city by July 31, 2013 and then start the experiment on July 31, 2014.

- An independent auditor will track electricity use and costs associated with that use and any addition construction related to that electricity infrastructure;

- The above point must consider net electricity use not gross electricity production. For example suppose 1000 MW are produced, but only 500 MW are used due to a lack of storage, the produced count must be 500 MW not 1000 MW in percentage calculations in order to not overstate the used production rate of renewable sources; i.e. utilized reserves is what matters not name plate capacity.

- Note that the city does not have to remain static once the test has begun, it can still add or subtract electricity infrastructure features; however, these changes must be incorporated into the evaluation metric for the efficiency and validity of the renewable sources tested;

If the simplicity and viability of the above methodology is to be believed then what is stopping one (or more through a coalition) of the various solar and wind companies from administering it? Realistically there seem to be only two reasons. First, wind and solar proponents are not accurate in their assessment that these energy technologies are advanced enough to effectively substitute for fossil fuel technologies and wind and solar companies know it, but don’t want to admit it. Second, solar and wind companies are not sure whether or not such an experiment will be successful and are afraid that if it is implemented and fails the negative publicity surrounding such a failure will produce a significant handicap to their future growth.

This potential “fear of failure” attitude is interesting because most intelligent people realize that failure is an integral part of technological growth, so why pass up an opportunity to explore the strengths and weaknesses of what numerous people hope is the future energy infrastructure in a real experimental environment over the worthless rooftop-like piecemeal “experiments” that are currently conducted? One possibility is that these companies believe that a failure in the above type of experiment will be regarded by society not as a learning experience, but as an inherent flaw in the technology itself, thus a higher probability of possible abandonment and lose of millions. This is a fear that solar and wind companies need to get over if they want to better serve society both now and in the future because if the technology does have flaws that are not corrected for before their application then society loses more than just money.

Despite the above concerns the apparent trepidation by solar and wind energy companies when it comes to this type of experiment is disconcerting. If they were confident in the maturity of the technology and its ability to provide consistent electricity to a populous then such an experiment should have already been conducted. Success would produce a valuable and powerful point of evidence that would support the rapid expansion and deployment of solar and wind energy technology and further demonstrate what strengths would benefit society from such a system and what weaknesses exist, which could be improved upon over time.

Two final notes, first some may point out that the city of Lancaster, California has recently spearheaded a large growth of solar power, but understand that it is no where near the capacity necessary to power the city and is probable too large a city for this initial test (population 157,000+).

Second, some may argue that Portugal’s 2013 1st quarter success of 70% power generation from renewables demonstrates its validity as the future energy infrastructure. However, when looking at the details of the renewable breakdown this success becomes less and less impressive and repeatable in the short-term. For example while Portugal is an above average producer of energy from non fossil fuel sources, favorable weather is more of a reason for the higher renewable percentage than anything else. A large spike in existing hydroelectric efficiency (312% increase) drove most of the change with no significant new project builds. In fact Portugal solar photovoltaic penetration only made up approximately 0.7% of energy use (in 2012), which is in direct contrast to most plans put forth by solar enthusiasts regarding massive solar deployment and is counter to the challenge presented in this blog. Therefore, Portugal’s success proves nothing about the validity of a solar/wind energy infrastructure, just the usefulness of hydroelectric power.

Overall if the benefit of success is a significant increase in growth rate of the industry, why has no one in the solar/wind industry attempted such an experiment? This lack of experimentation reminds one of the blind faith that some have in electrical vehicles acting as mobile storage batteries to augment solar and wind power, yet no one has ever demonstrated the viability of such a strategy in a community of 5,000 people let alone a country of 300+ million. If the solar and wind industry want their technology to be taken seriously as a substitute for existing fossil fuels by all parties then they have to demonstrate the ability to do the heavy lifting with minimal assistance from other energy providers. Otherwise why waste time playing with expensive toys in lieu of proven fossil fuel substitutes like nuclear and geothermal?

The Need for Serious Analysis of Wind and Solar in the Future

Carbon mitigation is essential to limit any detrimental significant damage to the environment and by extension human civilization. However, carbon mitigation requires intelligent planning and forethought not a simple scratch-the-surface methodology buttressed by good intentions and hope. Sadly most of the individuals that place significant hope in a vast deployment of solar and wind power behave in this very manner when it comes to the incorporation and maintenance of such an idea. The hard questions are either outright ignored with a sporadic scolding of those asking along with labeling as ‘anti-renewable’ or ‘anti-Earth’ or these questions are addressed through the use of inappropriately isolated or small examples, which only brush the outside of the core inquiry. What follows is a group of questions that everyone who supports the massive deployment of solar and wind power in the eventual representation of over 80+% of energy consumption should be able to answer in nauseating detail and specifics in order to justify the legitimacy of their beliefs that such widespread deployment is the appropriate strategy.

As France is the model country for nuclear power, many solar proponents are looking towards Germany as the model country for solar power [of course the solar strategy embarked on by Germany has always been confusing due to the below average capacity ratings (5-20%)]. In addition, due to political pressure, Germany as also begun to rapidly decommission existing nuclear power plants before eliminating coal power plants. While combining the loss of the trace emission nuclear plants with the below average capacity of solar power make little sense in a centralized power structure, solar proponents that support Germany have quickly sought to explain this behavior with the contention that Germany is exploring decentralization of their electricity grid, which requires the elimination of baseload in favor of load following plants to augment the energy from renewables.

The problem with decentralization is that no one has actually explained why it is superior to a centralized system consisting of nuclear and/or enhanced geothermal system baseload. The two immediate looming problems in a decentralized system is first based on economic theory the overall costs of such a decentralized system greatly exceeds a centralized system largely due to the increased transport costs (multiple build sites versus one) and adjustment for terrain inefficiencies resulting in redundant builds. Second, intermittent energy sources (solar and wind) require storage backup, but in a decentralized model this storage backup can lack multi-modal storage inputs, thus it would demand more redundancies in the system, which would further increase costs.

So those individuals that support a decentralized model of energy need to demonstrate the justifications for the incredible increase in costs over a centralized model governed by nuclear or enhanced geothermal as well as document how effective storage systems for each decentralized unit will be developed as it is assumed that individuals would want on-demand electricity availability.

Another potential problem that solar proponents avoid is the relationship between solar radiation management geo-engineering and solar energy. Most solar proponents would suggest that this confliction is irrelevant because it would be dangerous to undertake solar radiation management based geo-engineering methodologies. Unfortunately the slow global response to carbon mitigation increases the probability that solar radiation management techniques need to be utilized despite questions of uncertainty. For example at the moment global temperatures have increased approximately 0.9 degrees C. If one believes the conclusions of Dr. James Hansen, one of the grandfathers of climate science, this temperature increase only represents approximately 50% of the anticipated warming associated with the concentration increases of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due a two tiered (one slow and one fast) feedback effect. Thus, another 0.8-1 degree C temperature increase is expected in the future even if carbon emissions were reduced to generate a net mass balance difference of 0 tomorrow (basically the amount of carbon released into the atmosphere equaled the amount of carbon removed by carbon sinks).

At this moment expecting such a result is completely unrealistic and most individuals believe global emissions will continue to rise, largely due to the growth in China, India and Brazil and mitigation resistance from more developed countries like Canada and the United States; therefore, it would be reasonable to add at least another 0.8-1 degree C temperature increase to the 0.9 that has already occurred and the 0.8-1 that is already expected for a total increase of 2.5 – 2.9 degree C. Working from existing information and behaviors this is the best possible case for warming at the moment. Even this ‘best-case’ will place significant strain on both the environment and society that solar radiation management geo-engineering strategies will more than likely be needed.

Due to the fact that all solar radiation management techniques will reduce the volume or intensity of solar energy striking the earth what strategies do solar proponents have that will address how this reduction will influence available solar energy and electricity when solar consists of 40+% of the grid as dreamed of by solar proponents? As discussed above, simply saying that it will not happen is not a viable strategy because logic dictates that it probably will happen.

The most important issue that solar and wind supporters refuse to address is the realistic long-term shortage of rare earths, which depending on the type of rare earth will either result in higher mining and building costs or the inability to construct the particular renewable source. It is surprising that solar and wind proponents do not address the central question of whether or not enough materials even exist to construct their desired trace emission energy infrastructure. This reluctance implies either ignorance to the fact that rare earth supply is actually an issue or fear as answering the question of rare earths will lead to an answer that will not be liked. Look at this blog post for an excellent place to understand the rare earth issue.

Returning to one of the central problems with the arguments of solar and wind proponents is a matter of scale relative to intermittence. It stands to reason that wind and solar supporters are tired of hearing about intermittence as a problem, but that characteristic is the greatest weakness of solar and wind power. Sadly the more pressing problem almost seems to be the way proponents are responding to this weakness with inappropriate exaltations of very small and sheltered proof-of-concept test storage plants like Gemasolar (19.9 MW). No realistic individual can conclude that an effective solar infrastructure can be developed by building millions of 20-50 MW solar plants, thus these small proof-of-concept plants cannot be touted as the solution to the intermittence problem.

Another problem pertaining to intermittence is transmission loss. In a more centralized model for solar and wind power generation a vast majority of the production occurs in low population areas, which will result in meaningful transmission losses. Unfortunately for the most part the extent of these losses is unclear. Thus solar and wind proponents need to understand how the scale and nature of these losses of these low population infrastructure plans they have devised are appropriate.

For example all three types of plants (baseload, load-following and peak) operate on a general level of consistency based on usage trends. However, they are able to do so because they are dispatchable in various ways whereas wind and solar are not. Thus, transmission losses may provide more influence to wind and solar transfer versus current sources because those losses are more sporadic and non-linear than the more linear losses of baseload plants. Within the vein of transmission loss is the unfortunate crutch of a smart grid. While the full incorporation of a smart grid would be great, too many renewable proponents view it as inevitable and as a panacea for all intermittence and transmission problems, which it is not on both accords. Thus, renewable proponents must make contingency plans in case smart grids do not emerge in the ubiquitous nature solar and wind proponents dream.

Another big problem for proponents is storage, but not in the limits maximums demonstrated so far, but the demands that will be required. One must recall that the storage components to these plants start empty and need to be charged. Clearly this charge comes from surplus generated by the system. Most proponents believe that this surplus will be widely available, but there is a concern that these proponents are misleading themselves because their conclusions come based on observations of the existing energy infrastructure where significant overage is created by solar and wind sources due to existing fossil fuel baseload. However, if that fossil fuel baseload is removed then the probability for surplus is dramatically reduced. Therefore, in a trace emission energy world heavy redundancy of solar and wind constructions will be required to ensure sufficient storage during the ‘bleaker’ times. The concern is that not only will this excess redundancy increase costs, but is it even possible to construct due to rare earth shortages?

For example suppose renewables are to replace 500 MW from a baseload plant. If renewable sources function at an average capacitance of 25% with a 100% penetration one would initially suggest more than 500 MW of name-plate capacity is required (probably somewhere between 750-850 MW) to effectively cover the replaced baseload amount. Unfortunately the unpredictability of intermittence along with the maximum ceilings on storage elements (due to cost even if a surplus of 124 MW may exist over the period of a month only 50 MW may be available for storage) will demand that an even greater redundancy be developed to ensure available electricity. Basically if one could plan out all weather over the course of a year and how much electricity would be demanded every minute or so over that year then redundancy would be more controllable, but because this is not the case more source is required to cover the uncertainty.

Some proponents argue that biomass based energy, which can be better controlled, will act as a counterweight limiting the amount of redundancy required. The problem is that individuals who make this argument do not discuss how a steady supply of biomass will be cultivated over years and years because most of the biomass supply utilizes land that will compete or complicate food production. For example one idea is to use grain and forest residues because no animals consume them, but people forget about bacteria and how the bacterial-based decomposition of these residues aid soil quality; take away these residues and soil becomes more exposed to water and wind erosion in addition to being stripped of nutrient rejuvenation.

Wind and solar proponents largely have a problem with details and specifics when it comes to their ideas for a future trace infrastructure governed principally by these two generating sources. When planning for the future the details need to rival that of the Sistine Chapel not ‘Connect the dots to see an outline of an elephant’. The two biggest problems seem to be that most proponent tie cost, name-plate and storage estimations of wind and solar to the present system with fossil fuel baseload instead of the future system where fossil fuels and (for most of them nuclear) will not be contributing to the energy mix. Also proponents have not appropriately addressed the availability of rare earths both from a cost structure and a simple supply amount. Part of this problem is that rare earths that are used in wind turbines and solar cells are not exclusive to these elements, but are also utilized in other commercial products. The looming potential of solar radiation management strategies is also ignored in general under the increasingly less realistic belief that they will never be utilized.

Overall wind and solar proponents need to start getting serious when it comes to the details and future planning of their intended energy infrastructure; just looking at Germany and saying ‘that’s the model’ is not good enough because the German system is not mature or independent enough to warrant it as a model.

To do list for proponents of various energy technologies

What solar power proponents need to do:

- Demonstrate that solar power can be a baseload provider. How: Recruit a city of 50,000-60,000 to be powered by solar power (and maybe wind) with no fossil fuels or nuclear power as backup.

- Construct a modeling study from now until 2050 where:

- No new nuclear has been constructed and fossil fuel energy generation has
been reduced to at least 0-5% of 2011 levels (assuming some potential for
application of CCS).

- Slow, but rational rates of growth for biomass and geothermal (0.5-1.5% per year).

- Assume three principle scenarios of future global energy use: down 10%, up 10% and up 33% (despite the publicity about the gains that could be made by improving efficiency it is reasonable to anticipate more global energy use in the future due to continued economic development in Brazil, parts of
Africa, India and China).

- Wind power can represent anywhere from 3% to 15% of global energy generation with an average real-world generation capacity of 25%.

- Model energy demand over four distinct periods: early morning, early
afternoon, late afternoon/evening and late night and how available energy
generation technologies would meet this demand;

- Create a specific plan for the construction of solar power infrastructure asking exactly where, how much, at what cost, etc. This information must be very detailed, ‘this area here from latitude coordinates x and y and longitude coordinates a and b will house x number of mirrors, PV or whatever generating an average of x between hour x and hour y’ instead of ‘built a lot in the Mojave Desert over some arbitrary x by x area’.

- Calculate how much raw materials, including rare earths, will be needed to construct all of infrastructure for solar power including material extract rates relative to construction rates. In addition determine where these materials will come from and what production rates will be required to ensure stable and clean acquisition streams;

- Identify the best storage system apart from pumped hydro, which will normally not have applicable association with high quality solar locations (not a lot of pumped hydro availability in deserts). Calculate storage scale requirement and associated economical costs for this storage medium for required backup amount (still uncalculated due to lack of real-world large scale solar applications).

What wind power proponents need to do:

- Demonstrate that wind power can actually significantly contribute to the energy profile of a future energy infrastructure. Currently most wind power, even in countries with very high wind power penetration like Denmark and Germany, is heavily supported by the existing fossil fuel baseload. Due to this support most anti-wind individuals argue that for all of the wind power that has been installed, very little actual absolute carbon emission reduction has occurred in response. Wind power proponents need to produce a very specific report describing exactly how highly variable would operate without the fossil fuel baseload backbone to fill in the gaps.

- Create new energy generation models accounting for future wind speed predictions based on the anticipated change in global wind speeds due to the shrinking deltaT between Arctic and Temperate regions. There appears to be information that wind speed in most scenarios will decrease with larger standard deviations from the mean average due to the higher probability of tornadoes and hurricane formation. More Information

- Plan out the necessary elements balancing production between further wind power penetration and manufacture of electrical vehicles due to competition between rare earths and their potential shortages, especially yearly production shortfalls in neodymium and dysprosium. More Information

- Determine if constructing more conventional wind turbines is practical due to the increasing demands for conventional raw materials such as steel and concrete. The inherent low MW/single structure ratio of wind power will especially become difficult to manage in their production and transport if the issue of Peak Oil comes to pass. Therefore, is it even relevant to continue to produce convention wind turbines when other energy alternatives are available?

What geothermal power proponents need to do:

- Significantly increase the number of experimental EGS-Geothermal test pilot plants to determine future problems that may arise from EGS systems. The construction of these plants is also needed to generate further experience EGS system design to potentially lower economic costs.

- Demonstrate future drilling techniques that can be used to meet the increased depth demands of EGS systems over those depths used for oil or gas extraction, will be viable.

- Develop better heat pumps or other heating systems to optimize power generation from EGS systems as well as reduce potential seismic side-effect activity.

What biomass power proponents need to do:

Nothing, because there is no rational reason to pursue any further increase in biomass based energy. Economically viable biomass demands the use of land which will be in direct competition with food production and potential carbon sequestration through bio-char production. In such a competition biomass based energy finishes a distant third in importance. Non-economical biomass based energy can evade excess land use, but there is no reason to invest in expensive trace energy sources over other alternatives. Basically biomass-based energy fails because there are other energy generation alternatives available, but no legitimate food generation alternatives available with regards to required land use.

What tidal power proponents need to do:

Nothing, because there is no rational reason to pursue offshore hydro (tidal) power at all. Tidal power is not economical and will take a technological miracle for tidal power to produce large amounts of uninterrupted energy.

What nuclear power proponents need to do:

Three major reasons are used to justified opposition to nuclear power: cost, residual nuclear waste and its storage and pure personal morality. The first two reasons can be and should be addressed.

- Discuss the variance of cost between countries for construction nuclear power plants including the potential for global safety recommendations that will apply to all nuclear power plants around the world. These recommendations could also involve an independent inspection organization to ensure compliance.

- Develop a storage strategy for nuclear waste. Nuclear proponents cannot simply rely on the hope for the future development and commercialization of Type III and Type IV generation technology to address future nuclear waste accumulation as the possibility does exist that nuclear power will be needed, but these advanced nuclear technologies will not be readily available.

In addition to answering these issues the environmental community itself needs to be much more proactive in addressing the number of reports that come out from various institutions both in objective criticism and publicity. Currently there appears to be no ‘warehouse’ of sorts where individuals can go online to view any major report on a given energy medium regardless of what individual or organization produced it. One would think that if an organization like the newly merged 1sky/350.org actually cares about the environment organizing such an archive would be one of the first things they would do, but yet no easily accessible archive exists. Basically the environmental movement needs to create a ‘Cochrane Collaboration’ for energy putting all of its personal bias aside and look for the best solution.

Overall the important goal that solar, wind and geothermal proponents need to accomplish is demonstrate that at least one of these technologies can provide baseload electricity in a future energy infrastructure. If not then there exists almost no point in constructing these technologies over nuclear, despite any ‘excessive’ costs associated with nuclear power because it makes more sense to develop a future energy infrastructure around an expensive, but capable baseload provider than an expensive or inexpensive, but incapable baseload provider.

Planning the Future of Energy with Rare Earths

Millions of jobs, less dependence on foreign energy suppliers, lower energy prices in the long-term, etc. These are just some of the buzz phrases that environmentalists and ‘Climate Hawks’ use to push for the development of trace emission energy sources over dirtier fossil fuels and even nuclear power. Unfortunately very few of these individuals/groups even consider the material resources that will be required to construct a new trace emission infrastructure of significant size. Until an honest and objective discussion and strategy is conceived for addressing the infrastructure demands it is irresponsible for individuals to push a trace emission environment in a specific direction.

The buzz phrase in the manufacturing industry with respects to the elements that comprise the most important aspects of what most individuals envision in a trace emission environment (wind turbines, solar panels, electrical batteries, etc.) is rare earths. The primary reason rare earths are important in these industries is their strong permanent magnetism. For example neodymium magnets are an alloy of neodymium, iron and boron that forms a tetragonal crystal structure with the molecular formula Nd2Fe14B.1 The chief advantage of these magnets is their energy product of approximately 440 kJ/m3, almost ten times that of ceramic ferrite magnets, which reduces the total size and weight demand on the magnets.2

The two problems surrounding rare earths are first that while the term ‘rare’ is somewhat misleading (most rare earths are more abundant than silver and gold in the Earth’s crust), most deposits are spread so thin that harvesting them is not economically attractive thus their commercial availability is significantly reduced versus their actual availability. Second, the presence of radioactive thorium can spoil some deposits.3 Compounding these problems are that while researchers are working hard to produce viable alternatives, no rare earth alternatives have been discovered which maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of its counterpart. Magnets are especially tricky for no alternatives currently exist which allow for miniaturization with similar energy yields and those energy yields are quite important for maintaining a reasonable size, weight and cost in devices like hybrid/EV engines and wind turbines.

Due to the critical importance of rare earths it is vital to determine consumption patterns with regards to how the new trace emission infrastructure will emerge. One way the importance of these rare earths in the future infrastructure can be seen is in the construction of wind turbines. One rare earth that is important in creating the most reliable and efficient wind generators for a turbine and has caught some attention is neodymium.

First, a source of supply needs to be determined. Based on recent Chinese statements it is unlikely that it will continue to export large quantities of rare earths after 2012, despite this limitation being an incredibly foolish strategy, thus other supplies, especially domestic, must take the bulk of the supply responsibility. Domestic supplies are important because if foreign supplies are tapped, environmentalists need to stop boasting ‘less reliance on foreign suppliers’ as an advantage to the generation of a trace emission energy infrastructure.

Contrary to some popular belief, China does not have 97% of the known economically viable rare earth deposits (only about 37%), but the 97% number relates to production rates. Therefore, in the short-term if China does stop exporting large quantities of rare earths it will take an unknown period of time before the necessary operations are available in other countries including the United States to compensate for those losses. The biggest problems for domestic production are not the mining operations themselves, but processing/purifying operations because almost all quantities of rare earths are not pure and actually permitting the mines themselves; basically the purification and the paperwork both which take copious amounts of time and money.

For example currently there is only one fully established rare earth mine in the United States, the Mountain Pass mine now owned by Molycorp, which closed in the 1990s due to economic concerns. The known reserves in Mountain Pass have been estimated at approximately 20 million tons with about 8.9% of those reserves being rare earths and about 11.1% of those rare earths being bastnaesite and monazite, which yield neodymium.4,5 Assume that 95% of this 11.1% is recoverable neodymium from bastnaesite and 5% is non-recoverable neodymium from thorium containing monazite. Assume that 100% of the neodymium reserves in Mountain Pass still exist and that all of the neodymium in Mountain Pass will be used in generators for wind turbines. Note these assumptions will probably not hold true, but for the sake of a best-case scenario analysis it makes sense. Therefore, of the 20 million tons of reserves in Mountain Pass about 187,701 tons of neodymium should be available.

Most trace infrastructure plans cite a significant dependence on wind power. So for this argument assume that the United States builds an additional 350 GW of wind nameplate capacity over the next 20 years (2011-2031). Note that nameplate capacity is the maximum generation potential for a wind turbine. Thus, a 1 MW wind turbine can generate at most 1 MW of power at any given time if the wind is blowing above a particular speed. Optimization of performance for these wind turbines demands the use of neodymium. The reason neodymium is required for a turbine is the use of a permanent magnet over gearboxes. Replacing gearboxes is preferable to ensure low maintenance and high reliability both in total operation time and during operation. Due to its inherent properties neodymium is the most effective material to use in the construction of these permanent magnets. It is possible to construct wind turbines that do not use neodymium, but it is difficult to have confidence that those turbines will provide a steady stream of power when conditions permit.

Earlier on it had been reported by Jack Lifton, Co-founder and Director of Technology Metals, that 1 ton of neodymium is required per 1 MW of nameplate capacity.6 However, that number has been misinterpreted for the 1 ton is in reference to neodymium-iron-magnet alloy not neodymium alone. The general consensus for the amount of required neodymium ranges between 200 – 300 kg per 1 MW of nameplate capacity or 441 – 661 pounds (0.22 – 0.33 tons).7-9 Therefore, for 350 GW of additional capacity these turbines will require 77,000 –115,500 tons of neodymium. So the largest known supply of neodymium for the United States covers 100% of a hypothesized, yet reasonable capacity of future wind power desired by a number of environmentalists with anywhere from a 62.5% to 143% additional overlap.

While the maximum reserves appear to be available, a secondary issue apart from the total neodymium demand is the yearly demand versus associated production. Assuming a linear average, construction of wind turbines over the 20-year period would result in the addition of 17.5 GW of nameplate capacity per year. This rate of construction demands a neodymium production rate of 3,850 – 5,775 tons per year. Due to the closing of Mountain Pass until just recently and lack of processing facilities, no reasonable person would suggest that the United States will be able to develop this amount of yield for a significant period of time (at least 5 years maybe) without shipping raw materials to a country like China that already had the processing capacity.

Another issue also exists apart from the rare earth issue, the fact that constructing this infrastructure will take enormous amounts of conventional resources. For example returning to the wind turbine discussion above, a 1.5 MW wind turbine typically requires approximately 29 tons of steel.10 Due to a lack of available information and the evolution of wind turbines in nameplate capacity assume only a 40% increase in steel requirement is needed for a 100% increase in nameplate capacity (40.6 tons for 3 MW). Constructing 350 GW of additional capacity would require 116,667 new 3 MW wind turbines, which would require 4,736,680 tons of steel.

On its face it appears that this value is not significant relative to global production values of over 1.35 billion tons of steel per year12 (2007 value is used to account for the loss during the global recession) and a U.S. annual production value of 98.1 million an additional 4.7 million should not be an issue. However, looking at the issue of steel is not as simple as solely comparing anticipated additional production to existing production. Recalling that because this steel requirement is an addition to the steel demand, it is important to ask about how this addition adds stress to the supply chain.

For example there are two possible scenarios that appropriately describe the situation. First, there is a gap between present production and maximum production, i.e. the resources are available to produce more steel, but the economic demand is not present. Second, there is not a significant gap between present production and maximum production; the resources to increase global steel production are not readily available. In the first scenario additional steel demand from new wind turbines can be absorbed in an economic way by the production stream, but in the second scenario it cannot. So it is important to confirm which scenario is valid before coming to the conclusion that the additional required steel will not be a concern.

Furthermore there are three important considerations to make regarding these numbers. First, taking the conservative assumption that U.S. electricity use only increases 10% in the next 20 years to approximately 4.57 billion MW-hr12 (once again 2007 data used to account for the recession) the deployment of an additional 350 GW of wind nameplate capacity will be able to replace, at a maximum, 27.6% of that theorized used electricity. Second, environmentalists are interested in using hybrids and electrical vehicles (EV) to replace transportation emissions. Unfortunately neodymium is a critical component in the operating engine requiring 1-2kg per car.13 Assume that 1 million hybrids/EVs are built per year over the next 20 years (20 million or about 12.5% of the existing vehicle fleet assuming no increase, which is a horrible assumption) would demand an additional 22,000 – 44,000 tons of neodymium total and 1,100 to 2,200 tons per year. Third and most importantly these numbers are for nameplate capacities and not real world wind generation values. Assuming an optimistic 35% operating capacity, an additional 1.085 million tons and 11.6 million tons of neodymium and steel respectively would be required to guarantee attaining an average for the original nameplate values. Clearly the steel value is still workable, but the neodymium requirement is not within domestic boarders or even global supply. These numbers also could include the 8% molybdenum that is typically doped into high-quality steel [total estimated requirement = 324,800 tons (for original estimate) to 928,000 tons (for nameplate average estimate)].

Tie these material requirements with the real potential of reduced wind speeds due to temperature equalization between Northern and Central latitudes along with the significant reduction in high-quality locations to collect wind power and it becomes difficult to envision the legitimacy of the large role that some environmentalists anticipate wind power playing in the future trace emission energy infrastructure. Until wind proponents can overcome these legitimate concerns regarding neodymium absolute resource limitation with regards to average capacity factors and yearly production demands it is difficult to take their arguments about wind power being an important part of a future energy infrastructure seriously.

The point of this post is not to conduct a full analysis of all of the potential limitations of rare earth supplies relative to demand, but instead bring this near-future production shortage and potential long-term optimized production shortage to the attention of those that argue that a future trace emission energy infrastructure should consist largely of wind and solar power. Also understand that cost relative to supply of neodymium is not the chief concern, but accessible supply itself and processing that supply. Recall that rare earth concentrations are not highly concentrated despite their frequent occurrence in the crust, thus when the major deposits run out new mines will have to be constructed for very insignificant concentrations which would highly dissuade many companies from even attempting extraction.

Note that this post did not address the element with the most critical crunch if massive wind scale up proceeds: dysprosium. Estimates range from 3-12% of the permanent magnets in wind turbines (the same which use neodymium) consist of dysprosium.14 Thus using the same example from above, 1 MW of nameplate capacity would require 60 to 240 lb of dysprosium and 350 GW would require 10,500 to 42,000 tons. On its face that range does not seem bad, until it is acknowledged that there may not be that much dysprosium economically available on the face of the Earth. For example less than 1,500 tons of dysprosium is produced globally (99%+ by China); that number is not influenced by a lack of demand and resources are heavily on the decline.

There are some high hopes for potential dysprosium deposits in Ucore’s Bokan Mountain Mine, but no hard numbers have yet to be complied. Even if significant deposits are uncovered, it will take years before production numbers reach what they need to be. Perhaps Paul Emile Lecoq de Boisbaudran saw the future when naming dysprosium after the Greek term for ‘hard to get’. Even if the production issues regarding neodymium are successfully worked out (remember this analysis only looked at estimated wind generation for the U.S. not global or no other elements like EVs), for wind power proponents it very well may come down to choosing either hybrid/electrical vehicles or wind power not both due to a lack of dysprosium.

Although not discussed serious concerns still exist for the construction of large-scale solar power instillations and PV panels especially concerning gallium and indium deposits. However, while wind power has serious questions that its proponents choose to ignore, solar power has some hope to overcome its rare earth problems. Potential viable efficiency increases lie both in exploration of the hot electron and quantum dots. Also preliminary lab tests have demonstrated effective solar cells using more common elements like copper, zinc, tin, sulfur, and selenium.15 However, these cells have not been tested in the field yet, so unforeseen problems could arise.

Overall it is important that those individuals who so feverously demand rapid deployment to a wind and solar energy infrastructure explain in specific detail how the massive required scale-up is going to avoid resource shortfall. In short if one believes that building a bridge over a 100 ft wide chasm is the best solution, that individual better check to confirm that existing resources will allow for the construction of a 100 ft bridge, not merely a 73 ft bridge. Otherwise it may be more beneficial for resources, effort, time and money to be devoted to other trace emission energy technologies over those that will fall short.


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1. Drak, M. and Dobrzanski, L. "Corrosion of Nd-Fe-B Permanent Magnets." Journal of Achievements in Materials and Manufacturing Engineering. 2007. 20. 239:

2. Herbst, J. F. "Neodymium-Iron-Boron Permanent Magnets." Journal of Magnetism and Magnetic Materials. 1991. 100. 57:

3. Haxel, G, Hedrick, J, Orris, G. "Rare Earth Elements-Critical Resources for High Technology." U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 087-02. Nov 02. 20.

4. David Jessey Geological Sciences. http://geology.csupomona.edu/drjessey/fieldtrips/mtp/mtnpass.htm

5. Mountain Pass rare earth mine. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mountain_Pass_rare_earth_mine

6. "Rare Metals Investment News Updates, Today's Edition." Gerson Lehrman Group. May 7, 2009. http://www.glgroup.com/News/Rare-Metals-Investment-News-Updates-Todays-Edition-%28RareMINUTES%29-050709-NEODYMIUM-38883.html

7. "The Effect Of Chinese Domestic Growth On Neodymium And Dysprosium Supply." Technology Metals Research. Mar 13, 2011. http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/2011/03/the-effect-of-chinese-domestic-growth-on-neodymium-and-dysprosium-supply/

8. http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2009/01/jack-liftons-research-on-mineral.html. 2nd Comment

9. "Why rare earth metals matter." Mineweb. May 18, 2009. http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page72102?oid=83419&sn=Detail

10. Pomeroy Wind Farm. http://www.pomeroyiowa.com/windflyer.pdf

11. List of countries by steel production. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_steel_production

12. “Electric Power Industry 2007: Year in Review.” Table ES1. Summary Statistics for the United States, 1996 through 2007. Energy Information Administration. May 2008.

13. Luft, Gal, Korin, Anne. Turning Oil Into Salt: Energy Independence Through Fuel Choice. 2009. ISBN: 1-4392-4847-8.

14. "The Fight over Rare Earths." Technology Metals Research. Nov 10, 2010. http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/2010/11/the-fight-over-rare-earths/

15. "IBM Develops Higher-Efficiency Solar Cells Using Non-Rare Materials." Popsci.
Feb 2, 2010. http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-02/ibm-develops-higher-efficiency-common-element-solar-cells

Determining the Future of the U.S. Electrical Grid

Although the official position of the government is not to attempt to select winners and losers through application of certain policy, the situation involving the environment is becoming dire. It is time for the government to realize that the free market is not capable of developing the appropriate grid demographic to substitute for the electricity provided by coal in the necessary allotted time frame to avoid severely detrimental consequences. This failure of the market is largely because of all of the lobbyists and the ‘so-called experts’ that are unwilling to accept the potential shortcomings in their preferred power medium. Normally even in the face of this common market bias people have faith in the market that the best option will outmaneuver the lesser options eventually controlling the market; however, on the doorstep to the end of ‘cheap oil’ with the era of ‘no oil’ not that far behind, decisions need to be made now, something the market is incapable of doing.

Almost all infrastructure is dependent on oil for its construction due to material transportation and construction operation and in an era of constant $150+ a barrel oil it will be incredibly difficult to construct an effective new electricity grid when the market is still deciding upon a winner because of its inefficiencies and imperfections. A wide range of piecemeal energy infrastructure (solar plant there, wind farm here, nuclear plant there, geothermal plant here) will not solve the energy problems of the future and yet that is exactly where the market is leading energy infrastructure. Therefore, the government MUST convene a legitimate and thorough energy conference to determine what one or two power mediums will be supported by government funds and which power mediums will be left out in the cold (from a government funding and subsidy perspective). It is time for the U.S. government to step-up, do its job and stop relying on the ‘all-powerful’ market to do a job that it is ill-equipped to do. Below are some concerns regarding most of the viable candidates to replace coal to get the ball rolling.

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Some Issues about Nuclear Power –

1. With the lack of commercially viable Generation IV plants and none predicted to be available until 2021 at the very earliest, can Generation III plants carry the load for nuclear investment in the near-future from a cost prospective for clearly the cost effectiveness of Generation II plants is lacking.

2. Generation III plants do not appear to be able to create a negative radioactive waste load, so until Generation IV plants are created and fully commercialized in, at the earliest, 2025 where does all the excess radioactive waste go?

3. Although the probability of nuclear accident/meltdown is extremely small in modern nuclear plant designs, there are still lingering questions about who will foot the bill in the case of an accident.

Note the issue of ‘target for terrorist theft or strike’ seems irrelevant as no nuclear power plant has been destroyed by terrorist attack in decades of operation and with Pakistan, North Korea and in due time Iran all having nuclear bomb capacity, the impact and probability of terrorists stealing substandard and improperly enriched materials from a nuclear plant seems significantly unlikely when they can more easily acquire it from these countries.

Some Issues about Geothermal Power –

1. Without enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) is geothermal even worth pursuing as a baseload power source?

2. Can EGS be commercialized fast enough for geothermal to become a chief baseload provider warranting a rapid ramp-up of geothermal or should expansion be slow and steady pursuant to a back-up baseload provider?

Some Issues about Solar Power –

1. Will storage mediums ever move from uneconomical proof-of-concept plants to something which is actually realistic for a 500 – 1000 MW plant?

2. When will transmission lines be upgraded to dramatically reduce efficiency losses to warrant the massive economic investment of solar power in out-of-the-way desert and other high sun-low functional regions?

3. Will solar power ever become affordable relative to other options or will proponents continue to sell the yet-to-be-proven idea of scale-up significantly reducing prices? For decades solar proponents have professed that if only given a fair chance solar power could economically compete with fossil fuels and yet this proclamation for all intensive purposes remains false.

4. How will large-scale deployment of solar power handle large volcano erruption events? What is the attitude regarding the confliction between using solar power and the geo-engineering technique of seeding the atmosphere with sulfur dioxides?

Some Issues about Tidal Power –

1. Can tidal derived power even begin to produce any meaningful level of power required within the appropriate time frame of climate change? Basically is it even worth talking about tidal power?

Some Issues about Wind Power –

1. No one, wind proponents or wind opponents, seem to address the very real possibility of slower average wind speeds in the future due to higher average air temperatures in the Arctic brought on by climate change taking a significant bite out of wind power generation potential. Here

2. The concern that cost per MW for wind power is actually moving upwards not downwards as the best land-based locations for wind power have already been developed. Note: Offshore wind farms have yet to materialize in any significant capacity to develop a real and valid cost estimation to how their future development would influence overall wind prices per MW.

3. There is still the issue regarding how much emission savings wind power actually generates. Initial intuition leads to the conclusion that additional wind power that directly replaces coal or natural gas should reduce carbon emissions and while correct that intuition could be too simplistic. The problem with wind power relative to coal or natural gas is that wind power has only intermittent capacity, which demands backup power from more reliable sources (coal, natural gas, nuclear, geo-thermal or some form of storage medium). Unfortunately wind power advocates continue to downplay this need for effective and efficient power storage strategies to augment widespread wind power deployment on legitimate scale up grounds. Most pro-wind arguments make very optimistic estimates about the ability to scale up wind power via potentially unrealistic assumptions, like an average wind power failure with a very low standard deviation a la Diesendorf’s “the wind is always blowing somewhere” comment. Exactly how much backup is needed? Not surprisingly wind proponents cite almost nothing and wind opponents cite almost 100%. What is actually the right answer?

Also there is the issue of natural gas. Natural gas proponents feature natural gas as a cheaper and more reliable source of electricity over alternatives like wind, geothermal, solar and nuclear in the short-term. Such a strategy could be troublesome because widespread expansion of natural gas could be viewed as a significant waste of money because natural gas is not an endpoint energy solution, even if society wanted it to be one. While switching all coal plants to natural gas would cut total U.S. carbon emissions anywhere from 10.5 to 13.1% (derived from 2007 EIA data depending on natural gas plant efficiency), such a strategy is only a stop-gap measure because if emission targets to evade the worst consequences of global warming are to be met natural gas use as an electricity source must be minimized. With that reality would any significant scale-up of natural gas use for electricity be regarded as a waste of money if it has to scale back down 10 years later when that investment could have better been distributed to a cleaner and more permanent energy generation technology like geothermal, nuclear or solar?