In the past the United States did not have entirely humanitarian motives when distributing food aid, but instead seemed primarily concerned with its own self-interests. Such an attitude was demonstrated through increases in food aid during periods of surplus production and reductions during shortfalls.1 The reason behind such a strategy was the simple economics of supply and demand. The greater the production of cereals or other agricultural type products, the lower the market price would be based on the overall scarcity of the good and the competitive environment for its sale. With farming already providing razor thin profit margins for most producers (large agro-businesses excluded), even a small reduction in price could spell disaster, so removing a significant amount of supply from the available marketplace is critical and was commonly done under the guise of food aid for another country. Even in the present, overproduction in the United States is a significant problem causing the government to subsidize a number of farmers to encourage them to not plant and harvest on their fields.
This price dilemma has existed for almost 100 years in the U.S. when surplus production (on a variety of products not just food) first threatened to diminish prices. In the beginning, two potential strategies were proposed for neutralizing the surplus and the resultant price drops. The first option was for corporations to increase wages paid to workers, so the domestic economy could better absorb the existing surpluses, thus maintaining appropriate price. The second option was to capture the foreign markets and sell the surplus abroad. The first option was commonly associated with socialism, thus leaders selected the second option. This decision created the chief motivating for foreign policy for the U.S. throughout the 20th century, economic expansion and maintaining influence on foreign markets.
Regarding this strategy one may say, ‘alright, so what if developed countries are motivated by their own economic self-interests when distributing food aid, the motivation in this situation is not important because the action itself is win-win for both sides. The developed countries get to stabilize or improve a portion of their economy and the developing country receives free food, so the citizens can spend what little money they have on other resources. Why is it such a bad thing that the developed countries are getting something out of the deal in the first place? Developed nations should not be expected to give handouts just because they can.’
Whether or not the situation is win-win is determined by the market availability of food in the recipient nation. For example in a scenario with large price spikes due to supply shortage, especially for third-world nations, most of the negative elements of food aid are marginalized. The primary negative component of food aid is that the donated food floods the marketplace in the receiving country, food prices plummet in response and the agrarian sector of the economy, which is considerably large for most countries that receive food aid, is stunted and does not grow perpetuating sub-standard economic conditions. However, a situation that results in the loss of a significant amount of supply, most likely due to a catastrophic event, will lead to an increase in price, making it more difficult for consumers to purchase food. So with higher prices, the profit per unit increases for farmers, but the volume sold heavily decreases. Under these conditions food aid is beneficial because if people cannot afford to purchase food it makes little difference who is doing the selling. The opportunity to provide food to the populous in this scenario should take priority over any short-term detriment to the economy. Dead or starving citizens are much more dangerous to the longevity of an agrarian-based economy than a short-term price drop due to a surplus of food. Although giving food to a population that has had a poor harvest or has a breakdown in the mechanisms to produce and/or distribute food self-sufficiently is certainly a win-win situation, in the past most surplus dumping created not a win-win, but a win-lose situation because these food availability breakdowns were not present. In essence this type of food distribution is not only giving the man a fish instead of teaching him to fish, but also breaks his fishing rods.
The economic ramifications of surplus dumping as food aid appear to be significant, but now the past motivation of surplus dumping for food aid seems to be just that, the past motivation. The reason for this change is that the United States, as well as other high donor nations, no longer have the vast cereal surpluses they did in the past, thus a vast majority of present food aid is now purchased from the market. For example in the past suppose Country A produced 15 million bushels of wheat which would demand a domestic price of $2 per bushel. If that $2 was not a sufficient price, 6 million bushels would be removed from the market and ‘donated’ as food aid to a developing country somewhere else in the world. Now with the wheat supply at 9 million bushels the appropriate price would increase to $3.50. Under the new supply situation the market would generate an increased gross sales total of 1.5 million more dollars against the old supply situation assuming 100% of the supply is sold in both situations. Note that this example is simply meant to describe the underlying market dynamics, clearly the numbers of unrealistic.
Under the new system instead of simply removing the wheat from the available supply, the government actually purchases the removed wheat at a given price, believe it or not typically above market rate.2 Under this new strategy, in the above scenario instead of producing 15 million bushels only 10 million are produced with 1 million being purchased. The total gross sales would be dependent on what the government pays. Due to the fact that the government is now electing to purchase the foodstuffs before giving it as aid due to less available supply, it would make sense that less food is being given as aid and that is exactly what has happened over the last decade and a half. Since 1993 global food aid has dropped consistently from a high of 17.3 million tons to only 5.9 million tons in 2007.3
Realistically it is unlikely that food aid will rebound to the levels distributed in the 90s anytime in the future due to climate change and other market influencing factors. Such a reality demands that every ton of food that is tagged for food aid needs to have a high probability of being used to assist those that it is designed to assist. This expectation requires discussing the future of food aid and its components like improved infrastructure and management of the food aid system. Currently it is difficult to conclude that the food aid command structure in the United States is operating at a sufficient level, for there are a wide variety of issues that can be improved. While some argue for a complete overhaul,2,4 such a dramatic response seems unwarranted at the current time.
Note that when most discuss food aid the term, ‘food security’, is highlighted. Food security is typically defined two ways, depending on the group. The U.S. government defines ‘food security’ as “the ability to purchase food in a global market, unimpeded by trade barriers such as tariffs, import quotas, preferential trade arrangements or production and export subsidies.”2 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as “when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food they need.”2 Neither definition is that useful because the U.S. government does not define a population expectation (does a country have food security if only 70% of the population meet the prescribed conditions) and the FAO definition is almost impossible to achieve under the common political structure of any country.
One future question is whether or not the definition of food security should move beyond simple food procurement. For instance some, like Amartya Sen, believe that food security not only involves access to food, but also other elements which improve life like healthcare, credit/loan availability, jobs, education etc.1 The idea is that food security should materialize into a factor describing the overall health of a nation instead of a stand-alone reference factor, i.e. food access is only a single element in ending hunger. Although ‘food security’ will not be debated in this post, it is important to understand that some directly apply any change in ‘food security’ when determining whether or not food aid is successful, thus the definition utilized is important.
In general food aid has to meet three criteria to officially be defined as food aid:2
1. The aid in question must involve multiple countries or agencies sponsored by or representing countries;
2. The aid must be ‘concessional’ (it must be provided free of monetary payment or at a price lower than market rate);
3. Food aid must either be actual food or in some form of tangible good of equivalent value that will be exchanged for food;
Take note of the third principle element in the definition of food aid because it will be an important consideration to a critical question later.
The FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) are the two principle non-government organizations that aid in distribution and track distribution of food aid. In 1954 the Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) was established in the FAO introducing the concept of Usual Marketing Requirement (UMR).6 The UMR outlines a minimum quantity of imports that recipient countries must make at non-concessional prices before receiving food aid in effort to neutralize market distortion and import displacement. To avoid significant disruption to necessary food aid, the UMR does not apply to emergency aid, aid stemming from charities or local purchases. Some triangular purchases are also exempt.6 In addition to the CSSD, in 1967 the Food Aid Convention (FAC) was drafted. Although it technically expired in 2002, it continues to operate under annual renewals despite negotiations for a longer-term renewal is still in limbo. The FAC aimed to establish certain rules and procedures associated with the distribution of food aid including minimum donation obligations.
Unfortunately the FAC lacks meaningful tracking or enforcement mechanisms to ensure those rules and conditions are upheld. Normally this is not a problem because the assigned minimums are typically far smaller than the actual aid given, thus there is little concern that those minimums will not be attained. Due to this lack of enforcement it is believed that only about 5% of the total global food aid between 2000 and 2002 were reported under the CSSD arm of the FAO.4,5 Although one explanation for the lack of reporting is the increasing amount of food aid that is tied to emergency aid which does not need to be reported to the CSSD.2 However, with a consistently rising percent of food aid being classified as emergency aid, if this reporting role of the CSSD is going to have any power, reporting rules will need to be adjusted. Therefore, because of these lingering problems some believe that the current FAC focuses on outdated issues and requires modernization.4 In addition to stronger enforcement and tracking, proponents of a new FAC would like to see more explicit regulations concerning membership expansion beyond donor nations to recipient nations and perhaps other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as better understanding between food donations vs. non-food donations (normally monetary donations).4 Such changes should work well at improving the logistics of food aid in the future.
Food aid can be divided into three categories, emergency, program and developmental (or project). Emergency food aid is rather self-explanatory; aid is given when a specific country suffers from an unexpected natural or man-made disaster.2,6 Developmental aid is given in effort to improve the economical infrastructure or the physical well-being of a specific country usually under some specific project (i.e. food for work, mother child nutrition centers, etc.).2,6 The last category is program aid although it is difficult to regard program aid as a genuine aid as it typically consists of government to government transfers where food is purchased with borrowed money (whether or not that money needs to be repaid is determined by the donor country), then that food is sold by the receiving government to the populous.2,7 Also program aid was the aid that was most commonly associated with surplus dumping and is typically regarded as having little influence on food security because the recipient government is in charge of distribution. A significant amount of program aid was used as a tool during the Cold War to acquire the allegiance of various foreign states against the Soviet Union.
In the past few decades, food aid distribution has demonstrated a reversal between emergency aid and program aid due to changes in the global political structure. With the ‘threat’ of Communism ending in 1989-1990 and an increasing emphasis on humanitarian aid, program aid has steadily fallen from almost 8 million tons in 1990 to less than 1 million tons (0.9) in 2007 whereas emergency aid has increased from 2.2 million tons in 1990 to over 5 million tons in 2005 before falling below 4 million in 2007. Regarding program aid South Korea is now the largest contributor through to its relationship with North Korea.3
Clearly it is important to ensure that enough food aid is provided for disaster relief, but one continuing criticism of U.S. food aid programs is that more food aid needs to be funneled towards economic improvement to lessen the demand for food aid (project aid). This contention is demonstrated in the fact that project aid has barely fluctuated in the last two decades (a slight decrease has occurred in recent years, largely due to the total drop in global food aid). Some argue that the stagnation in project aid stems from donor fatigue and lingering concerns over market distortion.7
In the future due to the specter of global warming, it is likely that emergency aid will steadily increase outpacing any real changes in project aid and program aid will continue to decrease although not vanish completely. The below figure illustrates the changes in these three programs from 1990 to 2007.3 The reason for the program aid spike in 1999 was quasi-agriculture collapse in Russia.
One of the ways that developmental aid can be increased as well as improved is altering the means of procurement. There are three ways that food aid can be procured. The first and most common, especially in the United States is direct transfer. Direct transfer involves the donor country purchasing the food that will be donated from the domestic market and then shipping that food to the receiving country. Approximately 58.6% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as direct transfers largely because over 99% of the 2.6 million tons of food aid given by the United States was through direct transfer.3
The second means is through local purchases. Local purchase procurement is exactly as it sounds, instead of acquiring the food from the supply of the donor country, the donor country purchases the aid from the recipient country. This form of food aid is popular with humanitarian and social developers because not only are the citizens of the recipient country receiving food, but also the economy of the recipient country receives the benefit of the purchase. In fact this method aids the developing nation in two ways. First, the purchase of the food improves the local economy and second the food itself aids the productivity and health of the developing nation. There are also advantages for the purchasing country, especially related to reduced costs as the market price in the developed nation is typically higher than the market price in the developing nation. In addition there are significant reductions in shipping and other overhead costs. Approximately 17.7% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as local purchases.3
The third means is through the use of middlemen, Country A purchases from Country B and then gives the Country C, otherwise known as triangular purchases. Although it initially may seem that triangular purchases simply invite inefficiency and corruption by adding another party to the mix and a local purchase should be made instead, triangular purchases do have their uses. First, triangular purchases can be utilized in the wake of an economic sanction. For example suppose Country A has a boycott on the products of Country B. Country A can still purchase food from Country C, perhaps an ally, and give that food to the citizenry of Country B as aid without generating the economic benefit in Country B which would violate the sanction. Second, suppose Country A generates a crop surplus, but neighboring countries do not have the financial capital available to purchase portions of this surplus. Leaving the surplus in Country A will be detrimental to food prices and the economy in general, so Country B, a country with the necessary finances swoops in purchases the food and then distributes it to Country C, which may not have such a bumper crop. Approximately 23.7% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as triangular purchases.3 Overall from 2003 to 2007 procurement from developing countries has increased by 69.6% (from 23% in 2003 to 39% in 2007).3
There are caveats to developmental aid. The developing nation can only produce so much food; therefore, the maximum capacity of food that can be distributed via this method is going to be lower than the amount of food distributed if the donor nation taps into its own food supply. A second concern is that if the organization purchasing the aid from a developing nation does not have the proper channels and/or connections when making the purchase, the purchase can have a detrimental influence on markets such as widening the capital gap between its citizens. Better organizational procedures and relationships between the donor and receiving country will reduce the probability of the occurrence of these caveats.
In addition to the above methodology for distributing developmental aid, another method has gained popularity in recent years. Instead of allocating food for developmental purposes, donor countries have attempted to distribute cash equal to the value of the food. In some instances there are conditions on this cash, such that it can only be used for the purchase of food and in other instances there are no conditions. Proponents of this developmental strategy heavily favor not putting any conditions on the distributed funds citing that the increased flexibility provided by unconstrained cash increases the probability of significant economic development.8 The reason behind this belief is that most individuals in the developing world that benefit from food aid have needs that extend beyond food. It is difficult to conclude that the only thing missing in their lives is sufficient food and once they acquire that food the road to economic prosperity is ensured. Some even argue that cash instead of food should be the norm for all ‘food’ aid related programs. Using cash in favor of food tends to move more towards Amartya Sen’s ideal of food security.
The problem with this belief is that frequently in emergency situations a sufficient market does not exist at a significant enough capacity to service the needs of the damaged community. Therefore, distributing cash instead of food may prove to be more volatile than beneficial. In addition there are significant logistical complications including identifying between individuals that are affected by the disaster vs. those impoverished despite the disaster vs. those simply looking to exploit the program. Just looking at all of the trouble FEMA had with corruption within their cash distribution program during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina should give one pause regarding the administration of a similar program overseas without proper testing. Despite the initial successes in pilot programs that have utilized cash aid over food aid, there are still significant organizational issues that have to be dealt with before such a change can be executed on a mass scale.
Another problem that needs to be addressed in relation to the above issues is the question of the ‘tying status’ of food aid. Tying status refers to mandates about the markets from which food aid may be sourced.1 Basically it relates to whether or not the donor has obligations to purchase the stock that will make up the food aid from a given country. Currently most of the major donors have ‘untied’ food aid in that they can provide either food or cash (and the food does not need to be purchased from the market of the donor country). However, the United States and Canada have ‘tied’ food aid systems in that food aid purchases must be made from the respective domestic market. This ‘tying status’ is the reason behind why a vast majority of the food aid that originates in the U.S. is direct transfer. Due to the fact that the United States provides approximately 44-45% of the total food aid,3 determining a uniform policy of food aid amongst donors would be useful to avoid unnecessary complexity in policy concerning developmental aid. Clearly any negotiations for such policy unification would have to include all of the most prominent donors, (the United States, the European Commission/Union, Canada, Japan and Germany).3
One issue in tied vs. non-tied is that non-tied countries (largely the European Union) believe that the U.S. is using the ‘tied’ status as a backdoor export subsidy to improve the competitiveness of U.S. farm interests. Supporters of U.S. tying do not agree and claim even if it were true, it merely evens the playing field in light of the domestic subsidies provided by European nations to their agricultural sector. Unfortunately the prospect of untying U.S. based food aid seems only temporary, if it ever happens at all, because to do so would be to challenge the political clout of the agriculture industry and farm lobby and even if successful, such action would significantly increase the probability of a defeat in the next election and re-instatement of the policy under the next Congress under the control of a new party leadership.
Another issue involved in the future role of food aid is generating a proper definition for ‘emergency’. Although the current definition may suffice for the current structure, it is reasonable to assume that certain compromises in the rules and policy surrounding developmental aid and possible changes to CSSD reporting will demand that ‘emergency’ aid be redefined. The definition of ‘emergency’ will need to be more expansive than simply what situations can be regarded as emergencies. Notably the new definition will have to include what bodies can declare an emergency for a given country, how long does an emergency last and what is its scope (who is affected by the emergency in the given country).
With all that has been said about food aid, how great of an influence does it have on domestic price? Overall it is difficult to identify an exact significance of influence. When looking at the raw numbers food aid does not appear to be that useful. For example interpolating from given data in 2009 approximately 232.23 kg is consumed per day per person in Sub-Saharan Africa.9 Therefore, the amount of food that was donated to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (3.19 million tons)3 could feed 34,141 people for an entire year or 12,461,436 people for a single day. Although those seem like big numbers, when taking into consideration the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has a population over 680 million people, the overall aid does not seem as impressive. However, the very fact that surplus dumping is really not practiced anymore as well as that over 50% of the aid given to Sub-Saharan Africa is of the emergency variety, it is difficult to concluded, despite what the numbers may say, that food aid does not have some significant influence in these countries. A supporting piece of evidence to this influence is that food distribution from WFP has reached between 50 to 100 million people, although not all in Sub-Saharan Africa, since 1996.10
Due to the fact that food aid has a high potential to provide a significant price signal in developing nations, there are two main issues that need to be addressed concerning the future of food aid. First, a specific definition regarding ‘food aid’ needs to be designated. For instance as discussed above, some individuals/groups support giving cash equivalent instead of food in response to an emergency or for developmental reasons. In addition there has been significant discussion regarding when food aid is actually an appropriate resource for addressing food insecurity. Studies exist that direct cash payment is a better tool to neutralize food insecurity when the region in question has functional markets.5,11 However, is it the responsibility of food aid programs to distribute cash instead of food? There are no assurances that the cash will be utilized to purchase food. Ironically this lack of certainty is one of the reasons that cash instead of food receives support. Thus, is there a defining line between general charity and ‘food aid’ and if so what is it and if not should there be? The reason this question is important is it facilitates the broader issue of what is the responsibility of those in the developed world to aid in the economic development of the developing world? Providing cash implies they have a much greater responsibility than if they were only to provide food.
Second, the logistics that govern food aid need to be improved significantly, especially involving communication between the donor and the recipient. One of the main issues with logistic reform is changing the mindset to add a level of analysis to resource distribution. Instead of simply throwing large quantities of food over a large region, specific analysis must be made of different segments of that region to determine where the food aid is needed most and where it is need least. In addition evidentiary analysis must be conducted regarding the effectiveness of the food aid in the given region, why it is successful or why it is failing and take steps to replicate the successes or remedy the failures. It is important that objectivity be practiced in this information gathering and analysis because if these considerations are tied to the donor or an operational agency (NGO, etc.) it will be difficult to evade questions of impartiality.
Improved analysis of regionality livelihood is an important element to understanding and dismantling the infamous ‘poverty trap’. Poverty traps are situations where individuals are unable to become prosperous on their own largely due to a lack of access to resources, but if given a small amount of assets the possibility for sustained financial improvement increases significantly. This ‘access to small assets’ philosophy is the motivation behind programs that administer micro-loans within developing nations, a system that provides the necessary assets to escape the ‘poverty trap’. Although, depending on the answer to the first question about the specific role of food aid, food aid may not be the means utilized for escaping ‘poverty traps’.
Analysis of the ‘poverty trap’ question leads to the contention regarding the importance of targeting. One of the biggest concerns about even the most organized food aid program is that the aid will never reach those that require it the most, either because those individuals are not properly identified or the aid is intercepted by those in power and not properly distributed. Normally there are two categories for errors in targeting, errors of inclusion (food aid provided to those that would have purchased it or receiving too much) and errors of exclusion (those that need the aid do not receive it or receive too little).12 In addition there is still the lingering question regarding the total influence that food aid has on the economic fortunes of the receiving nation. These concerns invoke the issue of how long should food aid be distributed over a given region, how much food aid should be distributed, what is the optimal time frame for distribution and what should be the medium of distribution to avoid distributing it to those that do not need it?
Unfortunately these distribution questions are difficult due to lack of regionalized economic information, lack of access and/or lack of infrastructure. For instance the biggest problem concerning distribution is the medium of distribution due to the lack of infrastructure. Most of the transportation mechanisms in poorer countries consist of dirt roads or nothing at all. To make matters worse these mediums are typically controlled by significant powerbrokers that are more likely to keep the aid for themselves than to assist in its distribution to others. These problems with identifying and utilizing a medium of distribution generate significant delays in delivery of the food aid.
For example even when the proper targets are identified and the appropriate amount of aid is allocated the average time from a call forward to delivery of U.S. food aid is approximately five months (and U.S. food aid distribution operates at the fastest average delivery time over relatively similar distances).2,5 Although some of this time delay can be attributed to the direct transfer methodology, the lack of transportation infrastructure is also an important factor. This delay also compounds the problem of determining the amount of allocation because in the typical situation one cannot identify a poor harvest season with any level of accuracy until at least June meaning that the earliest food aid will arrive to the struggling country is in November. Therefore, rapid response is almost impossible, which is the very point of emergency-driven food aid.
Some have proposed cutting down on delivery times by creating more on-site storage facilities. Unfortunately the proper management and structure of such resources are highly dependent on a stable government and the rule of law; otherwise they are highly vulnerable to political manipulation, raiding and selective dispersal.13 Such a lack of access would increase the probability of civil unrest amongst the population during food shortages. Others argue that local purchase is the proper strategy to eliminate most of the problems with the medium of distribution and the time delay; however, such a strategy heavily favors developmental aid not emergency aid due to disrupted markets and/or lower than anticipated crop yields. Also local food purchase harkens back to the first question regarding the role of food aid. Either way, improved logistics and analysis will not be able to eliminate these problems, but it will make it easier to manage them.
Similar to the ‘poverty trap’, analysis of how the food aid is utilized once it reaches the appropriate individual is important in order to understand the nature and probability of dependency. To better understand food aid dependency take the issue of welfare. One of the main concerns raised by those that oppose the welfare system in the United States is the belief that welfare recipients will become dependent on welfare and never seek to improve their lives to the point where the welfare is no longer required. The main flaw with this dependency mindset is that most individuals do not like the fact that they require such drastic assistance and would rather do without such aid, if possible.
The concern of dependency operates the same way in the developing world; in some respects food aid can be viewed as a weaker form of welfare for the developing world. In economically struggling communities, especially ones that have disrupted markets due to a recent disaster, there exists the potential for despair and diminished incentives, which can increase the probability that individuals rely on food aid instead of working to improve his/her economical situation. Therefore, improved analysis can increase the probability that food aid will be utilized as a stopgap measure in troubled times instead of a permanent expectation. It must be noted that some believe that dependency on food aid is an impossible outcome because food aid typically arrives too late at an insufficient quantity. Basically food aid is too unreliable to form any level of dependency, thus without this certainty individuals instead look to acquire alternative sources of food.14,15
The process of donating food aid to a less fortunate country is a practice that should be continued; however, it is important that such a program be carried out for the right reasons. A country should be cautious about giving food aid to a country unless they ask for it or if a disaster has destabilized food production and/or distribution channels in a country where supply is negatively affected. However, such an implication means that food aid cannot be a permanent fixture in a country. Unfortunately as previously discussed if the food prices and supply in the developing world are still influenced by the food prices and supply in the developed world not enough separation has been created between the necessity of food aid and events that may necessitate food aid. The first step to widening this gap is improving the ability of local agricultural markets in the developing world to provide sufficient food for the local population, an issue that will be addressed in the next post.
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1. Maxwell, Daniel. “Global Trends in Food Aid.” Khartoum Food Aid Forum. June 6-8, 2006.
2. Murphy, Sophia and McAfee, Kathleen. “U.S. Food Aid: Time to Get It Right.” Minneapolis: The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. July 2005.
3. “2007 Food Aid Flows.” World Food Programme. International Food Aid Information System. 2008.
4. Barrett, C., and Maxwell, D. “Towards A Global Food Aid Compact.” Food Policy. 2006. 31: 105–118.
5. Barrett, C., and Maxwell, D. “Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role.” 2005.
6. Clay, E. and Benson, C. “Acquisition of commodities in developing countries
for food aid in the 1980s,” Food Policy. 1990. 15(1): 27-43.
7. Russo, L, et, Al. “Joint evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of the enabling development policy of the World Food Programme.” Rome, Italy, Developer’s Research Network, Aide à la Décision Economique, Groupe-conseil Baastel ltée, Eco Consulting Group, and Nordic Consulting Group. 2005.
8. Overseas Development Institute. “Cash and Emergency Relief: Conference Report.” London. 2005.
9. “3. Global and regional food consumption patterns and trends.” World Health Organization.
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index.html.
10. Sarah Lowder and Terri Raney Food Aid: A Primer Agricultural and Development Economics Division ESA Working Paper No. 05-05 June 2005.
11. Devereux, S. “Identification of Methods for Emergency Assessments to Distinguish Between Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity, and to Evaluate the Effects of Shocks.” SENAC Project, World Food Programme, Emergency Needs Assessment Branch, Rome. 2006.
12. Gebremedhin, B., and Swinton, S.M. “Reconciling food-for-work project feasibility with food aid targeting in Tigray, Ethiopia.” Food Policy. 2001. 26(1): 85–95.
13. Devereux, S. “The Malawi Famine of 2002: Causes, Consequences and Policy Lessons.” Brighton: IDS. 2002.
14. Abdulai, A., Barrett. C., and Hoddinott, J. “Does food aid really have disincentive effects?
New evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Development. 2005. 33(10): 1689-1704.
15. Lentz, E., Barrett, C., and Hoddinott, J. “Food Aid and Dependency: Implications for
Emergency Food Security Assessments.” SENAC Project, World Food Programme,Emergency Needs Assessment Branch, Rome. 2005.
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