Evolution of Agriculture in Africa

As previously discussed in past blog posts there is a significant probability that food shortages will affect a number of countries in the near future, especially those in Africa. Unfortunately these shortages can only be supplemented through proceeds from other countries for a limited time. Therefore, it is important to identify strategies that can be implemented in these countries in order to develop a more productive agriculture infrastructure to lessen dependency on others. Although the countries that need help are not limited to those in Africa, the focus of this post will be on Africa.

The conclusion that agriculture in Africa needs to be improved is not surprising, for humanitarians and scholars have considered the questions of how to increase the productivity of African agriculture for decades. First things first, Africa has the highest population percentage engaged in agriculture and has the second-largest area of cultivable land of all seven continents.1 Therefore, it is unreasonable to suggest that Africa lacks the inherent capacity to produce self-sustaining yields. Unfortunately Sub-Saharan African countries have grain yields per hectare significantly lower than the averages in both Northern African countries and more developed countries1 largely attributed to missing the Green Revolution. To combat these low yields, two options have emerged from theory and the literature as the top candidates for facilitating a green revolution in Africa. Both options have unique strengths and weaknesses, have backing by significant powerbrokers and are currently being tested in the isolated environments throughout Africa.

To review the Green Revolution involved the utilization of high yield variety seed which was genetically selected to possess larger product/fruit (greater mass/yield per hectare), faster growth and day-night neutrality. To achieve this selection, the seeds were cultivated to respond to fertilizers due to higher levels of exposure to nitrogen and phosphate in order to produce additional mass. The faster growth in these seeds was predicated through increased rates of photosynthesis due to the higher mass. However, the rate of photosynthesis also required additional water for sole reliance on rain would regionalize increased growth rates wasting a significant amount of growth potential, thus irrigation levels was increased. In short the Green Revolution involved new seed, higher yields, new irrigation strategies and lots of fertilizer.

The first option for improving African agriculture is the strategy put forth by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the Millennium Project, which seeks to initiate a green revolution in Africa through means similar to previous green revolutions. That is to introduce higher quality seed and fertilizer to African farmers in order to provide the same technological and chemical advantages utilized by farmers in more developed nations. In addition to these advances, AGRA also focuses on encouraging farmers to form cooperatives amongst themselves to increase their buying power as well as to develop a cohesive strategy for land management to maintain soil quality. The original large-scale test for the AGRA is the Sauri Cluster where newly provided access to seed and fertilizer lead to the revival of previously resource depleted soils as well as a 50% expansion of cultivated land all resulting in a 300% increase in maize production.2

The Sauri Cluster was selected as a representative of the general African condition, in order to develop a general model to identify points of success and failure for future reference, although it could be argued that the Sauri Cluster has a higher than average soil quality. The Sauri Cluster is located in western Kenya consisting of 11 villages and covering an area of approximately 8 square km.2 It was determined that this region had a strong community system, but did not have the economic infrastructure to provide basic services for necessary growth. In fact it was estimated that 60-70% of the 55,000 individuals living in this region live on less than $1 per day.2 Agriculture is the primary source of employment and capital acquisition in the region, yet a significant number of individuals are still hungry.

In addition to the large jump in maize yield, the AGRA has also had initial success establishing a baseline of credit for farmers through micro-loans to previously identified high-risk loan candidates. The release of this capital has allowed farmers to not only purchase higher quality seed, but also invest in their own farms to improve production. Also the AGRA is creating logistical avenues to document and measure successes vs. failures in policy and what can be done to reinforce the positive outcomes and rectify the detrimental outcomes. This new documentation and recording strategy is important when considering the shear size of the required changes in the African agriculture structure within a number of countries.2

There are those that have criticized the AGRA strategy on the basis that it is incorrect to assume inadequacy in the less chemical and labor-intensive agricultural methodology, which has been practiced by African farmers from centuries. Farmers used to generate enough food for themselves in Africa in the past,1 so instead of ‘fixing’ things through the insertion of what can be regarded as ‘modern-day’ techniques, focus should be on addressing what changed in food production vs. consumption and what to do about it. Unfortunately such reasoning is flawed because such a statement assumes that African farmers have had the opportunity in the past to incorporate new seed, fertilizer and other ‘modern-day’ techniques/technology and have declined to use these tools because they were not advantageous, whereas the reality is these farmers never had the economic clout to entertain these options in the first place.

Another criticism of the AGRA strategy is that the introduction of fertilizer is only a short-term solution in that it may increase yields, but will reduce soil quality in the process creating a system of agriculture dependent on fertilizer which will have the same vulnerability that the developed world faces when it comes to price spikes due to increasing natural gas and oil prices. Most of those individuals that have these concerns seem to only read about the sound bites of the AGRA strategy, not the official strategy itself. Introducing fertilizer and advanced seed is not all that the AGRA proposes to generate an agricultural revolution in Africa. Additional elements for soil improvement involve improved water harvesting and management, planting nitrogen fixing crops and use of manure to compliment fertilizer as well as management groups to track and document the use and quality of soils throughout Africa.2

However, despite other avenues for improvement of African agriculture, incorporation of advanced seed and fertilizer is still a significant component of the AGRA policy. Pertaining to the concern that fertilizer will enhance the influence of the price shock due to fluctuating natural gas and oil prices, at the present time it is difficult to conclude that African farmers will have tons of fertilizer per hectare ratios akin to the developed world.3 Therefore, these lower ratios will reduce the amplitude of any price spikes seen in African nations vs. the developed world relative to fertilizer price. This is not to say that food price will not be influenced by fertilizer price, just that it will not be as excessive (at least until the market is developed enough that it can be adjust to price spikes). Also as discussed in a previous post, an increase in fertilizer and transport price due to increased oil prices was only one of many factors contributing to the increasing food price in the developed world. Overall the claim that fertilizer should not be introduced solely based on the fact that it will not be a permanent fixture in African agriculture is unreasonable. However, such a sword is dual-edged in that is introducing fertilizer in the first place a reasonable strategy if not enough of it will be incorporated to significantly increase yields?

A second concern with the introduction of fertilizer has been the question of fertilizer dependency. The core question regarding fertilizer dependency is does large quantities of fertilizer used over a number of years in the same plot eliminate the natural ability of the soil to support crop growth without fertilizer. Fertilizer dependency is a tricky issue because it is generally unclear that such a phenomenon exists, although some studies claim there is a correlation between fertilizer use and soil depletion and/or complications.4,5 The problem is that proving correlations are difficult and even if true, little work has been done generating any type of fertilizer to soil quality ratio. For instance clearly if a correlation did exist between fertilizer use and depletion of soil quality, it is likely that less fertilizer use would result in slower soil depletion; however, is there a time frame and amount of fertilizer use that delineates the point where a plot is dependent on fertilizer vs. it has the capacity for recovery? Also is the relationship linear or is there a threshold point where all fertilizer use below that point has zero detrimental influence on soil quality? Although it is highly probable that there is an answer to these questions, the answers are undetermined.

Identifying this ‘dependency’ factor is important because if there is no dependency factor, fertilizer can be used to significantly increase yields over the time it is available and then phased-out of African agriculture when the price outweighs its yield benefits. Thus, farmers can increase yields and become more profitable utilizing fertilizer and then revert back to non-fertilizer based agriculture when profitability is not longer viable without any significant detriment. If fertilizer dependency is legitimate and the time frame and quantity required would more than likely be met, then incorporation of fertilizer could be inappropriate due to long-term detriments outweighing short-term benefits.

Another avenue of agricultural improvement sought by the AGRA is expansion of individual crop profitability on a crop per crop basis. Not only do farmers need the tools to increase yield, but also better access to markets because an increased yield loses a significant amount of value if the market is not large or convenient enough to absorb the additional product. Therefore, the AGRA also aims to reduce transaction costs by establishing more rural marketplaces, commodity exchanges, produce alternatives and milling and processing operations.2

The policy and partnership program of the AGRA focuses on strengthening the ability of governments at a national level to establish policies to benefit farmers in effort to facilitate the necessary changes, both on an institutional level and technological level, to catalyze a green revolution. These national changes will also allow a given African nation a better opportunity to participate in global level negotiations with other nations. Based on the history of agriculture and its market structure in Africa, this strategy very well could be the most important element to increasing agriculture productivity and economic prosperity.

The second option for improving African agriculture is continuing not to use fertilizer or advanced seed and instead introduce more thorough organic farming techniques. The reason this strategy is so appealing is that some believe because the Green Revolution skipped most of Africa, most of its farming remains low input low output, thus its farming system is already de facto organic. In general organic farming focuses on the use of specific land management over technology and biological processes over chemical processes.6 For example some of the organic farming in Africa include returning nitrogen to the soil via nitrogen fixation from legumes, planting spring onions to ward off insects and altering surrounding ground layers to reduce erosion.

Organic farming proponents believe that the better option for increasing profitability of African agriculture lies in reducing costs instead of increasing volume of product sold. One of the main cost-cutting methods in organic farming is bypassing fertilizer in favor of more labor-intensive methods that not only generate conditions for profit and yield increase, but also offer temporary employment to fellow Africans. Lower labor costs typically differentiate the higher costs of organic farming in the developed world vs. the lower costs of the same organic farming in the developing world.

It seems rational to conclude that most of any increase in yields derived from organic farming involve faster turnover of available and viable farmland. In the past African agriculture relied on natural replenishment. Food was grown on a given plot until the soil began to lose a significant amount of nutrients (2-4 years) then a quasi slash-and-burn is performed on the land and it is abandoned, while the planter moves on to a new plot. After approximately 5-15 years (depending on various conditions) a secondary forest region will usually grow over the slash-and-burned region and gradually the soil regains its fertility making the land viable for crop growth once again.7

Unfortunately this method of cultivating typically results in soil that is rarely of the quality of the previous soil. Also the natural method of regeneration is imprecise requiring that one err on the side of caution (waiting longer than perhaps necessary) before renewing cultivation efforts. The waiting is necessary, for if cultivation begins too early soil fertility and crop yield is decreased reducing cultivation lifespan to 1, maybe 2 years. If crop growth is pushed beyond this lifespan, soil will become exhausted increasing the probability of weed infestation (typically Imperata cylindrical) basically spoiling the ability of the plot to rejuvenate naturally.7 Therefore, the idea behind introducing more genuine organic techniques is to reduce or even eliminate the downtime for these plots, thus increasing yield by increasing crop turnover. Small additional yield increases could also come from the soil in general being more fertile.

However, there seems to be a suggestion from some supporters that utilizing organic techniques in Africa will generate yields that will rival those generated from significant inclusion of fertilizer. Such claims are problematic because there are a wide variety of studies which support and disprove this statement. In smaller studies organic farms do well versus fertilizer-driven farms on a ratio basis (lb/hectare) and total output (sum of all positive output, not just crops).8,9,10,11 However, there are few complete studies that focus on scaling up organic plots to rival the absolute yield capacity of fertilizer-driven farms. Overall organic plots will generate 20-25% lower yields than fertilizer-driven plots, but will require less energy and will better maintain soil fertility and biodiversity.12

Another issue that needs to be addressed regarding the future evolution of agriculture is water availability. A vast majority of agriculture is rain-fed either due to lack of irrigation availability or irrigation infrastructure; however, in the future such dependency on rain looks to be troublesome as progressing climate change can be viewed as the most pertinent and viable threat to agriculture evolution demanding the development of new strategies for water access. For example the IPCC predicts that by 2020 in some countries in Africa, yields from rain-fed sources could be reduced by up to 50%, which will severely compromise access to domestic food supplies.13 Most of this crop shortage will occur in Northern and Southern Africa due to significant decrease in overall rainfall. Although not hit as hard, Central Africa will also see an overall reduction in total rainfall.13 Unfortunately viable water synthesis alternatives do not appear to be available for large parts of Africa. For example the most popular method of potable water generation is desalinization, but Africa does not have the energy or financial resources to initiate a large-scale desalinization programs similar to those in the Middle East. Although there are initial ideas of generating a large-scale solar energy production network in the Sahara, it is unlikely that anything substantial will be up and running in time to be meaningful regarding a desalinization strategy. Therefore, a cheaper strategy needs to be developed to avoid serious water and agricultural shortfall in the future or application of either the AGRA method or the advanced organic method to improve agriculture will be ineffective.

Although it may not be important at the time due to the improvement of African agriculture being largely driven by the priority to feed Africa itself, one of the factors that supporters neglect to discuss when considering the effects of organic farming is crop certification for export. In order for a farm that is classified as organic to export to the world market it must be certified. The certification is organized under an official participatory guarantee system, which is operated by a group comprised of farmers linked to a specific exporter. Clearly the farm must be ‘up-to-snuff’ because the reputation of the exporter is on the line with each export.

There are two types of certified organic farming in Africa. The first are large conglomerates or agribusinesses (yes there are some in Africa) like SEKEM, which can implement internal control systems such as inspection, marketing activities and certification on their own.6 The second are small groups, maybe in a collective maybe not. It is much more difficult for these small groups to be certified because of lack of organization and lack of resources. Therefore, farms that fall into this second group typically need support through food or development aid programs like Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA).6

Other than certification the second big problem most African nations will have exporting is that currently there is not a large market for intracontinental exportation, thus it is reasonable to anticipate that the biggest recipient of African exports will be Europe, most notably the European Union. Such a reality is a problem for most nations due to the high transportation costs to cover the distance and the lack of existing infrastructure to reduce these transportation costs. Thus to maximize export potential most sub-Saharan countries would need to focus on low volume high price items.

A renewed focus on exporting may be more detrimental than beneficial to African agriculture if mistakes of the past are repeated where exportation focus became an obstacle in the development of African agriculture. A significant reason that African agriculture flounders behind the systems in North America, South America, Europe and Asia can be attributed to the attitude of colonial powers when most of Africa was originally broken up into colonies answering largely to European powers. Under the control of European powers most land use was geared towards livestock or high value crop production to provide an economic driver for maintaining the colony.14,15 Little attention was paid to the local population and the development of a thriving local market. Rationally the best land was selected to grow these high value crops, which would later be exported back for sale on the European market, because the local market did not have the ability to absorb significant quantities of said crop. The remaining land was utilized for local crop growth with little regard for land quality.

This strategy emulated the old ‘chicken vs. egg’ argument where the local markets were not developed, so little attention was paid to producing crops that could be sold locally, but because few to no crops were grown for sale locally, little attention was paid to developing a large local market that could absorb those crops. Realistically one can somewhat understand the attitude of the colonial powers in that running a colony costs significant capital, thus the colony must produce economically viable resources and growing high value low volume cash crops was the easiest way to accomplish that economic goal. The lack of development of local markets lead to a lack of purchasing power for the local population, which unfortunately forced food and other agricultural products from areas where they were most in demand to areas were the demand was considerably lower, but the market could afford them.14,15

Even though colonial powers no longer rule over various African countries it can be argued that their policies centuries earlier put African agriculture in a significant hole that it has yet to climb out of. Although it would be different now, in that any capital generated from exportation would go to the African countries not its colonial masters, some would argue that any focus on exportation would be at some level of expense to local markets and would simply delay agriculture development in Africa. One could understand this position even now as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and structural adjustment programs (SAP) have frequently favored developed nations over developing nations in the subject of global trade. A number of policies from these organizations have given considerable power to markets over governments (policies that put Africa at a disadvantage due to underdeveloped markets and little market power).16,17 Stripping power from governments in these developing nations is sometimes viewed as necessary before opening the door to allow trading on the global market, but loss of this power also limits protections that can be applied to domestic consumers, one of the main reasons to explain price spikes in these countries, despite insignificant influence from most of influencing factors of price. Therefore, one of the primary ways to both reduce the volatility of food price and further aid the advancement of African agriculture, regardless of which direct agricultural strategies is applied, may be to establish better governmental control policies outside of the influence of the WTO, IMF and World Bank.

Overall improving export potential would be a worthwhile goal for many African nations if significant quantities of agricultural related items could be exported. However, at the moment without specific quota aid it its difficult to conclude that African nations will eventually be able to effectively compete with larger developed nations on the world market. Realistically these nations will probably never be able to compete on par from a grain exportation slate with countries like the United States, Canada and Russia due to technological and topographical limitations, thus advantages for pursuing exportation become murkier.

Improving the agriculture infrastructure in Africa is not isolated to just a cultivation methodology. Fertilizer is not the only technological advantage that the developed world has over the developing world in the field of agriculture. Another option that has received a significant amount of attention would be to supply African farmers with genetically engineered crops (largely Bt and HRCs) that resist specific types of pests reducing costs and use of pesticides moving beyond ‘simple’ high yield seed. However, executing such a strategy would be difficult. In order to adequately distribute genetically engineered seeds throughout Africa the seeds would have to be provided for no cost or be heavily subsidized to adhere to the intellectual properties rights held by companies like Monsanto, which developed and sell the seeds in question.

The question of genetic engineered crops has been explored before and critical elements of cost would have to be decided before progression. Corporations are concerned with mass production of genetically engineered plants without profiteering safeguards because such crops can be harvested for their seed and that seed can be recycled into the next growing season removing the need to purchase new seed from the corporation. Clearly corporations that spend the money on research and development to produce these new products deserve to be compensated and not have the profitability of their product compromised. However, there are questions of morality in that access to these advances should not be limited only for the rich. So before an idea involving these seeds in mass can go forward a solution will need to be reached to properly compensate these corporations.

Even if approval could be arranged for the mass deployment of genetically engineered seed in Africa there are a number of opponents that believe such a strategy would be flawed. Numerous studies have expressed various concerns about the administration of genetically engineered seed on their own and in co-existence strategies with non-engineered seed. The most pressing concerns are unintentional and possibly detrimental spread of genes from the engineered crop to the non-engineered crop, reduction in fitness of non-target organisms through transgenic trait hybridization, rapid resistance generation for target insects and disruption of natural pest control measures.17,18,19,20,21 Gene transfer is a significant concern by itself as in developing countries there is the belief that wild weeds can be more sexually compatible making transfer of various resistances more probable unintentionally creating ‘super’ weeds.17

There are also concerns with the yield potential of the seeds themselves as problems with stem splitting and boll drop can arise. Also transgenic seed combination with fertilizer could increase the rate of soil depletion due to the accumulation of transgenic toxins (such as Bt toxin) in soil, which would further reduce soil fertility.17

The real issue in genetically engineered crops may be the underlying problem which emphasizes the ‘one pest-one gene’ approach. Unfortunately such a strategy limits the ability to initiate an alternative strategy when pest targets develop resistance to the genetically induced deterrence. When greater selection pressure is applied to a population through a single element it is reasonable to assume that there will be a more rapid and significant reactionary evolution response. This rapid response is why some favor the principle of ‘integrated pest management’ which avoids utilizing single responses to a given condition (a single pesticide for a single insect population, etc.) and instead employs multiple pest and cultivation control mechanisms.17 Under such a strategy even if a certain group develops resistance to a transgenic crop or pesticide there is a higher probability that the group is wiped out by another means before passing those resistance genes on to the next generation. To combat rapid resistance development in the United States the EPA mandates that farmers designate a certain percentage of their plot for non-Bt crop varieties. However, whether or not a similar policy will be incorporated in developing countries with the incorporation of genetically engineered crops is unclear.22,23

Another means to increase efficiency of agricultural operations in the developing world would be to augment their operations with modern harvesting technology. Initially one may be skeptical regarding the application and expansion of modern harvesting technology, but there is a significant advantage. One of the biggest concerns in African agriculture is not an increasing population that becomes harder and harder to feed, but a decreasing population that is unable to produce significant quantities of food through lack of available labor. For example it is typical that millions of young African men and women migrate from their home villages/cities to acquire work leaving a smaller and less able workforce to tend the fields.1 Any potential lack of local labor can be neutralized through application of modern harvesting technology.

Unfortunately similar to genetically engineered seeds, it would be impractical for companies like John Deer and Caterpillar to simply give the necessary heavy machinery to these farmers. Clearly the company would want to sell it to the farmer. The problem with that is the farmer more than likely could not afford it. The United States government gives millions to billions of dollars in the form of food aid annually. Technically there is nothing stopping a temporary shift in policy converting some of that food aid into grants for heavy machinery and proper training in its use. In fact it would be possible to simply create a government sponsored production chain which purchases John Deer/Caterpillar equipment from U.S. manufacturers and then gives it to African farmers through a government run charity. Politically such a policy shift may create an unusual battle between the farm lobby and the manufacturing lobby as food aid is typically purchased not simply given away.

While the above procurement method seems viable, distribution of this equipment may be a sketchy issue. One possibility involves the use of a lottery-type system where farmers would be assigned a ‘x’ digit number (however many numerals are necessary) and a select quantity of numbers would be drawn randomly to determine who receives the equipment.

Another question regarding the above program is would there be domestic strife created by such a program? Largely the question stems from whether or not the local or federal government of a specific country involved in the program should be directly involved or indirectly involved? Circumventing the government avoids issues of potential corruption that could restrict or disallow the acquisition of the equipment for the farmers under trumped up circumstances, resulting in a distribution of those items to those that do not need them (i.e. the rich and the well connected). However, if the government were only an indirect player in the distribution process, what would be the chances of the government seizing the equipment at a later date? What about conflict between farmers that receive equipment and those that do not, especially in the more war-torn states because clearly not all farmers would be able to receive the necessary equipment? This could be a big problem because the farmers that receive the equipment should outpace those that do not, increasing the probability of wealth division between the two parties.

If strife and conflict under a randomly assigned distribution system is determined to be highly probable, another strategy for distribution could involve establishing regions of use and assigning certain operators that would utilize the equipment on farms within the assigned regions. Basically no one would own the equipment instead it would be used by farmers within a given region as community property. This strategy would probably succeed in poor communities will few resources because there would be little conflict as all parties would accept equal access and even if they wanted the equipment for themselves, they would not have the resources to take it from others in the region.

Overall both of the main strategies for developing African agriculture have flaws that seem difficult to rectify. AGRA and its supporters have the problem of fertilizer availability. In the future fertilizer prices will continue to increase driven by increasing natural gas and oil prices as well as potential phosphorous shortages, thus there is little reason to believe that fertilizer price will crest in the future. Although inconsistent assess to fertilizer does not destroy the success parameters for the AGRA, the problem is much more serious if fertilizer dependency is legitimate, for then execution of widespread fertilizer use could be devastating in the long term. If fertilizer dependency is not legitimate, then the strategy proposed by AGRA seems to be rather effective, for as previous mentioned once fertilizer becomes too expensive farmers can simply convert back to an organic agriculture style utilizing some of the more advanced strategies proposed by the organic strategy supporters. Proponents of more thorough organic techniques have the problem that it is still highly debatable that such a strategy will afford Africa the ability to provide a significant portion of its food on a domestic level. As previously mentioned there are serious questions regarding the scale-up potential of organic farming. Lacking the ability to scale-up reduces the potential of both the domestic and foreign markets.

Therefore, the debate regarding the best growth methodology between the two above strategies regarding increasing the viability and productivity of the African agricultural system boils down to two questions. The first question: is fertilizer dependency a significant concern? The answer to this question seems rather complex because of the issue of fertilizer threshold dependency. One could argue that an objective party conduct field test studies on small isolated plots of land that simulate African soil structure and after a considerable period of time wean the soil off of fertilizer (various portions of the area would receive various concentrations of fertilizer) and measure the change, if any, in yield versus a control plot. In fact some of the Sauri region in the AGRA could be used for this analysis due to the introduction of ample quantities of fertilizer a few years ago.2 However, such a study would take a considerable period of time.

The second question: what is the projected lifespan of fertilizer use in African agriculture? Basically how long will most African farmers be able to afford and use sufficient quantities of fertilizer? The reason this question is important is it relates back to another question, what alternative strategies can be undertaken with the money that would be used to provide the initial supplies of fertilizer to various African farmers? If the lifespan of fertilizer use is ‘long’ then it is highly likely that the economic benefit derived from the administration of fertilizer will overshadow many of the alternatives that could be executed in lieu of fertilizer use. If the lifespan of fertilizer use is ‘short’ then it is highly likely that the economic benefit derived from the administration of fertilizer will fall short of these possible alternatives.

The answer to the above question will largely depend on estimations regarding remaining oil, natural gas and phosphorous supplies. Another influencing factor would be whether or not a new catalytic process for fertilizer synthesis is generated in the future. A new catalytic step would more than likely reduce required energy, thus reducing the influence of oil and natural gas price on fertilizer synthesis.

Either way the long-term solution to African food security may rest behind door number 3. Although stocks have been depleted due to efforts to create more cultivatable land, Africa still has considerable wood-based resources (excluding Northern Africa due to a certain topographical feature). Wood estimates range from 65-70 billion tons from twig to trunk.7 Such an ample supply of wood stocks seem to almost scream for a strategy involving biochar synthesis and sequestration in soil. Instead of utilizing slash-and-burn techniques, farmers would instead collect a percentage of any biomass refuge and use it in a pyrolysis process to generate bio-char that could be sequestered in the soil.

There is little question that bio-char has the potential to produce a positive effect when it is integrated into soil; it increases the quality of that soil enhancing the growth rates and yields of any future crops by aiding in the supply and retention of nutrients.24,25,26 However, the question is whether or not the incorporation of bio-char into the wide variety of African soils will have the same positive effects seen in the Amazon and test plots in North America.27,28 The test plots in Canada run by the Dynamotive Energy Systems Corporation reported results after a year long study of an increase of 6-17% in yield as well as greater root depth and plant density.28

In addition to bio-char, the Moringa Tree (the most common variety being moringa oleifera) also has the potential to increase yield. The moringa tree has proven to have excessive quantities of basic nutrients (Vitamin A, C, calcium, potassium, iron, etc.), thus it is an excellent food crop. However, the green matter (most notably in the leaves) can be extracted in ethanol to create a solution containing growth enhancing properties (cytokinine hormones)29 that can be applied to crops. Crops that are exposed to these moringa derived hormones experience accelerated growth, increased pest resistance, reduced rate of decay, larger fruit, deeper roots and greater yields by 20-35%.29

Overall despite the large attention that is being paid to the fertilizer or no fertilizer debate, there are clearly a number of elements that can be incorporated into a successful cultivation improvement strategy. First, based on the above initial studies it would prove valuable to begin employing a system that generates a sufficient amount of bio-char and moringa plant matter as growth enhancement elements. These systems can be created through focal points of land (more than likely government owned) which would be responsible for housing the pyrolysis plant(s) responsible for synthesizing the bio-char as well as growing and producing the moringa trees and the resultant green matter/ethanol solution. A percentage of plants and other biomass material would be taken from fields (only a percentage because complete removal of all refuse could be detrimental to soil quality and reduce erosion protection) and funneled to these pyrolysis plants where the resultant bio-char could be sold at the same local market as food crops from local fields that provide the bio-char. The Moringa trees could be grown near the pyrolysis plants (on the government owned land) or they could be grown on local farms.

Second, clearly a new strategy regarding the influx of water to crops needs to be established. With climate change threatening to reduce the level of rainfall in Africa, a large number of crops will not have sufficient water, which will collapse the entire structure regardless of whether or not fertilizer is used or whatever organic technique applied. One possibility to reduce (but not eliminate) the water burden would be to look into establishing a network of atmospheric water generators in the Sahara desert and other remote regions of Africa.

Third, new government-based protections need to be established under periods of emergency to avoid severe price spikes. Note that it would be difficult to grant governments any sweeping powers to control prices due to potential trade interference, but the ability to neutralize price spikes that would lead to civil unrest and/or greater starvation should be granted. In addition to greater government protections, the AGRA idea to form farmer-based cooperatives should be pursued so farmers can better work with each other to maximize profit and crop growth while generating a greater ability to negotiate on the domestic and global stage.

Fourth, improving transportation infrastructure is important because African agriculture is typically divided in smaller more numerous farm plots, not the larger plots in the developing world, thus it would be difficult to establish meaningful marketplaces in all of these regions that would have the potential to grow. Therefore, establishing better transportation routes to ferry agricultural products to a more centralized marketplace should foster better economic growth. Incorporating rail instead of road should involve less overall cost (due to future maintenance) as well as be more economically assessable to a wide variety of socioeconomic classes.

Overall despite the good initial start in the past decade, there is still much left to do in order to encourage the evolution of Africa’s agricultural system. One of the most important things that must be respected when applying a method is the future of the system. It would be irresponsible to sacrifice the future of Africa agriculture in effort to fill holes in the immediate short-term. Short-term thought is partially responsible for the problems in African agriculture to begin with, thus short-term thought cannot be used to generate a viable solution.


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18. Kendall, H.W., et Al. “Bioengineering of crops. Report of theWorld Bank Panel on Transgenic Crops.” 1997. Washington, DC: World Bank.

19. Rissler, J., & Mellon, M. “The ecological risks of engineered crops.” 1996. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

20. Snow, A., et, Al. “A BT transgene reduces herbivory and enhances fecundity in wild sunflower.” BioScience. 2003. 13: 279-286.

21. Losey, E., et, Al. “Transgenic pollen harms monarch larvae.” Nature. 1999. 399: 241.

22. Altieri, M. A., and Rosset, P. “Strengthening the case for why biotechnology will not help the developing world: Response to McGloughlin.” AgBioForum. 1999. 2: 226-236.

23. Altieri, M. A., and Rosset, P. “Ten reasons why biotechnology will not ensure food security, protect the environment and reduce poverty in the developing world.” AgBioForum. 1999. 2: 155-162.

24. Glaser, B, et, Al. “The Terra Preta phenomenon – A model for sustainable agriculture in the humid tropics.” Naturwissenschaften. 2001. 88: 37–41.

25. Glaser, B. Lehmann, J, Zech, W. “Ameliorating physical and chemical properties of highly weathered soils in the tropics with charcoal - a review.” Biology and Fertility of Soils. 2008. 35: 4.

26. Lehmann, J., and Rondon, M. “Bio-char soil management on highly-weathered soils in the humid tropics.” Biological Approaches to Sustainable Soil Systems. 2005. Boca
Raton, CRC Press, in press.

27. Lehmann, J, Gaunt, J, Rondon, M. “Bio-char sequestration in terrestrial ecosystems – a review.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change. 2006. 11: 403–427.

28. http://www.dynamotive.com/2009/05/12/blueleaf-inc-and-dynamotive-announce-biochar-test-results-cquest-biochar-enriched-plots-exhibit-overall-higher-crop-yield/

29. Foidl, Nikolaus, et, Al. “The Potential of Moringa Oleifera for Agricultural and Industrial Uses.” October 20th - November 2nd 2001. Dar Es Salaam.

The Future of Food Aid

Domestic and international food aid has origins in both altruism, through supplying essential food and other resources to those that suffer sudden losses from catastrophic events, and economic advancement, unburdening domestic marketplaces of excess supply. The continuing evolution of food aid demands focus because with the climate change challenges that will arrive in the near future, the components behind international transfer of food will become even more important. Therefore, it is important to understand the past and present of food aid and how it affects the interaction between developed nations, the typical donors, and developing nations, the typical recipients.

In the past the United States did not have entirely humanitarian motives when distributing food aid, but instead seemed primarily concerned with its own self-interests. Such an attitude was demonstrated through increases in food aid during periods of surplus production and reductions during shortfalls.1 The reason behind such a strategy was the simple economics of supply and demand. The greater the production of cereals or other agricultural type products, the lower the market price would be based on the overall scarcity of the good and the competitive environment for its sale. With farming already providing razor thin profit margins for most producers (large agro-businesses excluded), even a small reduction in price could spell disaster, so removing a significant amount of supply from the available marketplace is critical and was commonly done under the guise of food aid for another country. Even in the present, overproduction in the United States is a significant problem causing the government to subsidize a number of farmers to encourage them to not plant and harvest on their fields.

This price dilemma has existed for almost 100 years in the U.S. when surplus production (on a variety of products not just food) first threatened to diminish prices. In the beginning, two potential strategies were proposed for neutralizing the surplus and the resultant price drops. The first option was for corporations to increase wages paid to workers, so the domestic economy could better absorb the existing surpluses, thus maintaining appropriate price. The second option was to capture the foreign markets and sell the surplus abroad. The first option was commonly associated with socialism, thus leaders selected the second option. This decision created the chief motivating for foreign policy for the U.S. throughout the 20th century, economic expansion and maintaining influence on foreign markets.

Regarding this strategy one may say, ‘alright, so what if developed countries are motivated by their own economic self-interests when distributing food aid, the motivation in this situation is not important because the action itself is win-win for both sides. The developed countries get to stabilize or improve a portion of their economy and the developing country receives free food, so the citizens can spend what little money they have on other resources. Why is it such a bad thing that the developed countries are getting something out of the deal in the first place? Developed nations should not be expected to give handouts just because they can.’

Whether or not the situation is win-win is determined by the market availability of food in the recipient nation. For example in a scenario with large price spikes due to supply shortage, especially for third-world nations, most of the negative elements of food aid are marginalized. The primary negative component of food aid is that the donated food floods the marketplace in the receiving country, food prices plummet in response and the agrarian sector of the economy, which is considerably large for most countries that receive food aid, is stunted and does not grow perpetuating sub-standard economic conditions. However, a situation that results in the loss of a significant amount of supply, most likely due to a catastrophic event, will lead to an increase in price, making it more difficult for consumers to purchase food. So with higher prices, the profit per unit increases for farmers, but the volume sold heavily decreases. Under these conditions food aid is beneficial because if people cannot afford to purchase food it makes little difference who is doing the selling. The opportunity to provide food to the populous in this scenario should take priority over any short-term detriment to the economy. Dead or starving citizens are much more dangerous to the longevity of an agrarian-based economy than a short-term price drop due to a surplus of food. Although giving food to a population that has had a poor harvest or has a breakdown in the mechanisms to produce and/or distribute food self-sufficiently is certainly a win-win situation, in the past most surplus dumping created not a win-win, but a win-lose situation because these food availability breakdowns were not present. In essence this type of food distribution is not only giving the man a fish instead of teaching him to fish, but also breaks his fishing rods.

The economic ramifications of surplus dumping as food aid appear to be significant, but now the past motivation of surplus dumping for food aid seems to be just that, the past motivation. The reason for this change is that the United States, as well as other high donor nations, no longer have the vast cereal surpluses they did in the past, thus a vast majority of present food aid is now purchased from the market. For example in the past suppose Country A produced 15 million bushels of wheat which would demand a domestic price of $2 per bushel. If that $2 was not a sufficient price, 6 million bushels would be removed from the market and ‘donated’ as food aid to a developing country somewhere else in the world. Now with the wheat supply at 9 million bushels the appropriate price would increase to $3.50. Under the new supply situation the market would generate an increased gross sales total of 1.5 million more dollars against the old supply situation assuming 100% of the supply is sold in both situations. Note that this example is simply meant to describe the underlying market dynamics, clearly the numbers of unrealistic.

Under the new system instead of simply removing the wheat from the available supply, the government actually purchases the removed wheat at a given price, believe it or not typically above market rate.2 Under this new strategy, in the above scenario instead of producing 15 million bushels only 10 million are produced with 1 million being purchased. The total gross sales would be dependent on what the government pays. Due to the fact that the government is now electing to purchase the foodstuffs before giving it as aid due to less available supply, it would make sense that less food is being given as aid and that is exactly what has happened over the last decade and a half. Since 1993 global food aid has dropped consistently from a high of 17.3 million tons to only 5.9 million tons in 2007.3

Realistically it is unlikely that food aid will rebound to the levels distributed in the 90s anytime in the future due to climate change and other market influencing factors. Such a reality demands that every ton of food that is tagged for food aid needs to have a high probability of being used to assist those that it is designed to assist. This expectation requires discussing the future of food aid and its components like improved infrastructure and management of the food aid system. Currently it is difficult to conclude that the food aid command structure in the United States is operating at a sufficient level, for there are a wide variety of issues that can be improved. While some argue for a complete overhaul,2,4 such a dramatic response seems unwarranted at the current time.

Note that when most discuss food aid the term, ‘food security’, is highlighted. Food security is typically defined two ways, depending on the group. The U.S. government defines ‘food security’ as “the ability to purchase food in a global market, unimpeded by trade barriers such as tariffs, import quotas, preferential trade arrangements or production and export subsidies.”2 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as “when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food they need.”2 Neither definition is that useful because the U.S. government does not define a population expectation (does a country have food security if only 70% of the population meet the prescribed conditions) and the FAO definition is almost impossible to achieve under the common political structure of any country.

One future question is whether or not the definition of food security should move beyond simple food procurement. For instance some, like Amartya Sen, believe that food security not only involves access to food, but also other elements which improve life like healthcare, credit/loan availability, jobs, education etc.1 The idea is that food security should materialize into a factor describing the overall health of a nation instead of a stand-alone reference factor, i.e. food access is only a single element in ending hunger. Although ‘food security’ will not be debated in this post, it is important to understand that some directly apply any change in ‘food security’ when determining whether or not food aid is successful, thus the definition utilized is important.

In general food aid has to meet three criteria to officially be defined as food aid:2

1. The aid in question must involve multiple countries or agencies sponsored by or representing countries;
2. The aid must be ‘concessional’ (it must be provided free of monetary payment or at a price lower than market rate);
3. Food aid must either be actual food or in some form of tangible good of equivalent value that will be exchanged for food;

Take note of the third principle element in the definition of food aid because it will be an important consideration to a critical question later.

The FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) are the two principle non-government organizations that aid in distribution and track distribution of food aid. In 1954 the Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) was established in the FAO introducing the concept of Usual Marketing Requirement (UMR).6 The UMR outlines a minimum quantity of imports that recipient countries must make at non-concessional prices before receiving food aid in effort to neutralize market distortion and import displacement. To avoid significant disruption to necessary food aid, the UMR does not apply to emergency aid, aid stemming from charities or local purchases. Some triangular purchases are also exempt.6 In addition to the CSSD, in 1967 the Food Aid Convention (FAC) was drafted. Although it technically expired in 2002, it continues to operate under annual renewals despite negotiations for a longer-term renewal is still in limbo. The FAC aimed to establish certain rules and procedures associated with the distribution of food aid including minimum donation obligations.

Unfortunately the FAC lacks meaningful tracking or enforcement mechanisms to ensure those rules and conditions are upheld. Normally this is not a problem because the assigned minimums are typically far smaller than the actual aid given, thus there is little concern that those minimums will not be attained. Due to this lack of enforcement it is believed that only about 5% of the total global food aid between 2000 and 2002 were reported under the CSSD arm of the FAO.4,5 Although one explanation for the lack of reporting is the increasing amount of food aid that is tied to emergency aid which does not need to be reported to the CSSD.2 However, with a consistently rising percent of food aid being classified as emergency aid, if this reporting role of the CSSD is going to have any power, reporting rules will need to be adjusted. Therefore, because of these lingering problems some believe that the current FAC focuses on outdated issues and requires modernization.4 In addition to stronger enforcement and tracking, proponents of a new FAC would like to see more explicit regulations concerning membership expansion beyond donor nations to recipient nations and perhaps other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as better understanding between food donations vs. non-food donations (normally monetary donations).4 Such changes should work well at improving the logistics of food aid in the future.

Food aid can be divided into three categories, emergency, program and developmental (or project). Emergency food aid is rather self-explanatory; aid is given when a specific country suffers from an unexpected natural or man-made disaster.2,6 Developmental aid is given in effort to improve the economical infrastructure or the physical well-being of a specific country usually under some specific project (i.e. food for work, mother child nutrition centers, etc.).2,6 The last category is program aid although it is difficult to regard program aid as a genuine aid as it typically consists of government to government transfers where food is purchased with borrowed money (whether or not that money needs to be repaid is determined by the donor country), then that food is sold by the receiving government to the populous.2,7 Also program aid was the aid that was most commonly associated with surplus dumping and is typically regarded as having little influence on food security because the recipient government is in charge of distribution. A significant amount of program aid was used as a tool during the Cold War to acquire the allegiance of various foreign states against the Soviet Union.

In the past few decades, food aid distribution has demonstrated a reversal between emergency aid and program aid due to changes in the global political structure. With the ‘threat’ of Communism ending in 1989-1990 and an increasing emphasis on humanitarian aid, program aid has steadily fallen from almost 8 million tons in 1990 to less than 1 million tons (0.9) in 2007 whereas emergency aid has increased from 2.2 million tons in 1990 to over 5 million tons in 2005 before falling below 4 million in 2007. Regarding program aid South Korea is now the largest contributor through to its relationship with North Korea.3

Clearly it is important to ensure that enough food aid is provided for disaster relief, but one continuing criticism of U.S. food aid programs is that more food aid needs to be funneled towards economic improvement to lessen the demand for food aid (project aid). This contention is demonstrated in the fact that project aid has barely fluctuated in the last two decades (a slight decrease has occurred in recent years, largely due to the total drop in global food aid). Some argue that the stagnation in project aid stems from donor fatigue and lingering concerns over market distortion.7

In the future due to the specter of global warming, it is likely that emergency aid will steadily increase outpacing any real changes in project aid and program aid will continue to decrease although not vanish completely. The below figure illustrates the changes in these three programs from 1990 to 2007.3 The reason for the program aid spike in 1999 was quasi-agriculture collapse in Russia.

One of the ways that developmental aid can be increased as well as improved is altering the means of procurement. There are three ways that food aid can be procured. The first and most common, especially in the United States is direct transfer. Direct transfer involves the donor country purchasing the food that will be donated from the domestic market and then shipping that food to the receiving country. Approximately 58.6% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as direct transfers largely because over 99% of the 2.6 million tons of food aid given by the United States was through direct transfer.3

The second means is through local purchases. Local purchase procurement is exactly as it sounds, instead of acquiring the food from the supply of the donor country, the donor country purchases the aid from the recipient country. This form of food aid is popular with humanitarian and social developers because not only are the citizens of the recipient country receiving food, but also the economy of the recipient country receives the benefit of the purchase. In fact this method aids the developing nation in two ways. First, the purchase of the food improves the local economy and second the food itself aids the productivity and health of the developing nation. There are also advantages for the purchasing country, especially related to reduced costs as the market price in the developed nation is typically higher than the market price in the developing nation. In addition there are significant reductions in shipping and other overhead costs. Approximately 17.7% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as local purchases.3

The third means is through the use of middlemen, Country A purchases from Country B and then gives the Country C, otherwise known as triangular purchases. Although it initially may seem that triangular purchases simply invite inefficiency and corruption by adding another party to the mix and a local purchase should be made instead, triangular purchases do have their uses. First, triangular purchases can be utilized in the wake of an economic sanction. For example suppose Country A has a boycott on the products of Country B. Country A can still purchase food from Country C, perhaps an ally, and give that food to the citizenry of Country B as aid without generating the economic benefit in Country B which would violate the sanction. Second, suppose Country A generates a crop surplus, but neighboring countries do not have the financial capital available to purchase portions of this surplus. Leaving the surplus in Country A will be detrimental to food prices and the economy in general, so Country B, a country with the necessary finances swoops in purchases the food and then distributes it to Country C, which may not have such a bumper crop. Approximately 23.7% of all food aid in 2007 was classified as triangular purchases.3 Overall from 2003 to 2007 procurement from developing countries has increased by 69.6% (from 23% in 2003 to 39% in 2007).3

There are caveats to developmental aid. The developing nation can only produce so much food; therefore, the maximum capacity of food that can be distributed via this method is going to be lower than the amount of food distributed if the donor nation taps into its own food supply. A second concern is that if the organization purchasing the aid from a developing nation does not have the proper channels and/or connections when making the purchase, the purchase can have a detrimental influence on markets such as widening the capital gap between its citizens. Better organizational procedures and relationships between the donor and receiving country will reduce the probability of the occurrence of these caveats.

In addition to the above methodology for distributing developmental aid, another method has gained popularity in recent years. Instead of allocating food for developmental purposes, donor countries have attempted to distribute cash equal to the value of the food. In some instances there are conditions on this cash, such that it can only be used for the purchase of food and in other instances there are no conditions. Proponents of this developmental strategy heavily favor not putting any conditions on the distributed funds citing that the increased flexibility provided by unconstrained cash increases the probability of significant economic development.8 The reason behind this belief is that most individuals in the developing world that benefit from food aid have needs that extend beyond food. It is difficult to conclude that the only thing missing in their lives is sufficient food and once they acquire that food the road to economic prosperity is ensured. Some even argue that cash instead of food should be the norm for all ‘food’ aid related programs. Using cash in favor of food tends to move more towards Amartya Sen’s ideal of food security.

The problem with this belief is that frequently in emergency situations a sufficient market does not exist at a significant enough capacity to service the needs of the damaged community. Therefore, distributing cash instead of food may prove to be more volatile than beneficial. In addition there are significant logistical complications including identifying between individuals that are affected by the disaster vs. those impoverished despite the disaster vs. those simply looking to exploit the program. Just looking at all of the trouble FEMA had with corruption within their cash distribution program during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina should give one pause regarding the administration of a similar program overseas without proper testing. Despite the initial successes in pilot programs that have utilized cash aid over food aid, there are still significant organizational issues that have to be dealt with before such a change can be executed on a mass scale.

Another problem that needs to be addressed in relation to the above issues is the question of the ‘tying status’ of food aid. Tying status refers to mandates about the markets from which food aid may be sourced.1 Basically it relates to whether or not the donor has obligations to purchase the stock that will make up the food aid from a given country. Currently most of the major donors have ‘untied’ food aid in that they can provide either food or cash (and the food does not need to be purchased from the market of the donor country). However, the United States and Canada have ‘tied’ food aid systems in that food aid purchases must be made from the respective domestic market. This ‘tying status’ is the reason behind why a vast majority of the food aid that originates in the U.S. is direct transfer. Due to the fact that the United States provides approximately 44-45% of the total food aid,3 determining a uniform policy of food aid amongst donors would be useful to avoid unnecessary complexity in policy concerning developmental aid. Clearly any negotiations for such policy unification would have to include all of the most prominent donors, (the United States, the European Commission/Union, Canada, Japan and Germany).3

One issue in tied vs. non-tied is that non-tied countries (largely the European Union) believe that the U.S. is using the ‘tied’ status as a backdoor export subsidy to improve the competitiveness of U.S. farm interests. Supporters of U.S. tying do not agree and claim even if it were true, it merely evens the playing field in light of the domestic subsidies provided by European nations to their agricultural sector. Unfortunately the prospect of untying U.S. based food aid seems only temporary, if it ever happens at all, because to do so would be to challenge the political clout of the agriculture industry and farm lobby and even if successful, such action would significantly increase the probability of a defeat in the next election and re-instatement of the policy under the next Congress under the control of a new party leadership.

Another issue involved in the future role of food aid is generating a proper definition for ‘emergency’. Although the current definition may suffice for the current structure, it is reasonable to assume that certain compromises in the rules and policy surrounding developmental aid and possible changes to CSSD reporting will demand that ‘emergency’ aid be redefined. The definition of ‘emergency’ will need to be more expansive than simply what situations can be regarded as emergencies. Notably the new definition will have to include what bodies can declare an emergency for a given country, how long does an emergency last and what is its scope (who is affected by the emergency in the given country).

With all that has been said about food aid, how great of an influence does it have on domestic price? Overall it is difficult to identify an exact significance of influence. When looking at the raw numbers food aid does not appear to be that useful. For example interpolating from given data in 2009 approximately 232.23 kg is consumed per day per person in Sub-Saharan Africa.9 Therefore, the amount of food that was donated to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (3.19 million tons)3 could feed 34,141 people for an entire year or 12,461,436 people for a single day. Although those seem like big numbers, when taking into consideration the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has a population over 680 million people, the overall aid does not seem as impressive. However, the very fact that surplus dumping is really not practiced anymore as well as that over 50% of the aid given to Sub-Saharan Africa is of the emergency variety, it is difficult to concluded, despite what the numbers may say, that food aid does not have some significant influence in these countries. A supporting piece of evidence to this influence is that food distribution from WFP has reached between 50 to 100 million people, although not all in Sub-Saharan Africa, since 1996.10

Due to the fact that food aid has a high potential to provide a significant price signal in developing nations, there are two main issues that need to be addressed concerning the future of food aid. First, a specific definition regarding ‘food aid’ needs to be designated. For instance as discussed above, some individuals/groups support giving cash equivalent instead of food in response to an emergency or for developmental reasons. In addition there has been significant discussion regarding when food aid is actually an appropriate resource for addressing food insecurity. Studies exist that direct cash payment is a better tool to neutralize food insecurity when the region in question has functional markets.5,11 However, is it the responsibility of food aid programs to distribute cash instead of food? There are no assurances that the cash will be utilized to purchase food. Ironically this lack of certainty is one of the reasons that cash instead of food receives support. Thus, is there a defining line between general charity and ‘food aid’ and if so what is it and if not should there be? The reason this question is important is it facilitates the broader issue of what is the responsibility of those in the developed world to aid in the economic development of the developing world? Providing cash implies they have a much greater responsibility than if they were only to provide food.

Second, the logistics that govern food aid need to be improved significantly, especially involving communication between the donor and the recipient. One of the main issues with logistic reform is changing the mindset to add a level of analysis to resource distribution. Instead of simply throwing large quantities of food over a large region, specific analysis must be made of different segments of that region to determine where the food aid is needed most and where it is need least. In addition evidentiary analysis must be conducted regarding the effectiveness of the food aid in the given region, why it is successful or why it is failing and take steps to replicate the successes or remedy the failures. It is important that objectivity be practiced in this information gathering and analysis because if these considerations are tied to the donor or an operational agency (NGO, etc.) it will be difficult to evade questions of impartiality.

Improved analysis of regionality livelihood is an important element to understanding and dismantling the infamous ‘poverty trap’. Poverty traps are situations where individuals are unable to become prosperous on their own largely due to a lack of access to resources, but if given a small amount of assets the possibility for sustained financial improvement increases significantly. This ‘access to small assets’ philosophy is the motivation behind programs that administer micro-loans within developing nations, a system that provides the necessary assets to escape the ‘poverty trap’. Although, depending on the answer to the first question about the specific role of food aid, food aid may not be the means utilized for escaping ‘poverty traps’.

Analysis of the ‘poverty trap’ question leads to the contention regarding the importance of targeting. One of the biggest concerns about even the most organized food aid program is that the aid will never reach those that require it the most, either because those individuals are not properly identified or the aid is intercepted by those in power and not properly distributed. Normally there are two categories for errors in targeting, errors of inclusion (food aid provided to those that would have purchased it or receiving too much) and errors of exclusion (those that need the aid do not receive it or receive too little).12 In addition there is still the lingering question regarding the total influence that food aid has on the economic fortunes of the receiving nation. These concerns invoke the issue of how long should food aid be distributed over a given region, how much food aid should be distributed, what is the optimal time frame for distribution and what should be the medium of distribution to avoid distributing it to those that do not need it?

Unfortunately these distribution questions are difficult due to lack of regionalized economic information, lack of access and/or lack of infrastructure. For instance the biggest problem concerning distribution is the medium of distribution due to the lack of infrastructure. Most of the transportation mechanisms in poorer countries consist of dirt roads or nothing at all. To make matters worse these mediums are typically controlled by significant powerbrokers that are more likely to keep the aid for themselves than to assist in its distribution to others. These problems with identifying and utilizing a medium of distribution generate significant delays in delivery of the food aid.

For example even when the proper targets are identified and the appropriate amount of aid is allocated the average time from a call forward to delivery of U.S. food aid is approximately five months (and U.S. food aid distribution operates at the fastest average delivery time over relatively similar distances).2,5 Although some of this time delay can be attributed to the direct transfer methodology, the lack of transportation infrastructure is also an important factor. This delay also compounds the problem of determining the amount of allocation because in the typical situation one cannot identify a poor harvest season with any level of accuracy until at least June meaning that the earliest food aid will arrive to the struggling country is in November. Therefore, rapid response is almost impossible, which is the very point of emergency-driven food aid.

Some have proposed cutting down on delivery times by creating more on-site storage facilities. Unfortunately the proper management and structure of such resources are highly dependent on a stable government and the rule of law; otherwise they are highly vulnerable to political manipulation, raiding and selective dispersal.13 Such a lack of access would increase the probability of civil unrest amongst the population during food shortages. Others argue that local purchase is the proper strategy to eliminate most of the problems with the medium of distribution and the time delay; however, such a strategy heavily favors developmental aid not emergency aid due to disrupted markets and/or lower than anticipated crop yields. Also local food purchase harkens back to the first question regarding the role of food aid. Either way, improved logistics and analysis will not be able to eliminate these problems, but it will make it easier to manage them.

Similar to the ‘poverty trap’, analysis of how the food aid is utilized once it reaches the appropriate individual is important in order to understand the nature and probability of dependency. To better understand food aid dependency take the issue of welfare. One of the main concerns raised by those that oppose the welfare system in the United States is the belief that welfare recipients will become dependent on welfare and never seek to improve their lives to the point where the welfare is no longer required. The main flaw with this dependency mindset is that most individuals do not like the fact that they require such drastic assistance and would rather do without such aid, if possible.

The concern of dependency operates the same way in the developing world; in some respects food aid can be viewed as a weaker form of welfare for the developing world. In economically struggling communities, especially ones that have disrupted markets due to a recent disaster, there exists the potential for despair and diminished incentives, which can increase the probability that individuals rely on food aid instead of working to improve his/her economical situation. Therefore, improved analysis can increase the probability that food aid will be utilized as a stopgap measure in troubled times instead of a permanent expectation. It must be noted that some believe that dependency on food aid is an impossible outcome because food aid typically arrives too late at an insufficient quantity. Basically food aid is too unreliable to form any level of dependency, thus without this certainty individuals instead look to acquire alternative sources of food.14,15

The process of donating food aid to a less fortunate country is a practice that should be continued; however, it is important that such a program be carried out for the right reasons. A country should be cautious about giving food aid to a country unless they ask for it or if a disaster has destabilized food production and/or distribution channels in a country where supply is negatively affected. However, such an implication means that food aid cannot be a permanent fixture in a country. Unfortunately as previously discussed if the food prices and supply in the developing world are still influenced by the food prices and supply in the developed world not enough separation has been created between the necessity of food aid and events that may necessitate food aid. The first step to widening this gap is improving the ability of local agricultural markets in the developing world to provide sufficient food for the local population, an issue that will be addressed in the next post.

==
1. Maxwell, Daniel. “Global Trends in Food Aid.” Khartoum Food Aid Forum. June 6-8, 2006.

2. Murphy, Sophia and McAfee, Kathleen. “U.S. Food Aid: Time to Get It Right.” Minneapolis: The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. July 2005.

3. “2007 Food Aid Flows.” World Food Programme. International Food Aid Information System. 2008.

4. Barrett, C., and Maxwell, D. “Towards A Global Food Aid Compact.” Food Policy. 2006. 31: 105–118.

5. Barrett, C., and Maxwell, D. “Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role.” 2005.

6. Clay, E. and Benson, C. “Acquisition of commodities in developing countries
for food aid in the 1980s,” Food Policy. 1990. 15(1): 27-43.

7. Russo, L, et, Al. “Joint evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of the enabling development policy of the World Food Programme.” Rome, Italy, Developer’s Research Network, Aide à la Décision Economique, Groupe-conseil Baastel ltée, Eco Consulting Group, and Nordic Consulting Group. 2005.

8. Overseas Development Institute. “Cash and Emergency Relief: Conference Report.” London. 2005.

9. “3. Global and regional food consumption patterns and trends.” World Health Organization.
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index.html.

10. Sarah Lowder and Terri Raney Food Aid: A Primer Agricultural and Development Economics Division ESA Working Paper No. 05-05 June 2005.

11. Devereux, S. “Identification of Methods for Emergency Assessments to Distinguish Between Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity, and to Evaluate the Effects of Shocks.” SENAC Project, World Food Programme, Emergency Needs Assessment Branch, Rome. 2006.

12. Gebremedhin, B., and Swinton, S.M. “Reconciling food-for-work project feasibility with food aid targeting in Tigray, Ethiopia.” Food Policy. 2001. 26(1): 85–95.

13. Devereux, S. “The Malawi Famine of 2002: Causes, Consequences and Policy Lessons.” Brighton: IDS. 2002.

14. Abdulai, A., Barrett. C., and Hoddinott, J. “Does food aid really have disincentive effects?
New evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Development. 2005. 33(10): 1689-1704.

15. Lentz, E., Barrett, C., and Hoddinott, J. “Food Aid and Dependency: Implications for
Emergency Food Security Assessments.” SENAC Project, World Food Programme,Emergency Needs Assessment Branch, Rome. 2005.